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1Introduction
“All models are wrong, but some are
useful."
— George E P Box (1919-2013)
The brain is a very impressive organ. It is made up of an estimated 85
billion neurons (Azevedo et al., 2009) interconnected by 100− 500 trillion
synapses. Neurons communicate with each other by sending electrical
impulses, called spikes, that influence the receiving neuron depending
on the synaptic strength of the connection1. It is widely believed that the
connection pattern between neurons and the synaptic strengths represent
everything that you know about the world.
One of the most useful properties of the brain is that it can learn new
ideas and skills, such as riding a bike or calculus. Learning involves chang-
ing the connection patterns and synaptic strengths in the brain. If you ever
had a pet dog, you know you can train animals to do tricks, just by reward-
ing them for desired behavior. Somehow, by giving rewards, we can rewire
the brains of animals to perform interesting behaviors (though see Breland
and Breland, 1961). With this thesis I hope to contribute to the understand-
ing this type of learning. The work in this thesis builds on ideas in animal
learning, the mathematical framework of reinforcement learning, neuro-
science and artificial neural networks. In the remainder of this chapter I
will give a birds-eye overview of the context in which this thesis fits, and in
the last section I will give an outline of the thesis.
1This holds for chemical synapses, which are the most common in the brain (Gerstner and
Kistler, 2002).
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1.1 Animal Learning
The scientific study of animal learning started at the beginning of the 20th
century with the work of Ivan Pavlov and Edward Thorndike. Pavlov is most
well known for his conditioning experiments with dogs (Pavlov, 1928). He
trained dogs to associate a stimulus (e.g. a bell) with receiving a bite of food
a short while later. Normally, dogs start to salivate when they are presented
with food, but after a number of co-occurrences of the bell and the food, the
dogs would start salivating at the sound of the bell. The physical process of
salivation thus showed that the dog ‘expected’ to receive food after hearing
the bell; a conditioned reflex. Learning to associate a stimulus with a reward
or punishment in this way is called classical or Pavlovian conditioning.
Although Thorndike is less well known than Pavlov, his work was both
earlier and perhaps more general. One limitation of the work of Pavlov is
that animals did not need to do anything in order to receive their rewards,
while in the real world animals need to perform actions to achieve their
goals. Thorndike devised puzzle boxes in which he placed animals that
had to find a way to escape from the box, for instance by pressing a button
or pulling a lever (Thorndike, 1898). When the animal finally escaped,
it was rewarded with food. By plotting the amount of time that it took
animals to escape from the box over subsequent trials, Thorndike could
show that learning typically followed an ‘S’ shape—animals were slow to
escape in the beginning, then ‘discovered’ the trick and got faster and faster
at escaping the box, and finally the escape times reached a minimum. Based
on these experiments he formulated a theory of learning. The two main
elements of this theory were that animals learn by trial-and-error, and that
behavior follows the law of effect—actions that tend to be followed by a
positive outcome become more likely and actions that tend to be followed
by negative outcomes become less likely to be executed by the animal.
Thorndike also seems to have coined the term reinforcement: strengthening
a certain behavior by giving rewards. The type of learning that ThorndikeReinforcement
studied is now called instrumental or operant conditioning, contrasting
with the classical conditioning studied by Pavlov. In general both classical
and operant conditioning are forms of associative learning.
The experiments above make clear that animals can learn associations
between stimuli and sequences of actions that lead to rewarding outcomes,
but the theories that were developed were word theories. The problem with
word theories is that they are vague. For instance, what exactly does the law
of effect predict? How does the probability of executing an action (e.g.
pressing a button) change after the animal successfully escapes from the
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puzzle box after pressing this button? Word theories are fundamentally
different from the mathematical theories that allow precise predictions in
physics, e.g. it is possible to predict quite precisely how much time it takes
for a ball to fall to the ground from any specified height quite accurately,
given that we know the relevant parameters (mass, size, spin of the ball,
atmospheric conditions, etc.). In the 20th century various mathematical
models of learning were developed, e.g. in the branch of mathematical
psychology with prominent researchers such as Hull, Bush and Mosteller
(see e.g. Lovie, 2005; Niv, 2009, and references therein for a more detailed
history)—the most pertinent to our discussion is the framework of
Reinforcement Learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) to which I will turn next.
1.2 Reinforcement learning
The aim of the Reinforcement Learning (RL, Sutton and Barto, 1998) Reinforcement
Learning (RL)framework is to understand how intelligent agents can learn to achieve
goals while interacting with a (possibly stochastic) environment. The
explicit sequential nature of the learning problem is what sets RL apart
from other problems in machine learning, such as classification and
supervised learning. Learning in the RL framework is very similar
to animal learning; the algorithms learn by interacting with their
environment in a trial-and-error fashion. Under certain conditions it can be
guaranteed that the algorithms will learn the optimal sequence of actions,
where optimality is defined as a function of the total possible reward that
the agent manages to extract from the environment.
The mathematical framework of Reinforcement Learning is based on the
experimental results of animal learning and on the framework of dynamic
programming from optimal control theory (Bellman, 1957). Sutton and
Barto (1998) trace the roots of computational investigations into trial-and-
error learning to work by Minsky (1954) and Farley and Clark (1954) in
the 1950s, through work by Klopf in the 1980’s. A very readable account of
the historical background of RL can be found in (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
A good review that focusses on the links between neuroscience and RL is
Niv (2009). In the next chapter I will formally introduce the RL framework,
focussing on the concepts relevant to this thesis.
Temporal difference learning and the reward-prediction error
theory of dopamine
One of the most powerful ideas in RL is the concept of temporal difference Temporal
Difference (TD)
learning3
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Figure 1.1: Dopamine neurons code for reward prediction errors. Left, an unexpected
reward (R) occurs. Middle, a reward occurs after a conditioned stimulus (CS). Right,
no reward occurs after the conditioned stimulus. The graphs show peristimulus time
histograms (top) of spike rates of a single dopamine neuron over multiple trials (bottom).
The figure is adapted from Schultz, Dayan, and Montague (1997).
(TD) learning. TD learning is powerful because it allows agents to learn
rewarding behaviors purely by interacting with their environment, in
contrast to for instance dynamic programming techniques that require
detailed knowledge about the environment. A second important property
is that TD learning methods learn by bootstrapping—they learn to improve
their own estimates by experience, by building on their own earlier
estimates.
The RL framework is agnostic about the learning agent—it could be a
brain, but it could also be a set of tables in computer memory. It also does
not specify how the learning agent actually implements the algorithms. It
was therefore a groundbreaking discovery that certain neurons seem to
encode exactly the temporal difference error (Montague, Dayan, and
Sejnowski, 1996; Schultz, Dayan, and Montague, 1997) I discussed above.
These midbrain (or, mesencephalic) dopamine neurons2 in the substantiaDopamine
neuron nigra and ventral tegmental area (VTA) project diffusely throughout the
brain, and can thus inform large areas of the cortex about temporal
difference errors.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the prediction error behavior of dopamine
neurons under various conditions. In the left panel, an untrained monkey
receives a reward (a drop of fruit juice) in the absence of any prediction,
leading to a positive prediction error. The dopamine neuron shows a burst
of activity on the delivery of this unexpected reward. The middle panel of
Figure 1.1 shows the behavior of a dopamine neuron after the animal is
2Dopamine neurons are neurons that release the neurotransitter dopamine. Neurotrans-
mitters are chemicals that can transmit information from one neuron to another. When I refer
to dopamine, I always refer to brain dopamine.
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trained to associate a stimulus with a reward that is delivered slightly later
(i.e. a conditioned stimulus)—the stimulus thus predicts the reward.
Dopamine neurons now burst in response to the onset of the stimulus, and
not when the reward is actually delivered. Why? Clearly, the arrival of the
conditioned stimulus predicts that a drop of fruit juice will arrive shortly,
so this gives a positive prediction error3. The reward, which occurs exactly
as predicted, does not. Finally, when the trained monkey is presented with
the reward predicting stimulus but the reward is withheld, the dopamine
neuron shows a dip relative to its baseline activation at the time that the
reward was expected (Figure 1.1, right): there is a negative prediction error
because the expected reward did not materialize. These patterns also hold
for instrumental tasks, where the animals have to perform actions in order
to get their reward (e.g. Schultz, Apicella, and Ljungberg, 1993).
The temporal difference learning interpretation of dopamine signaling
establishes a bridge between animal learning and the theoretical
framework of reinforcement learning, and it is one of the greatest successes
of computational neuroscience to date.
Dopamine can influence the synaptic plasticity between neurons, and in
this way the global reward prediction error can influence learning (see e.g.
Wise, 2004). However, the dopamine signal in itself is not enough to explain
learning: synaptic plasticity needs to be constrained to those synapses that
were actually responsible for the observed reward prediction errors; the
models we developed in this thesis offer one possible mechanism for how
this could be implemented in the brain.
Although I emphasized the temporal difference interpretation of
dopamine in this thesis, there is significant evidence that dopamine has
more functions. For instance, firing rates of midbrain dopamine neurons
also seem to be influenced by motivation (Dayan and Balleine, 2002; Satoh
et al., 2003), reflect salient stimuli (Horvitz, 2000; Redgrave, Prescott, and
Gurney, 1999), reward uncertainty (Fiorillo, 2003), and the start of new
trials (Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, and Hikosaka, 2010a, although these
results might be explained by TD given timing uncertainty). Some authors
have even suggested different interpretations of the DA signal, for instance
Redgrave and Gurney (2006) suggest it has an important role in the
discovery of new actions. Further, working memory representations in
prefrontal cortex have been shown to be sensitive to dopamine levels
(Vijayraghavan et al., 2007; Williams and Goldman-Rakic, 1995), implying
that dopamine plays a more direct role in working memory tasks than just
3Please see secion 2.1 in the next chapter for a mathematical description of TD learning.
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influencing synaptic plasticity as I assumed in this thesis.
Dopamine is also not the only neurotransmitter that is associated with
learning and signaling rewards. Other neurotransmitters that seem to
be involved are Acetylcholine (ACh, Kilgard and Merzenich (1998)
and Richardson and DeLong (1986)) and Norepinephrine (NE). One
interpretation is that these neurotransmitters are important for informing
the brain about ‘expected’ and ‘unexpected’ uncertainty (Yu and Dayan,
2005). These functions are related to model-based reinforcement learning
(see section 2.1), which is beyond the scope of this thesis, although I think
it will be extremely worthwhile to combine such methods with ours. Very
recent work seems to indicate that 5-HT (Serotonin) and Glutamate might
also be involved in signaling rewards (Liu et al., 2014).
The agents in this thesis consisted of simple rate-coding artificial neural
networks, and the models we developed demonstrate how such networks
can be trained by reinforcement learning, combining ideas from biology,
artificial neural networks and RL. In the next section I briefly discuss the
history of artificial neural networks and then discuss why we chose this
model.
1.3 Artificial Neural Networks
Barto and Sutton (Barto, Sutton, and Brouwer, 1981) and others (Rumelhart,
Hinton, and Williams, 1986) also revived the idea that networks of ‘artificial’
neurons might be relevant for developing artificial intelligence.
The first artificial neural networks were developed in the 1940’s by
McCulloch and Pitts (1943) and later by Widrow and Hoff (1960) and
Rosenblatt (1962). These networks were loosely inspired by the brain, and
consist of simple binary units4 called perceptrons5 that sum the inputs they
receive, weighted by connection strengths (synapses) and ‘fire’ when the
input exceeded a threshold. While there was initially a lot of excitement
about these models, they were found to be fundamentally limited (Minsky
and Papert, 1969).
The general belief is that Minsky and Papert (1969) showed that
single layer neural networks6 are unable to solve problems that require
non-linear transformations, such as the famous exclusive OR problem, but
this is in fact not true (see e.g. Bishop, 1995). If perceptrons receive inputs
4I use the term ‘units’ to refer to model neurons, so that ‘neuron’ is reserved for the
biological variety.
5Also known as semi-linear, linear threshold, adaLines, or McCulloch-Pitts units.
6In this thesis I use the term layer to refer to a layer of plastic connection weights.
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from an carefully selected set of fixed pre-processing units (or, basis
functions) it can be shown that they can solve any classification problem7.
What Minsky and Papert actually demonstrated is that single layer
networks with pre-determined and fixed pre-processing units cannot be
guaranteed to solve any problem without an extremely large set of such
pre-processing units (exponential in the dimension of the problem). This
severely limits the practical value of single layer perceptrons. Furthermore,
although the theoretical results in the book are restricted to single
layer networks, the authors made the strong conjecture that a quest for
multi-layer learning rules would be sterile (Minsky and Papert, 1969, p.
231-232). After the publication of the book, many researchers thought it
implied neural networks would never solve any real problems, and thus
lost interest. The abandonment of connectionism, led, amongst other
disappointments with Artificial Intelligence (such as the failure of expert
systems and machine translation to live up to their hype) to a period called
the ‘AI-winter’.
A breakthrough came with the popularization of the error-back-
propagation algorithm (Rumelhart, Hinton, and Williams, 1986), a
powerful and efficient method for learning in essentially arbitrary
network structures, and in specific in multi-layered networks with
sigmoidal non-linear units as “neurons”. Error-backpropagation is based
on gradient-descent, and provides a very efficient and simple way to
do the required computations. For a gradient-based method to work,
small changes in synaptic weights need to result in small changes in the
output of units, a condition that is not met by the threshold function of
the perceptrons discussed above. Replacing discrete thresholds with
smooth (differentiable) activation functions solves this problem. In the
next chapter, I will discuss backpropagation in detail. Although the
error-backpropagation algorithm provides us with a recipe for determining
synaptic updates in networks of neuron-like elements, it has various
problems as a model for learning in the brain, as I will also discuss in the
next chapter.
Like the typical artificial neural networks used in machine learning, the
models we developed in this thesis had two layers of plastic weights, and
the units have smooth, differentiable, activation functions. This is quite
7Such ideas are still widely used, for instance in Support Vector Machines (Boser, Guyon,
and Vapnik, 1992) and Echo/Liquid state machines (Jaeger, 2001; Maass, Natschläger, and
Markram, 2002). There is even neurophysiological evidence that the brain might use random
projections (Luo, Axel, and Abbott, 2010).
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an abstraction from real brains—in the next section I will discuss why we
chose this level of modeling.
1.4 The Level of Modeling
A term that is used often in this thesis is biologically plausible, and it isBiologically
Plausible fruitful to elaborate on exactly what I mean with this term. The models that
are described in this thesis are all abstract rate coding networks8, in the
tradition of the neural networks that were popularized in the 1980’s. These
models contain many elements which are known to conflict with biology, a
simple example being that synaptic weights in biological neuronal networks
are either excitatory or inhibitory9—synapses have never been observed to
change their ‘sign’. In our models, we do however assume that connection
weights can change ‘sign’10. Another assumption is that units in our models
communicate by a firing rate (the number of spikes per second), while there
is ample experimental evidence that in many settings the temporal details
of the spike train matter (see e.g. Gerstner and Kistler, 2002; Rieke, 1999,
for an in-depth discussion).
How can we call models that go against basic neuroscientific facts bio-
logically plausible? This depends on the level of modeling that one chooses.
There is a whole continuum of different levels of modeling, from detailed
molecular level models of neurons to very abstract mean field models that
describe the dynamics of whole populations of neurons. One important ob-
servation was made by the statistician George E P Box (1919-2013): “essen-
tially, all models are wrong, but some are useful”. One can take the most de-
tailed biophysical model that has been made to date and point out where
the model does not match biology. Further, there are many details about
biology which are completely unknown to us. For instance, the biological
machinery of synapses is nothing short of astounding, even at the level of
understanding we have now (e.g. Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell, 2013). In
short, any model that will ever be made of the brain will be in some sense
biologically implausible. The key is in the ‘usefulness’ of models.
I believe that the chosen level of abstraction can inform us about the
brain, given that some assumptions hold. The first one is that the detailed
spike-by-spike level is not relevant for the tasks that we want to model and
the second one is that the behavior of excitatory and inhibitory neurons can
8This type of model can be derived from the Hodgkin-Huxley equations (Hodgkin and
Huxley, 1952) however.
9This is called Dale’s principle, or Dale’s Law.
10Though see section 2.2 for ideas on how this assumption can be relaxed.
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be described by a unit type that allows for positive and negative connection
weights and switches in sign. What I then mean by biologically plausible
is that all information that is required to determine connection weight
changes is available locally, at the synapse.
We are not the first who have tried to build biologically plausible neural
networks that can be trained by reinforcement learning, and our approach
is certainly not the most biologically detailed. What I believe sets our
methods apart from other work is that they show how to train multi-layer
networks by RL, while others have mostly worked on training essentially
single layer networks11 (see e.g. Potjans, Morrison, and Diesmann, 2009;
Soltani and Wang, 2009; Urbanczik and Senn, 2009). While single layer
networks can be useful, they are limited in the types of problems that they
can solve (as was famously discovered in the context of perceptrons, see
section 1.3). Multi-layered networks have the ability to learn representations
that are not explicitly given to them (e.g. the concept ‘chair’ from the widely
different examples of chairs in the world). It is a widely held belief that the
brain works by building on layers of such representations to deal with the
complexity of the world (see e.g. Fukushima, 1980; Serre et al., 2007). Deep
learning machine learning approaches that use this idea are currently the
state of the art (Ciresan et al., 2010; Hinton and Salakhutdinov, 2006; Le et
al., 2012). Very recently, similar ideas have also been applied in the context
of reinforcement learning, yielding state-of-the-art performance (and even
outperforming human experts) on various ATARI games (Mnih et al., 2013).
While such pure machine learning approaches are more powerful than the
models we introduce here, these methods also clearly show the potential of
moving beyond single layer models.
1.5 Outline of the thesis
In the next chapter I will introduce the framework of reinforcement learn-
ing, artificial neural networks and the ideas of the Attention-Gated Learn-
ing (AGREL, Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005) framework on which the rest
of the thesis builds.
The work in this thesis was aimed at investigating whether the key
ideas of AGREL could be extended to work for more general problems than
the tasks described in Roelfsema and van Ooyen (2005). In chapter 3, I
introduce the first generalization of the AGREL framework, MQ-AGREL.
11More specifically, only a single layer of plastic weights; the networks may have arbitrary
hardwired (non-learned) components.
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This chapter contains two new ideas; first, it replaces the action-probability
learning mechanism of AGREL with an action-value learning mechanism,
giving a clear interpretation of what the AGREL network tries to learn.
Second, I show that attention-gated learning can be generalized to learning
multiple simultaneous actions, instead of single binary actions, while
learning is still driven by a scalar prediction error signal.
The AGREL and MQ-AGREL models are both limited to direct-reward
reinforcement learning, whereas in most real world tasks animals need
to learn sequences of actions in order to gain food or other rewards. In
many real world tasks, one also needs some form of working memory,
for example for choosing the right direction at an intersection based on a
road-sign some hundreds of meters before. In chapter 4, I introduce the
Attention Gated MEmory Tagging (AuGMEnT) model which generalizes
the ideas of MQ-AGREL from direct-reward reinforcement learning to
sequential reinforcement learning. The model extends beyond standard
reinforcement learning approaches because it contains a set of memory
cells that allow it to learn tasks that require working memory. I use the
AuGMEnT model introduced to model four different working memory tasks
from the neuroscience literature, and we show that the model is able to
1) learn the same tasks as monkeys and 2) that the representations that
are formed in trained networks are similar to those found in monkeys
when they are trained on the same tasks. In chapter 5, I investigate how
AuGMEnT learns an attentional filtering task by trial-and-error learning.
An assumption we make in AuGMEnT is that there is a mechanism that
informs the network that it has reached the end of a trial and that it should
reset its working memory before a new trial starts. Animals learning similar
tasks however need to learn when trials begin and end, which may not be
a trivial feat. In chapter 6, I extend the AuGMEnT framework to learn to
recognize trial boundaries, enabling the network to learn complete tasks
purely by reinforcement learning.
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2Background
This chapter introduces the mathematical framework and notation that we
use throughout the thesis. We start with the description of the Reinforce-
ment Learning framework, then discuss Artificial Neural Networks, and
finally we discuss the main ideas of the AGREL model, which forms the ba-
sis for this thesis. Those familiar with reinforcement learning (RL) and arti-
ficial neural networks can skip directly to the last paragraph of section 2.2.
2.1 Reinforcement Learning
As discussed in chapter 1, Reinforcement Learning is aimed at understand-
ing how intelligent agents can learn to achieve goals while interacting with
a (possibly stochastic) environment (Sutton and Barto, 1998). One of the ba-
sic assumptions of RL is that the goal of any animal is to maximize the total
reward it can extract from the environment. It is also an assumption that
all rewards (e.g. food or drinks) can be expressed as scalar values r. We give
a short overview of the concepts from RL that are especially relevant in the
context of this thesis, where we mostly follow Sutton and Barto (1998).
Markov Decision Process
The standard framework in Reinforcement Learning is called a Markov
Decision Process (MDP). The interaction between an agent and its Markov Decision
Process (MDP)environment in an MDP is visualized in Figure 2.1. The standard RL
framework assumes that time t is discrete, and that there is a finite and
discrete set of world states S and actions A. At every time t, the agent
receives a scalar reward r(t) and a representation of the world state s(t) ∈ S .
It responds by selecting an action a(t) ∈ A(s)1, and the environment
responds to the action by emitting a new state s(t + 1) and a reward r(t + 1).
1This notation allows for the possibility that not all actions might be possible in state s.
We will write A as a shorthand, with the understanding that the set is possibly limited given
the state s.
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Agent
Environment
s(t)
r(t)
State
Reward
Action
a(t)
r(t+ 1)
s(t+ 1)
Figure 2.1: Diagram of the interaction between an agent and its environment (task).
Based on figure 3.1 in Sutton and Barto (1998)
The transitions between states given actions are represented by the
transition matrix P : S ×A×S → [0,1] mapping from (state,action) pairs to
a probability distribution over possible successor states. The shorthand P s′sa
is used to refer to the probability of transitioning from state s to s′ given
that action a is selected in s.
A reward matrix R : S × A × S → R maps any possible transition to
a scalar reward r, and the shorthand Rs′sa is used to refer to the expected
reward (since rewards may also be stochastic) for choosing action a in state
s and transitioning to state s′ .
The tuple 〈S ,A,P ,R〉 completely defines the MDP. The word ‘Markov’
refers to the assumption that all the information for taking the optimal
decision at any time t is contained in the state2 s(t) (to be more precise,
this is first order Markov, which is default in most work). Technically,
this is expressed as equality between the following conditional probability
distributions:
P
[
s(t + 1) = s′ , r(t + 1) = r | s(0), a(0), r(0), . . . , s(t), a(t), r(t)] =
P
[
s(t + 1) = s′ , r(t + 1) = r | s(t), a(t)] , (2.1)
for all s′ , r and all histories s(0), a(0), r(0) . . . s(t), a(t), r(t). This means that the
state s′ and reward r ′ at time t + 1 only depend on the state and action at
time t—the agent could not do better by having more information. In many
real world problems the Markov assumption is clearly false, and in specific
2To avoid confusion, ‘state’ in standard RL refers to a signal given to the agent (Sutton
and Barto, 1998), not the true hidden state of the world as in generative models or Partially
Observable MDPs (see below).
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it is false in the domain of working memory tasks that we will discuss from
chapter 4 onwards; such tasks fall in the domain of Partially Observable
MDPs.
Partially Observable MDPs In a partially observable MDP it is assumed
that (some of) the state variables of the world are hidden or latent, i.e.
that they are never directly observed, but have to be inferred from
observations3. Following Kaelbling, Littman, and Cassandra (1996), a
POMDP can be described as a tuple 〈S ,A,T ,R,Ω,O〉, where S ,A,T ,R
would define a standard MDP as defined in the previous section, Ω
the (finite) set of observations that the agent can experience and O an
S ×A→Π(Ω) observation function, mapping from each action and resulting
state to a probability distribution over observations.
An important construct in the POMDP framework is the belief state.
Since the agent does not observe in which true world state it is, it estimates
the probability that it is in any of the possible world states. This belief state
should capture the sufficient statistics about the history of the agent, i.e. it
should contain all the relevant information that can be extracted from the
past to make optimal decisions at the current time. A component called
the state estimator is responsible for updating the belief state given the last
action, the current observation and the last belief state. This is done using
Bayes’ rule, which is relatively straightforward if one has access to the true
underlying probabilistic model, as is often assumed4. Finally, a controller
(policy) maps the belief state to the optimal action.
Traditionally, POMDP problems are more seen as planning problems
(model-based) than as learning problems, in that it is often assumed that
the agents have access to the structure of the POMDP model, and that they
only need to find the optimal (action) value function (Kaelbling, Littman,
and Cassandra, 1996). Bayes Adaptive (PO)MDPs (Duff, 2002; Ross, Chaib-
draa, and Pineau, 2007) can additionally learn the model parameters (e.g.
the transition function). More recently there has been work on learning
POMDP model parameters and structure from scratch, see for instance
Doshi-Velez (2009), which we believe to be an important direction in RL
research.
The models for learning working memory tasks we have developed
(chapter 4 and onwards) do not make use of an explicit belief state, rather,
3But note that MDPs are a subset of POMDPs.
4If you do not, there are full Bayesian formulations for both MDPs and POMDPs, called
Bayes-Adaptive MDPs (BAMDPs, see Duff, 2002, and references therein) and Bayes-Adaptive
POMDPs (Ross, Chaib-draa, and Pineau, 2007), respectively.
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the models’ task can be seen as constructing useful internal states (in the
first order Markov sense) based on incoming sensations. They are aimed at a
subset of the general POMDP problem, namely problems that can be solved
by remembering (some) information about past observations (although a
full history model would be equivalent to belief states). For now, we shall
return to the discussion of the standard MDP framework of RL.
Episodic and infinite horizon tasks
It is convenient to expand the set of states S with a special terminal or
absorbing state, which can only transition to itself with a reward of 0. TheTerminal state
extended set of states is written S+. This addition is useful because it allows
for the treatment of terminating, episodic (achievement/finite horizon)
tasks and for non-terminating (maintenance/infinite horizon) tasks in the
same framework. An example of the former is navigating though a maze,
from start to end, and an example of the latter is maintaining a certain
temperature in a room by controlling a heating element.
We can now formally state the goal of an agent as maximizing, at each
time-step, the expected future discounted reward5 (also termed discountedExpected future
discounted
reward
return) E[Rt], with Rt :
Rt =
∞∑
k=0
γkr(t + k + 1) , (2.2)
where γ ∈ [0,1] is called the discount rate. This discount rate expressesDiscount rate, γ .
mathematically that a reward now is more valuable than the same reward at
a later point in time. If γ < 1 and all |r | <∞, the expected future discounted
reward is finite. This is essential, because an agent performing an infinite
horizon task with γ = 1 cannot distinguish between different actions since
all yield an infinite total reward6.
Value functions
The behavior of an agent can be summarized by its policy pi(a | s), which
gives the probability that the agent selects action a in state s. The policy
allows us to specify an important quantity, the state value Vpi(s):state value
5Note that there are alternative objective functions, such as for instance the total (i.e.
non-discounted) return, or the expected reward per unit time.
6Note however that one could optimize the rate of rewards instead of the expected future
discounted reward.
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Vpi(s) = Epi {Rt | s(t) = s} ,
= Epi
 ∞∑
k=0
γkr(t + k + 1) | S(t) = s
 by (2.2) ,
= Epi
r(t + 1) + ∞∑
k=1
γkr(t + k + 1) | S(t) = s
 ,
=
∑
a∈A(s)
pi(a | s)
∑
s′∈S
P s′sa
Rs′sa +γEpi
 ∞∑
k=0
γkr(t + k + 2) | S(t + 1) = s′

 ,
=
∑
a∈A(s)
pi(a | s)
∑
s′∈S
P s′sa
[
Rs′sa +γVpi(s′)
]
, (2.3)
the recursive relationship between Vpi(s) and Vpi(s′) is called the Bellmann
equation for Vpi(s). The state value Vpi(s) expresses how good it is for an Bellmann
equationagent to be in state s, in terms of the expected discounted return.
In this thesis we are mostly concerned with action values, or Q-values, Action/Q-value
which express a similar concept but for pairs of state and actions. Formally:
Qpi(s,a) = Epi{Rt | s(t) = s,a(t) = a} ,
=
∑
s′∈S
P s′sa
Rs′sa +γ ∑
a′∈A
pi(a′ | s′)Qpi(s′ , a′)
 , (2.4)
which can be read as the expected discounted return for selecting action a
in state s, given policy pi.
So far we have described value functions for a policy pi, but what we
are actually looking for is the optimal policy pi∗. Following the optimal optimal policy
policy yields the highest return, which is what we assumed to be the goal
of the agent. The optimal policy gives rise to optimal value functions V ∗
and Q∗, by replacing pi by pi∗ in equations (2.3) and (2.4), and replacing
the sums by max operators. It is always guaranteed that there is at least
one optimal policy, although finding it by explicitly solving the Bellman
optimality equation is only possible in some limited cases (Sutton and Barto,
1998)—the reason for this is the curse of dimensionality (Bellman, 1957):
in many problems the size of the problem scales exponentially with the
number of state variables. For instance, in a two dimensional maze, where
each dimension is discretized into 10 parts, there are 10×10 = 100 states,
and in a three dimensional maze there are already 1,000 states. For realistic
problems with many state variables the number of states is so vast that exact
solutions become infeasible, even for our fastest computers. In practice, one
thus tries to approximate the optimal value functions.
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An important observation is that if the agent would somehow know
the Q∗-values, then an agent can select the optimal action sequence by just
selecting the action with the highest value in each state, and it does not
need to know anything else about the environment7. The Q-value function
essentially caches the results of all one-step look aheads, and it is trivial to
select the best action (Daw, Niv, and Dayan, 2005; Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Temporal Difference Learning
In the previous chapter, we said that temporal difference learning is one
of the most central ideas in RL. Temporal difference learning is a class of
methods for learning good approximations (in some cases provably optimal;
Singh et al., 2000; Watkins and Dayan, 1992), to (action) value functions.
The beauty is that TD methods can learn purely by interacting with the
environment and observing the results; they do not need to know about the
structure of the environment or rewards (P and R). Such methods are thus
also called model-free methods8.Model-free RL
TD methods work by bootstrapping; initially, the values of all states V (s)
are set to some uniform or random value. Then, each observed transition is
used to improve the estimates of the state values, as:
V (s)← V (s) +α
Target−V (s)︸          ︷︷          ︸
Prediction Error
 , (2.5)
where← denotes assignment and where α is a (typically small) learning
rate that determines the influence that the observed prediction error9 has
on the new estimated value of the state. Observe that if the prediction error
is zero, the estimate remains unchanged.
What value should Target take? If we look at the Bellman equation for
the value function (2.3) and interpret it like an update equation, we see that
7Except the set of actions to optimize over—automatic discovery of actions is a fascinating
problem. Hierarchical RL methods can learn to compose primitive actions into coherent
sequences of actions that can be selected as a unit after learning, such as in the options
framework (Sutton, Precup, and Singh, 1999). There are also clear links to neuroscience,
see e.g. Botvinick, Niv, and Barto (2009). One can also approach this problem from another
direction, learning primitive actions from demonstration, see e.g. Niekum et al. (2013)
8There is another class of methods that are model-based. Although these models are very
relevant (e.g. Daw, 2012), they are much less developed in the context of biologically plausible
models and beyond the scope of this thesis.
9Throughout this thesis we use prediction error, temporal difference (TD) error or reward
prediction error (RPE) to refer to such differences.
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V (s) depends on an expectation involving Rs′sa +γVpi(s′). Unfortunately, we
only observe a single transition to s′ and a single reward r. Note however
that this transition does in fact follow the policy pi and the dynamics of
the environment. If we would make the transition infinitely often and take
the average of the value r +γV (s′), it would converge to the same value. In
the extreme case, we can take Target = r +γV (s′), and let the averaging be
performed by the agent on each occasion that it transitions from state s.
This yields:
V (s)← V (s) +α
r +γV (s′)−V (s)︸               ︷︷               ︸
Prediction Error
 . (2.6)
This simplification turns out to work very well in practice. Furthermore,
as remarked earlier, this prediction error has been related to the behavior
of dopamine neurons (Montague, Dayan, and Sejnowski, 1996; Schultz,
Dayan, and Montague, 1997).
It is also possible to formulate TD learning rules for action values; the
most well-known of these being the Q-learning algorithm (Watkins and Q-learning
Dayan, 1992):
Q(s,a)←Q(s,a) +α
[
r +γmax
a′
Q(s′ , a′)−Q(s,a)
]
. (2.7)
Q-learning is what is known as an off-policy algorithm—this is because off-policy
the error signal it uses for learning depends on the best available Q(s′ , a′),
whereas the model’s policy might select a different action in s′. One can
change Q-learning into an on-policy method by dropping the max operator, on-policy
and instead using the Q-value prediction in s′ for the action a′ that the
model actually selects:
Q(s,a)←Q(s,a) +α [r +γQ(s′ , a′)−Q(s,a)] , (2.8)
Q(s,a)←Q(s,a) +αδ(t) ,
δ(t) = r +γQ(s′ , a′)−Q(s,a) ,
where we introduce δ(t) as a convenient shorthand for the prediction error
in the square brackets. This is called the SARSA learning rule, due to the fact SARSA
that it uses two sequential state-action pairs plus a reward (Rummery and
Niranjan, 1994). Note that without careful control of exploration, SARSA
and Q-learning will typically learn different solutions (see e.g. the cliff-
walking example in Sutton and Barto (1998)). Intuitively, SARSA tends to
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avoid moving to states that have low values, due to the fact that it incurs
an error for the actually selected action, in contrast to Q-learning. In this
thesis we use a learning rule based on SARSA from chapter 4 onwards.
Action selection
So far we have not discussed how actions should be selected by an agent.
When the agent knows the optimal action-value function, the answer is
simple: select the action with the highest value in each state. The problem
is how to select actions when we do not know this value function, for
instance at the beginning of learning a new task, or when the environment
is non-stationary. The agent needs to find a good balance between exploiting
the information it already has about the environment and exploring the
environment for potentially even better rewards.
Two very common strategies are -greedy and softmax (or Boltzmann)
exploration. In -greedy, the agent will select the highest valued action
with probability 1−  and a uniformly random action otherwise (where 
is typically small). Note that this uniform exploration does not take into
account the Q-values the agent already knows, which can be disastrous if
there are some actions that lead to very low rewards in comparison to other
actions. The softmax rule is slightly smarter; the probability that the agent
selects action a, P (s,a) depends on the values for the different actions:
P (s,a) =
exp(Q(s,a)/τ)∑
s,a′ exp(Q(s,a′)/τ)
, (2.9)
where τ is a temperature parameter that determines the influence of the
values on the action probability (as limτ→∞ exp(Q(s,a)/τ) = 1); typically
this temperature is set high at the beginning of learning and is gradually
lowered as learning progresses10.
Both discussed action selection mechanisms are ad-hoc, since they do
not exploit all the information that an agent has, for instance focussing
exploration in regions that are unknown to it, and exploiting in regions
that are well known. Although we believe that the development of models
that try to address such issues (Bayesian RL, see e.g. Duff, 2002; Ross,
Chaib-draa, and Pineau, 2007) is important, it is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
10There is potential for numerical instability in the naive implementation of the softmax
controller. This is avoided by subtracting maxaQ(s,a) from each Q-term, (see e.g. van Hasselt,
2011).
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Eligibility Traces
In a standard TD learning method the value functions are only updated for
each transition. Imagine that the agent is in a maze where all transitions
except for the transition to the goal-state are unrewarded. Now, if a TD
method starts with an action value-function that assigns 0 to all (state,
action) pairs, the agent will only update the Q-value for the transition to
the goal on the first trial. This information then slowly flows back through
all paths that lead to the goal, one trial at a time. Eligibility traces speed
up this process by putting a ‘trace’ e(s,a) on each (state, action) pair that is
visited. This trace typically has an exponential decay, e.g.:
e(s,a, t) ∝
∑
i
H(t − Ti)exp(−(t − Ti)) , 0 ≤ Ti ≤ t , (2.10)
where t is the current time-step, Ti the time index of the ith visit to the
pair (s,a) and H(x) the Heaviside function which equals 0 for x < 0 and 1
for x ≥ 0. The form shown here is called ‘accumulating traces’—it is also
common to use only the time T of the last visit, resulting in a method
called ‘replacing traces’. One way to interpret these traces is as a forward
credit assignment signal: it states that a specific choice of state, action is
partially responsible for going down the path that the agent is on. When a
TD error occurs, the blame or credit is assigned to all (state, action) pairs
in proportion to their eligibility. This can greatly speed up learning, for
instance in the maze scenario described above.
It is possible to incorporate eligibility traces in the TD learning
algorithms we discussed above; we show how to do this for the SARSA
algorithm as this is the most relevant in the context of this thesis. After
each transition, the following updates are computed:
Q(s,a)←Q(s,a) + βe(s,a)δ(t) ∀s,a , (2.11)
e(s,a)← λγe(s,a) +
{
1 if s = s(t), a = a(t)
0 otherwise
∀s,a , (2.12)
where λ ∈ (0,1) is a decay parameter which determines how fast the eligibil-
ity traces decay. This method is called (linear) SARSA(λ). SARSA(λ)
Function approximation
So far we have implicitly assumed that all information, such as the Q-
value function, is stored in tables with an entry for each state, action pair.
This approach quickly becomes unfeasible for large problems, due to the
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exponential growth of the table as a function of the number of states and
actions. A table-based representation also fails to exploit any structure that
might be present in the problem. In general, when states are very similar,
one also expects the action values to be similar. Function approximation
techniques try to represent the (relevant aspects of) the state in a smart way,
reducing the number of parameters that need to be stored and learned for
representing the value function. In the light of this thesis, the most relevant
way to represent value functions is by (artificial) neural networks, which
we will turn to next.
2.2 Artificial Neural Networks
As discussed in section 1.4, we chose to model the brains of agents at the
level of abstract rate coding networks which were popularized in the 1980’s
by Rumelhart and coworkers (Rumelhart, Hinton, and Williams, 1986).
Here we briefly introduce the problems neural networks can solve, and then
discuss a simple example network architecture and the recipe to derive its
learning rules, the error backpropagation algorithm.
The goal of a neural network is to map input vectors x to output vectors
y. The goal can be classification or regression. In classification, the problem
consists of determining the class membership of (novel) input vectors,
for instance, determining whether fruit is ripe based on a vector of pixel
colors from a photograph of the fruit, or, in the context of RL, determining
the optimal action given a new observation. In regression, the problem
is mapping input vectors to output vectors in Rn, for instance, mapping
x1,x2→ x1x2, or in the context of RL, mapping a new observation to a set of
action values. Of course, the classification problem can be seen as a special
case of the regression problem, i.e. it is straightforward to turn the output
of a regressor into a classification, but knowing the goal of the network
and adapting the architecture to the problem often simplifies the learning
problem (Bishop, 1995).
Architecture
A typical neural network that can be used for regression is shown in Fig-
ure 2.2; it has a set of input units (x) on the top, a set of ‘hidden’ units y in
the middle and a set of output units o on the bottom. Input units xi are con-
nected to hidden units yj with connection weights vij , and hidden units are
connected to output units ok by weights wjk . Inputs are presented to the
network by clamping the activations of the input units x. The activations
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Hidden
Output
Figure 2.2: An example neural network.
for the hidden units yj are then computed as:
aj =
∑
i
xivij , (2.13)
yj = 1/(1 + exp(−aj )) = σ (aj ) , (2.14)
where aj represents the synaptic input to unit yj , and σ is a shorthand for
the sigmoidal transformation from the input to the output of the unit. The
output unit activations are computed as11:
ok =
∑
j
yjwjk . (2.15)
The mapping from input vectors to output vectors is parameterized by the
matrices of connection weights V and W . The next section discusses how
these parameters can be learned from a set of example pairs (x,o), where
the goal of the network is assumed to be regression.
Learning rules - Error Backpropagation
Here we derive the online12 learning rules for the example network above,
although it is straightforward to extend this to the general case. As was
11Note that we use just a linear activation function for the output units, as this is the form
we use throughout this thesis.
12Traditionally, the updates were computed in batch (i.e. after presenting all training
examples), but in practice it is both easier and faster to use the online form, see e.g. Wilson
and Martinez (2003). In modern work people typically compromise by using mini-batches,
which allow for fast parallel implementations. Recent work shows that mini-batches might
even outperform the online form in some cases, see Li et al. (2014).
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discussed in section 1.3, the error backpropagation algorithm is a fast13
way to compute how connection weights in a network should change to
minimize an error function, based on gradient descent.
A typical error function (or objective function) for regression tasks is
the squared error:
Ep(t, z) =
1
2
∑
k
(tpk − ok)2 , (2.16)
where tpk is the target value output unit k should take for input pattern p
and ok is the output of the network. We write Ep to emphasize that this is
the error the network makes for input pattern p.
The influence that weight wjk has on the observed error can be written:
∂Ep
∂wjk
=
∂Ep
∂ok
∂ok
∂wjk
,
= −(tpk − ok)yj , (2.17)
where the first step follows by the chain rule for derivatives and the second
step follows because wjk only influences the error made by unit ok .
To derive the influence that hidden weights have on the error, we follow
the same recipe:
∂Ep
∂vij
=
∂yj
∂vij
∑
k
∂ok
∂yj
∂Ep
∂ok
,
=
∂aj
∂vij
∂yj
∂aj
∑
k
∂ok
∂yj
∂Ep
∂ok
,
= −xiyj (1− yj )
∑
k
wjk(t
p
k − ok) , (2.18)
where the sum over the k output units follows from the fact that changing
the output of unit yj influences all output units ok , and
dσ (x)
dx = σ
′ = σ (x)(1−
σ (x)).
Now that we have computed the gradients of the error function with
respect to all weights in the network we can determine the updates of the
13The computational complexity of the algorithm scales linearly with the number of
weights, instead of quadratically, as a naive method of computing the gradients would require
(Pineda, 1989).
22
network parameters by moving in the direction of decreasing error:
∆wjk = − ∂E
p
∂wjk
,
= (tpk − ok)yj ,
= ηkyj , (2.19)
where ηk is a shorthand for the error (tk −ok) made by unit k. This allows us
to write the update for the hidden weights as:
∆vij = −∂E
p
∂vij
= xiyj (1− yj )
∑
k
wjkηk . (2.20)
The ηk’s flowing up through the network is why the algorithm is called
error backpropagation.
Biological Plausibility
Error backpropagation provides a recipe for deriving update rules for
essentially arbitrary networks, as long as the required gradients can be
computed (see Bishop, 1995). Although the underlying ideas are old, going
back to work on optimal control in the 1960’s (see e.g. Le Cun, 1988, and
references therein), it is still a main component in state-of-the-art machine
learning approaches (see e.g. Ciresan et al., 2010; Hinton, 2007; Hinton
and Salakhutdinov, 2006).
As a model for learning in the brain however, there are a number of
problems with error backpropagation (Crick, 1989; O’Reilly, 1996;
Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005), which we will discuss in the next
paragraphs.
Teaching signal The foremost problem is that in the standard setting, it
is assumed that there is a teaching signal (tpk in the previous section) that
informs the network what the required output was. In some cases it can be
argued that such a teaching signal is indeed present, for instance in motor
babbling (Wolpert, Ghahramani, and Jordan, 1995) or auto-association
(mapping an input to itself, potentially via a ‘bottleneck’ hidden layer of
lower dimension (Bishop, 1995)), but in most cases this assumption does
not make sense as it would imply that the agent already knows the correct
mappings.
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Backpropagation of errors There is neurophysiological evidence that
when certain types of neurons spike, backpropagating action potentials
retrogradely propagate into the dendritic tree (Stuart et al., 1997). This
signal could be used as a measure of the output of a neuron, and a such
could be used to influence presynaptic plasticity. The problem is that this is
not the error signal that is required in error-backpropagation; in terms of
the example network in section 2.2 what propagates back is ok , not ηk .
Another problem is that there is no evidence that this signal can propagate
through multiple layers. There is also some evidence that synaptic
depression induced at glutamatergic synapses can back-propagate
to pre-synaptic neurons (Fitzsimonds, Song, and Poo, 1997), but this
depression also does not seem to spread through multiple layers, and what
spreads back is depression instead of unit-specific error signals, so it is not
equivalent to error-backpropagation either. So, although there is some
evidence that signals can back-propagate in biological neural networks,
there is no known mechanism that could implement the backpropagation
of unit-specific error signals.
Synaptic weights The BP algorithm assumes that the connection weights
can change from excitatory to inhibitory, while this has never been
observed experimentally. We judge this to be a less severe issue than the
two other issues mentioned above, since we believe that it could be possible
to change our implementations to respect Dale’s law; for instance, one
could potentially constrain the weights to be positive, as in O’Reilly and
Frank (2006). Alternatively, it is possible to adapt networks with mixed
weight units into ones with excitatory and inhibitory units that have only
positive weights (Parisien, Anderson, and Eliasmith, 2008), and it might be
possible to generalize such techniques. This argument cannot be made for
the other issues.
In the final section of this chapter we will discuss the Attention Gated
Reinforcement Learning (AGREL) model by Roelfsema and van Ooyen
(2005), which is a learning scheme that has the attractive properties of
error-backpropagation, but that is more biologically plausible; the ideas of
AGREL formed the basis for the work in this thesis.
2.3 Attention Gated Reinforcement Learning
Attention Gated Reinforcement Learning is a biologically plausible
reinforcement learning scheme for training neural networks in a direct
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reward setting (Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005). In the direct reward
setting14, rewards are delivered immediately when the agent makes
its choice, so that there is no dependence on time. The main result in
Roelfsema and van Ooyen (2005) is that a set of local learning rules result
in synaptic updates that are on average equivalent to those produced by
the error-backpropagation algorithm.
The work in this thesis builds on the idea in Roelfsema and van Ooyen
(2005), which is that synaptic plasticity is gated by a combination of
attention-gated feedback and a global prediction error signal:
Global prediction error As discussed in section 2.2, a problem with
the BP algorithm is that unit-specific error signals need to be
propagated throughout the network, while there is no known
mechanism that could achieve this. However, in the RL context, we
only need to communicate a scalar prediction error, and there is
significant evidence that this signal is present in the brain by way of
neuromodulatory substances such as dopamine.
Attention-gated feedback Output units are assumed to have feedback
connections back to the hidden layer which allow information about
the selected action to flow back into the network. Synaptic plasticity
is constrained to those pathways that have both feedforward and
feedback activation, which is where the term ‘attention’ originates.
The combination of these mechanisms yields learning rules that are power-
ful enough to learn non-linear transformations, using information that is
locally available at the synapses.
The approach of AGREL differs from another popular class of methods
called policy-gradient methods (e.g. Legenstein et al., 2009; Seung, 2003;
Williams, 1992) where each unit (or synapse, in Seung (2003)) is a local
agent that tries to increase the global reward. In this way, no knowledge
about the structure of the network is needed. However, such methods do
not scale well to large, structured, networks for the intuitive reason that
the correlation between local behavior and global rewards weakens with
increasing network size. In Roelfsema and van Ooyen (2005) it was shown
that AGREL outperforms REINFORCE (Williams, 1992), and Urbanczik and
Senn (2009) showed that feedback about the selected action (albeit using
neuromodulators instead of feedback connections) significantly increases
the (learning) performance of spiking neural networks.
14This is also known as an immediate reward setting.
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There has been other work on biologically plausible implementations
of error-backpropagation, most notably the generalized recirculation algo-
rithm (GeneRec) in O’Reilly (1996). Like AGREL, GeneRec presumes the
existence of (roughly symmetric) feedback weights, but there are important
differences. One difference is mechanistic: GeneRec uses the neat insight
that the computation of the error term for hidden units can be computed
as a difference between two activation phases, the "minus" phase and the
"plus" phase. In the plus phase, both input and output units are "clamped"
and in the minus phase only the input is clamped. By combining these ac-
tivations from the different phases, hidden units can compute their error
without specialized "error" connections in the network. Another, more im-
portant, difference is that GeneRec requires that there is a teaching signal
that provides the desired out is clamped at the output layer (see also sec-
tion 2.2 above), which is an assumption that AGREL does not require. An-
other interesting idea is that of Zipser and Rumelhart (1993) who suggest
that there may be a separate "error network" to communicate errors to ear-
lier processing layers; the main problem with this idea is that such "error"
networks have not been found in the brain.
The AGREL architecture and learning rules were developed in a 1-of-c
classification setting, and the links to the RL framework were not worked
out in detail. In this thesis, we used the core ideas of AGREL, but recast
the problem in terms of action-values, instead of the action-probabilities
of AGREL. In AGREL, it was further assumed that the expected reward
for a given action could be expressed as the probability of selecting that
action, which cannot be assumed to hold in general. This assumption is
no longer required for the models presented in this thesis. We show how
the idea of attention gated feedback learning can be extended to learning
multi-dimensional outputs (chapter 3), and how it can be used in learning
sequential tasks that may require working memory (chapters 4-6).
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3Multi Dimensional Attention GatedLearning
Abstract
How does the brain learn to map multi-dimensional sensory inputs
to multi-dimensional motor outputs when it can only observe single
rewards for the coordinated outputs of the whole network of neurons
that make up the brain? We develop MQ-AGREL, a biologically
plausible multi-layer neural network model for multi-dimensional
reinforcement learning. We demonstrate that MQ-AGREL can learn
non-linear mappings from inputs to multi-dimensional outputs
by using only scalar reward feedback. We further show that in
MQ-AGREL the changes in the connection weights follow the gradient
that minimizes global prediction error, and that all information
required for synaptic plasticity is locally present. This chapter is based
on Rombouts, van Ooyen, et al. (2012).
3.1 Introduction
Imagine learning to play squash. High dimensional sensory inputs give rise
to patterns of neuronal activations. These in turn yield a rich motor output,
moving legs and arms to hit the ball with the racket. Which actions were
useful? Which were not? While humans are able to learn such complex
tasks, it is not clear how the brain solves these high dimensional learning
problems. In neuronal terms, the problem is one of credit assignment: how
should the efficacies of synapses in the brain change to make useful actions
more probable?
Reinforcement Learning (RL; Sutton and Barto, 1998) offers a mathe-
matical framework for learning to select optimal actions in Markov Deci-
sion Processes. For each possible state of the world an agent tries to predict
the expected reward values (Q-values) of all possible actions. It then selects
the best one with high probability. However, estimating all action-values
quickly becomes intractable in high dimensional spaces, the well-known
curse of dimensionality (Bellman, 1957).
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A natural way to solve high-dimensional learning problems is to
decompose them. Imagine a task that requires actions by both hands.
Instead of estimating values for joint actions (a simultaneous action by left
and right hand), as a naive application of RL suggests, we can estimate the
values for atomic actions independently. The optimal joint action can then
be produced by selecting locally optimal atomic actions. While a variety of
modular reinforcement learning systems based on this intuition exist, e.g.
Chang, Ho, and Kaelbling (2004), Ring, Schaul, and Schmidhuber (2011),
and Rothkopf and Ballard (2010), ideas on how such approaches could be
implemented in biologically plausible neural networks have been lacking.
Williams’ REINFORCE algorithm for training neural networks
(Williams, 1992) can be adapted to train neural networks with a modular
structure. However, REINFORCE lacks a mechanism to solve the learning
problem in an efficient and biologically plausible way. Roelfsema and van
Ooyen developed a biologically plausible learning scheme for training
multi-layer neural networks by RL, Attention-Gated Reinforcement
Learning (AGREL; Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005). However, AGREL can
only learn 1-of-n classification tasks, as it is constrained to select only
single actions.
Here, we develop MQ-AGREL, a biologically plausible network model
for modular reinforcement learning of multiple concurrent atomic actions.
We build on the ideas of AGREL to arrive at a neural network scheme
that can learn to select optimal simultaneous actions based on a scalar
reinforcement signal. For each output dimension, the model has a separate
output layer. Units in these output layers try to learn Q-values (Sutton
and Barto, 1998) for their associated atomic actions. Each output layer
subsequently has a separate stochastic Winner-Take-All competition (WTA)
to select each atomic action. We show that the model learns to minimize
prediction errors by gradient descent on a global prediction error, and that
all information required for synaptic plasticity is local.
Plasticity in MQ-AGREL is determined by two factors, as in Roelfsema
and van Ooyen (2005). The first is a globally available neuromodulatory
signal that communicates a global prediction error. Such a signal could
be implemented by a neuromodulator such as dopamine (Roelfsema, van
Ooyen, and Watanabe, 2010; Schultz, Dayan, and Montague, 1997). The
second factor is a set of feedback connections from output layers back to
the hidden layer that gates plasticity based on the atomic actions that were
selected.
We study classification tasks which require linear and non-linear map-
pings from inputs to multiple simultaneous outputs. All tasks are single
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WTA WTA
Figure 3.1: MQ-AGREL architecture with O separate output layers (shading). Feedback
weights shown with dashed lines.
step input-output mappings where rewards are directly delivered, so that
we only need to solve the spatial credit assignment problem. We show that
MQ-AGREL can learn multi-dimensional non-linear tasks, and that it sig-
nificantly outperforms the biologically implausible REINFORCE method
(Williams, 1992).
3.2 MQ-AGREL
MQ-AGREL is modeled as a standard neural network with multiple Winner-
Take-All (WTA) output layers o. In this way multiple atomic actions can
be selected at the same time. The network predicts Q-values (Sutton and
Barto, 1998) for all atomic actions. In each output layer, a stochastic WTA
competition based on the predicted values selects one atomic action for
execution. An example network is shown in Figure 3.1. For each joint action
the network executes, the network receives a scalar reward r. The magnitude
of this reward depends on the quality of the action (see section 3.3). The
network learns by gradient descent on the global prediction error.
Input patterns xi are presented to the input layer with N units. Hidden
unit activations yj are computed by a sigmoidal function of the linearly
weighted summed input aj :
yj =
1
1 + exp(−aj ) with aj =
N∑
i=0
vijxi , (3.1)
where vij is the synaptic weight between input unit i and hidden unit j and
v0j denotes the bias weight. Each output layer o is fully connected to the
hidden layer with M units by connections wojk . Each output layer separately
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computes Q-values qok (Sutton and Barto, 1998):
qok =
M∑
j=0
wojkyj , (3.2)
where a bias unit y0 is included.
With the Q-value estimates, a controller selects one of the atomic
actions in each output layer. We implemented a max-Boltzmann controller
(Wiering and Schmidhuber, 1997), which selects the action with the
highest estimated Q-value with probability 1− , and otherwise chooses an
action with probabilities determined by the Boltzmann distribution:
P r(zok = 1) =
expqok∑
k′ expq
o
k′
. (3.3)
The winning units K are then set to an activation of 1 and all other units to
an activation of 0, zok = δ
o
kK where δkK is the Kronecker delta function.
After executing an action the network receives a scalar reward r. A
prediction error δ is computed as:
δ = r −
O∑
o
Ko∑
k
zokq
o
k , (3.4)
where O is the number of output layers and Ko denotes the number of
output units in layer o. We assume that this δ signal is globally available.
Learning. The synaptic updates have two factors, as in AGREL
(Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005). The first is the global prediction error δ
and the second is a Hebbian interaction between feedforward activity and
attentional feedback signals. The resulting learning rules are biologically
plausible with all information required for the updates available at the
synapses (Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005). The hidden to output layer
synaptic updates are:
∆wojk = βyjz
o
kδ , (3.5)
where β is the learning rate. The synaptic updates between input and
hidden layer are:
∆vij = βxiyj (1− yj )δ
O∑
o
Ko∑
k
Wokjzok , (3.6)
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whereWokj are feedback connections from the output layer to the hidden
layer (Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005). These feedback connections effec-
tively gate the plasticity of the higher level weights. For convenience, feed-
back and feedforward weights are assumed to be symmetrical; they can be
trained by (3.5) as in Roelfsema and van Ooyen (2005).
MQ-AGREL and AGREL differ from (BP; Rumelhart, Hinton, and
Williams, 1986) in two important respects. First, attention-gated learning
does not require a teaching signal for each output node. Instead it is
trained with a global prediction error. Second, it does not require the
propagation of specific error signals from output layers to earlier layers
(Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005; Roelfsema, van Ooyen, and Watanabe,
2010). These two elements make attention-gated learning schemes
biologically plausible, unlike Error-Backpropagation.
MQ-AGREL minimizes global prediction error. The local learning rules
(3.5)–(3.6) update the weights along the gradient on the global prediction
error E:
E =
1
2
r −∑
o
∑
k
zokq
o
k
2 = 12δ2 . (3.7)
We can derive the updates for weights between the hidden and output layer
by moving in the opposite direction of the error gradient (Bishop, 1995):
− ∂E
∂wojk
=
∂E
∂qok
∂qok
∂wojk
= δzokyj , (3.8)
which is equivalent to the update in 3.5 up to the learning rate β. The
updates for the input to hidden layer weights can be written:
− ∂E
∂vij
=
∂aj
∂vij
∂yj
∂aj
O∑
o
Ko∑
k
∂E
∂qok
∂qok
∂yj
= xiyj (1− yj )δ
O∑
o
Ko∑
k
Wokjzok , (3.9)
where the rightmost term is the attentional feedback from the output layers
via the feedback connectionsWokj . Because of the WTA competition, only
one unit per output layer (with zok = 1) contributes to the feedback. Again,
the right hand side of (3.9) matches the update equation (3.6) up to a factor
β.
This derivation shows that by combining attentional feedback signals
and a globally available δ signal, MQ-AGREL minimizes prediction error
by gradient descent on the Q-value prediction errors, using local updates.
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Note that equations (3.4) and (3.7) implicitly assume that the rewards
for the different modules are independent, but we will show that the net-
work can deal to some extent with tasks where this assumption does not
hold. Note that there are no guarantees that networks will learn the correct
decomposition of the rewards, as all combinations of Q-values that equal
the observed reward result in a prediction error of 0.
BP-REINFORCE. To compare MQ-AGREL with another learning
algorithm, we implemented REINFORCE (Williams, 1992) for a network
architecture with multiple WTA output layers. The architecture and
activation functions are the same as in MQ-AGREL, except for the output
layers, where actions were selected as in equation (3.3). We applied the
REINFORCE updates for output weights (Williams, 1992):
∆wojk = βr
[
zok − P r(zok = 1)
]
yj , (3.10)
The hidden layer weights were updated by Error-Backpropagation (Rumel-
hart, Hinton, and Williams, 1986; Williams, 1992).
3.3 Experiments
Tasks. To demonstrate the performance of MQ-AGREL we implemented
a set of binary tasks with increasing difficulty. The key aspects that we
want to illuminate are that MQ-AGREL can deal with tasks that require
non-linear transformations and that it scales well to multiple output layers.
The tasks were constructed by concatenating different base tasks:
Linear The input consisted of two binary digits, of which one was randomly
set to 1. The output was required to be the same as the input pattern.
We provided the network with two hidden units for each linear task
component.
XOR A version of the non-linear exclusive-OR problem. Two binary inputs
need to be mapped to a ‘match’ signal if both inputs have the same
value, and to a ‘non-match’ signal if they have different values. The
output layer had two units, one coding for ‘match’ and the other for
‘non-match’. We provided the network with two hidden units for each
XOR task component.
Counting A set of N binary inputs is presented to the network. The net-
work has to count the number of input units with activation 1 and
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output this number in binary form. We provided an architecture with
dlog2N e+ 1 output layers, with two units each. We gave the network
dlog2N e+ 2 hidden units.
We evaluated the learning scheme on seven different tasks: Linear-Linear
(LL), XOR-Linear (XL), XOR-XOR (XX), 3XOR (3X), 4XOR (4X) and the
counting task with 8 (C8) and 32 (C32) inputs. On each trial the input for
subtasks was selected independent of the input for the other subtasks. For
instance, in the 3X task six random binary inputs were presented to the
network, leading to a set of 26 possible input patterns. For each output
layer the network received a reward of 1 if it was correct and 0 otherwise.
The network only observed the total reward obtained.
Details on training. For all non-counting tasks, we trained networks for
at most 250,000 random pattern presentations, or until convergence.
Convergence was determined by keeping track of the rewards obtained in
the last 200 trials. If the average amount of reward was at least 90% of the
total possible reward, the network was said to have reached convergence.
For the counting tasks, we set the maximal amount of training trials to
1,000,000. For all results reported here, we trained 100 networks with
random initializations of the synaptic weights. Weights were sampled from
a uniform distribution with range [−0.25,0.25]. The exploration rate  was
set to 0.025. We computed the convergence rate (proportion of 100
networks that reached criterion) and 95% confidence intervals. For
convergence times, we report Q1 (lower quartile), Q2 (median) and Q3
(upper quartile) plus minimal and maximal number of trials needed for
convergence. Non-converged networks were assigned the maximal number
of pattern presentations.
Performance. We compared MQ-AGREL to REINFORCE for the dual
tasks (LL, XL and XX), as shown in Figure 3.2. While performance for
the linear task is very comparable, MQ-AGREL significantly outperforms
REINFORCE for tasks with a non-linear component. Substantial effort was
made to find optimal parameters for both algorithms. We evaluated the
algorithms with learning rates (β) of 0.01,0.05,0.10, 0.20,0.30,0.40; shown
are the results for the best learning rate (highest convergence rate, fastest
median convergence time) for both algorithms. For both algorithms 0.4 was
the optimal rate for the LL and XL tasks. For the XX task the optimal rates
were 0.30 for MQ-AGREL and 0.05 for REINFORCE. Due to the meagre
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Figure 3.2: Performance of MQ-AGREL (black) compared to REINFORCE (grey) on
dual tasks, for best parameters found. Left, Convergence rates for 100 simulations in each
condition. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Right, Box plots show (from
bottom to top) minimal convergence trial, Q1 (lower quartile), Q2 (median, heavy line),
Q3 (upper quartile) and maximal convergence trial. In REINFORCE, learning rates for
each layer were individually optimized for best performance.
performance of REINFORCE on these tasks, we do not show further results
for this algorithm.
We further investigated the performance of MQ-AGREL on the harder
3X and 4X tasks (Figure 3.3a). Here MQ-AGREL also showed a robust
performance. For the more difficult 4X task, the network worked best with
a learning rate of 0.01. It might be that a lower learning rate smoothes out
the noise on the learning signal that is caused by the other modules.
We also evaluated MQ-AGREL on the counting tasks (Figure 3.3b). These
were significantly harder to learn than the 4X task (note the scale difference
on the ordinate), but the algorithm managed to learn both tasks. There was
no setting of β we tried in with all 100 networks managed to learn the C32
task, but it is likely that a longer maximal training time would improve the
convergence rate. Note that the model had to train six disjoint WTA output
layers in the C32 task, versus four in the C8 task.
As discussed in section 3.2, MQ-AGREL can also work in settings with
dependent rewards. With dependent rewards, networks only receive
rewards if all atomic actions are simultaneously correct, e.g. a reward of 2
if both sub-actions for a dual XOR task are correct, and 0 otherwise.
Performance on the dual tasks (Figure 3.4a) is very comparable to that
shown in Figure 3.2. The networks need significantly more trials to learn
the 3X and 4X tasks with dependent rewards. Figure 3.4b shows the results
for training MQ-AGREL for a maximum of 2.5× 106 trials with a learning
rate of 0.01. Note that tasks with dependent rewards have a degenerate
nature: for each input pattern, only one of the 2N binary action-vectors in
the N -d space is rewarded and this quickly (with increasing N ) makes it
very hard to find the rewarded joint action. This problem is called the curse
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Figure 3.3: Scaling performance, conventions as in Figure 3.2. a, Performance of MQ-
AGREL on 3X (black) and 4X (grey) tasks. b, Performance of MQ-AGREL on C8 (black)
and C32 (grey) tasks. Note that the learning rates (abscissa) and maximal training times
(ordinate) differ from those in panel a.
of dimensionality (Bellman, 1957), and MQ-AGREL cannot escape this.
This curse can explain the sharp increase in the number of trials to learn
the 4X task over the 3X task compared to the setting with independent
rewards.
Finally, we tested MQ-AGREL on tasks where the rewards over the
modules were not uniform. Figure 3.5 shows the results for networks that
were trained on an XX task under four different reward ratios (1 : 1,2 :
1,3 : 1,4 : 1, β = 0.1); the dots show the coordinates of winning Q-values
pairs for all 16 different input patterns, over 100 networks, where we only
show the results for correct trials. It is clearly visible that the networks are
not guaranteed to find the true reward decomposition (circle), but that the
summed Q-values tend to match the maximal possible reward (line). The
centers of the distribution (crosses) are however biased toward the true
reward decomposition. We conjecture that with a low enough learning rate
and enough training trials, the estimated decomposition will get closer and
closer to the true decomposition, because once the network finds the optimal
action, exploratory sub-actions around the optimal joint action provide
information for improving the reward estimates for individual modules.
This reasoning also explains why the estimated reward decompositions
in Figure 3.5 are biased towards the larger reward, as it induces a bigger
learning signal when an exploratory sub-action for the large-reward module
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Figure 3.4: Performance on tasks with dependent rewards, conventions as in Figure 3.2.
a, Performance of MQ-AGREL on dual tasks (LL, XL, XX) with dependent rewards.
Learning rates were β = 0.3,0.2,0.2 respectively, optimized over the same range as for the
results in Figure 3.2. b, Performance of MQ-AGREL on 3X and 4X tasks with dependent
rewards. Learning rate was set to β = 0.01. Note the difference in training times (ordinate)
on the right plot.
is selected.
3.4 Discussion
We have developed a biologically plausible neural network model that can
learn a variety of difficult input-output mappings. Our work builds upon
a previous model, AGREL Roelfsema and van Ooyen (2005), that could
learn only single-dimensional input-output mappings, with 0,1 rewards.
Compared to AGREL, the controller in MQ-AGREL separates the action
selection policy from the value estimation, allowing for the independent
selection of atomic actions and the computation of a joint reward estimation.
MQ-AGREL solves the spatial credit assignment problem by a combination
of feedback signals and a globally released neuromodulatory signal which
encodes a global prediction error. The feedback signals encode which atomic
actions were selected, and constrain synaptic plasticity to those synapses
that were involved in the selected joint action. We demonstrated that MQ-
AGREL can learn difficult tasks, even when subtasks have a non-uniform
distribution of rewards, or when rewards are not independent.
Compared to REINFORCE (Williams, 1992), MQ-AGREL exhibits much
better convergence for tasks that contain non-linear components, even
when REINFORCE uses the biologically implausible Error Backpropagation
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Figure 3.5: Results for MQ-AGREL trained on XX task under unequal rewards (ratios on
top). Lower left insets show proportion of 100 networks that learned the task. Small dots
show coordinates for correctly winning Q-value combinations for all 16 input patterns
for all networks. Black line is the line of equal global rewards. Red circle marks the
true reward decomposition, blue cross marks mean estimated reward decomposition. We
considered learning complete if the networks performed > 90% correct joint actions over
a window of 200 trials.
algorithm to update the hidden layer weights. A key difference is that
REINFORCE updates the policies for all atomic actions after each decision,
and not only those that were actually selected. Updating in this way may
destroy the correct policy that was stored in the synapses for the non-
executed atomic actions.
One of the limitations of MQ-AGREL is that networks are not guaranteed
to learn the correct decomposition of rewards, even though they might learn
the optimal policy. The method developed by Chang, Ho, and Kaelbling
(2004) solves this issue by a Kalman filtering approach, but this is not
a biologically plausible network solution. A Kalman filtering approach
requires an internal model of the environment, which would fit with model-
based RL, but this is beyond the scope of the current work.
A distinguishing factor in our model is the idea that multiple unrelated
atomic actions can be active at the same time. Most other models assume
that there is a single winning action, with all atomic actions mapping to the
same output space (Ring, Schaul, and Schmidhuber, 2011; Rothkopf and
Ballard, 2010). It is plausible that both types of solutions are used in the
brain. Modules competing for the control of a single effector could use a
shared action space model, and modules controlling independent effectors
could use a model like MQ-AGREL.
Interestingly, recent experimental work has investigated whether
humans could learn to simultaneously solve two independently rewarded
tasks with two different hands (Gershman, Pesaran, and Daw, 2009). The
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authors found that a reinforcement learning model that modularizes the
two learning problems fits the behavioral data significantly better than one
that learns action values over joint actions. This result gives experimental
support for the idea that multiple simultaneous actions are indeed learned
by separate modules.
MQ-AGREL is able to learn mappings for co-activated output modules
based on a single globally available reward prediction error. This is not a
trivial result, as it is not obvious that a global reward prediction error com-
bined with local feedback is powerful enough to correctly solve the spatial
credit assignment problem. As is mentioned in Chang, Ho, and Kaelbling
(2004) and Gershman, Pesaran, and Daw (2009), module-specific predic-
tion errors would be best for training separate output modules. However,
the dopamine signal found in experiments seems to be unitary throughout
the brain (Schultz, Dayan, and Montague, 1997).
Gershman, Pesaran, and Daw (2009) further report fMRI evidence that
supports the idea that both value and learning related signals are lateralized.
However, they used only two types of RL models as regressors: an RL
model that learns values of joint actions (i.e. the naive RL approach) and
a decomposed RL model that makes use of an effector-specific reward
signal (i.e. a vector-valued prediction error). They did not consider an RL
model that learns effector-specific action values based on a single reward
prediction error, as in MQ-AGREL, and it would be interesting to compare
such a model with the models considered in Gershman, Pesaran, and Daw
(2009). Our model and simulations provide evidence that multiple modules
could indeed be trained with a unitary reward prediction error.
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4Temporal Attention Gated Learning
Abstract
This chapter introduces the Attention-gated MEmory Tagging
model, or AuGMEnT. This model extends the ideas of AGREL
(Chapter 2) and MQ-AGREL (Chapter 3) to the delayed reward setting,
resulting in a biologically plausible implementation of SARSA(λ)
(Rummery and Niranjan, 1994). The basic model is limited to learning
in settings where the optimal action can be inferred from the direct
observation, an assumption that is often not met in real world tasks.
Real world tasks almost always require some form of working memory,
for instance for remembering what a road-sign said when arriving at
an intersection. We therefore included active working memory in the
model, based on the widespread presence of neurons with persistent
activations throughout the brain. We show that AuGMEnT learns by
stochastic gradient descent1 on the temporal difference error. We will
then show that AuGMEnT is indeed able to learn difficult tasks that
require working memory and non-linear transformations, and that,
when the model is trained on typical working memory tasks in the
neuroscience literature, the model learns representations that are
similar to those found in animals. This chapter is based on Rombouts,
Bohte, and Roelfsema (2012) and Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema
(2015).
4.1 Introduction
Animals like monkeys can be trained to perform complex cognitive tasks,
simply by giving rewards at the right times. They can learn to map sensory
stimuli onto responses, to store task-relevant information and to integrate
and combine unreliable sensory evidence. Training induces new stimulus
and memory representations in ‘multiple-demand’ regions of the cortex
(Duncan, 2010). For example, if monkeys are trained to memorize the
1Also known as online gradient descent.
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location of a visual stimulus, neurons in lateral intra-parietal cortex (LIP)
represent this location as a persistent increase of their firing rate (Gnadt
and Andersen, 1988; Gottlieb and Goldberg, 1999). However, if the animals
learn a visual categorization task, persistent activity of LIP cells becomes
tuned to the boundary between categories (Freedman and Assad, 2006)
whereas the neurons integrate probabilistic evidence if the task is sensory
decision making (Yang and Shadlen, 2007). Similar effects of training on
persistent activity have been observed in the somatosensory system. If
monkeys are trained to compare frequencies of successive vibrotactile
stimuli, working memory representations of analog variables are formed in
somatosensory, prefrontal and motor cortex (Hernández et al., 1997).
Which learning mechanism induces appropriate working memories in
these tasks? We here introduce AuGMEnT (Attention-Gated MEmory
Tagging), a new reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) scheme
that explains the formation of working memories during trial-and-error
learning. AuGMEnT addresses two well-known problems in learning
theory: temporal and structural credit-assignment (Rumelhart, Hinton, and
Williams, 1986; Sutton and Barto, 1998). The temporal credit-assignment
problem arises if an agent has to learn actions that are only rewarded after
a sequence of intervening actions, so that it is difficult to assign credit to
the appropriate ones. AuGMEnT solves this problem like previous
temporal-difference reinforcement learning (RL) theories (Sutton and
Barto, 1998). It learns action-values (known as Q-values, Sutton and Barto,
1998), i.e. the amount of reward that is predicted for a particular action
when executed in a particular state of the world. If the outcome deviates
from the reward-prediction, a neuromodulatory signal that codes the
global reward-prediction error (RPE) gates synaptic plasticity in order to
change the Q-value, in accordance with experimental findings (Dayan and
Balleine, 2002; Montague, Hyman, and Cohen, 2004; Morris et al., 2006;
Schultz, 2007). The key new property of AuGMEnT is that it can also learn
tasks that require working memory, thus going beyond standard RL models
(Sutton and Barto, 1998; Todd, Niv, and Cohen, 2009).
AuGMEnT also solves the structural credit-assignment problem of net-
works with multiple layers. Which synapses should change to improve per-
formance? AuGMEnT solves this problem with an ‘attentional’ feedback
mechanism. The output layer has feedback connections to units at earlier
levels that provide feedback to those units that were responsible for the ac-
tion that was selected (Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005). We propose that
this feedback signal tags (Cassenaer and Laurent, 2012) relevant synapses
and that the persistence of tags (known as eligibility traces, Houk, Adams,
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and Barto, 1995; Sutton and Barto, 1998) permits learning if time passes be-
tween the action and the RPE. In this chapter we will introduce AuGMEnT,
show that it learns by stochastic gradient descent on the temporal differ-
ence error, and discuss the relation to the SARSA(λ) (Rummery and Niran-
jan, 1994) algorithm. We will then use AuGMEnT to model a wide selection
of working memory tasks from the literature and discuss its neuroscientific
plausibility.
4.2 Model Architecture
We used AuGMEnT to train networks composed of three layers of units
connected by two layers of modifiable synapses (Figure 4.1). Time was
modeled in discrete steps.
Input layer
At the start of every time step, feedforward connections propagate
information from the sensory layer to the association layer through
modifiable connections vij . The sensory layer represents stimuli with
instantaneous and transient units (Figure 4.1). Instantaneous units
represent the current sensory stimulus x(t) and are active as long as the
stimulus is present. Transient units represent changes in the stimulus and
behave like ‘on (+)’ and ‘off (−)’ cells in sensory cortices (Nassi and
Callaway, 2009). They encode positive and negative changes in sensory
inputs w.r.t. the previous time-step t − 1:
x+(t) = [x(t)− x(t − 1)]+ , (4.1)
x−(t) = [x(t − 1)− x(t)]+ , (4.2)
where [·]+ is a threshold operation that returns 0 for all negative inputs, but
leaves positive inputs unchanged. Every input is therefore represented by
three sensory units. We assume that prior to trial start, i.e. at t = 0, all units
have zero activation, and that the first time-step is t = 1.
Association layer
The second (hidden) layer of the network models the association cortex, and
contains regular units (circles in Figure 4.1) and memory units (diamonds).
We use the term ‘regular unit’ to reflect the fact that these are regular
sigmoidal units that do not exhibit persistent activity in the absence of
input. Regular units j are fully connected to instantaneous units i in the
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Figure 4.1: Model Architecture. A, The model consists of a sensory input layer with
units that code the input (instantaneous units) and transient units that only respond
when a stimulus appears (on-units) or if it disappears (off-units). The association layer
contains regular units (circles) with activities that depend on instantaneous input units,
and integrating memory units (diamonds) that receive input from transient sensory
units. The connections from the input layer to the memory cells maintain a synaptic
trace (sTrace; blue circle) if the synapse was active. Units in the third layer code the
value of actions (Q-values). After computing feed-forward activations, a Winner-Take-All
competition determines the winning action (see middle panel). Action selection causes
a feedback signal to earlier levels (through feedback connections w′Sj , see middle panel)
that lays down synaptic tags (orange pentagons) at synapses that are responsible for the
selected action. If the predicted Q-value of the next action S ′ (Q′S ) plus the obtained
reward r(t) is higher than QS , a globally released neuromodulator δ (see eq. (4.17))
interacts with the tagged synapses to increase the strength of tagged synapses (green
connections). If the predicted value is lower than expected, the strength of tagged synapses
is decreased. B, Schematic illustration of the tagging process for regular units. FF is
a feed-forward connection and FB is a feedback connection. The combination of feed-
forward and feedback activation gives rise to a synaptic tag in step ii. Tags interact with
the globally released neuromodulator δ to change the synaptic strength (step iv,v). C,
Tagging process for memory units. Any presynaptic feed-forward activation gives rise to
a synaptic trace (step ii; sTrace - purple circle). A feedback signal from the Q-value unit
selected for action creates synaptic tags on synapses that carry a synaptic trace (step iv).
The neuromodulator can interact with the tags to modify synaptic strength (v,vi).
sensory layer by connections vRij (the superscript R indexes synapses onto
regular units, and vR0j is a bias weight). Their activity y
R
j (t) is determined
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by:
inpRj (t) =
∑
i
vRijxi(t) , (4.3)
yRj (t) = σ (inp
R
j (t)) , (4.4)
where inpRj (t) denotes the synaptic input and σ a sigmoidal activation
function;
σ (inpRj (t)) =
1
(1 + exp(θ − inpRj (t)))
, (4.5)
although our results do not depend on this particular choice of σ . The
derivative of yRj (t) can be conveniently expressed as:
y′Rj (t) = σ
′(inpRj (t)) =
∂yRj (t)
∂inpRj (t)
= yRj (t)(1− yRj (t)) . (4.6)
Memory units m (diamonds in Figure 4.1) are fully connected to the tran-
sient (+/−) units in the sensory layer by connections vMlm (superscript M in-
dexes synapses onto memory units) and they integrate their input over the
duration of the trial:
inpMm (t) = inp
M
m (t − 1) +
∑
l
vMlmx
′
l(t) , (4.7)
yMm (t) = σ (inp
M
m (t)) , (4.8)
where we use the shorthand x′l that stands for both + and − cells, so∑
l v
M
lmx
′
l(t) should be read as
∑
l v
M+
lm x
′+
l (t) +
∑
l v
M−
lm x
′−
l (t). The selective
connectivity between the transient input units and memory cells is
advantageous. We found that the learning scheme is less stable when
memory units also receive input from the instantaneous input units
because even weak input becomes integrated across many time steps. We
note, however, that there are other neuronal mechanisms which can
prevent the integration of constant inputs. For example, the synapses
between instantaneous input units and memory units could be rapidly
adapting, so that only variations in input are integrated.
The simulated integration process causes persistent changes in the
activity of memory units. It is easy to see that the activity of a memory unit
equals the activity of a hypothetical regular unit that would receive input
from all previous time-steps of the trial at the same time. To keep the
model simple, we do not simulate the mechanisms responsible for
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persistent activity, which have been addressed in previous work (Engel and
Wang, 2011; Fransén et al., 2006; Koulakov et al., 2002). Although the
perfect integration assumed in equation (4.7) does not exist in reality, we
suggest that it is an acceptable approximation for trials with a relatively
short duration as in the tasks that will be described in this chapter. Indeed,
there are reports of single neuron integrators in entorhinal cortex with
stable firing rates that persist for ten minutes or more (Egorov et al., 2002),
which is orders of magnitude longer than the trials modeled in this chapter.
In neurophysiological studies in behaving animals, the neurons that behave
like regular and memory units in e.g. LIP (Gnadt and Andersen, 1988;
Gottlieb and Goldberg, 1999) and frontal cortex (Funahashi, Bruce, and
Goldman-Rakic, 1989) would be classified as visual cells and memory cells,
respectively.
Q-value layer
The third layer receives input from the association layer through plastic
connections wjk (Figure 4.1). Its task is to compute action-values (i.e. Q-
values, Sutton and Barto, 1998) for every possible action. Specifically, a
Q-value unit aims to represent the (discounted) expected reward for the
remainder of a trial if the network selects an action a in the current state s
(Sutton and Barto, 1998):
Qpi(s,a) = Epi[Rt |st = s,at = a] , with Rt =
∞∑
p=0
γprt+p+1 , (4.9)
where Epi[·] is the expected discounted future reward Rt given a and s, under
action-selection policy pi and γ ∈ [0,1] determines the discounting of future
rewards r. It is informative to explicitly write out the above expectation to
see that Q-values are recursively defined as:
Qpi(s,a) =
∑
s′∈S
P s′sa
Rs′sa +γ∑
a′∈A
pi(a′ , s′)Qpi(s′ , a′)
 , (4.10)
where P s′sa is a transition matrix, containing the probabilities that executing
action a in state s will move the agent to state s′ , Rs′sa is the expected reward
for this transition, and S andA are the sets of states and actions, respectively.
Note that the action selection policy pi is assumed to be stochastic in general.
By executing the policy pi, an agent samples trajectories according to the
probability distributions pi, P s′sa and Rs′sa where every observed transition can
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be used to update the original prediction Q(st , at). Importantly, temporal
difference learning schemes such as AuGMEnT are model-free, which means
that they do not need explicit access to these probability distributions while
improving their Q-values.
Q-value units k are fully connected to the association layer by
connections wRjk (from regular units) and w
M
mk (from memory units). The
action value qk(t) is estimated as:
qk(t) =
∑
m
wMmky
M
m (t) +
∑
j
wRjky
R
j (t) , (4.11)
where qk(t) aims to represent the value of action k at time step t, i.e. if
at = k. In AuGMEnT, the state s in equation (4.9) is represented by the
vector of activations in the association layer. Association layer units
must therefore learn to represent and memorize information about the
environment to compute the value of all possible actions a. They transform
a so-called partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) where
the optimal decision depends on information presented in the past into a
simpler Markov decision process (MDP) by storing relevant information as
persistent activity, making it available for the next decision.
Action Selection
The action-selection policy pi is implemented by a stochastic winner-takes-
all (WTA) competition biased by the Q-values. The network usually chooses
the action awith the highest value, but occasionally explores other actions to
improve its value estimates. We used a Max-Boltzmann controller (Wiering
and Schmidhuber, 1997) to implement the action selection policy pi. It
selects the greedy action (highest qk(t), ties are broken randomly) with
probability 1 − , and a random action k sampled from the Boltzmann
distribution PB with small probability :
PB(k) =
exp(qk)∑
k′ expq
′
k
. (4.12)
This controller ensures that the model explores all actions, but usually
selects the one with the highest expected value. We assume that the
controller is implemented downstream, e.g. in the motor cortex or basal
ganglia, but do not simulate the details of action selection, which have
been addressed previously (Gurney, Prescott, and Redgrave, 2001;
Humphries, Stewart, and Gurney, 2006; Stewart, Bekolay, and Eliasmith,
2012; Usher and McClelland, 2001). After selecting an action a, the activity
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in the third layer becomes zk = δka, where δka is the Kronecker delta
function (1 if k = a and 0 otherwise). In other words, the selected action is
the only one active after the selection process, and it then provides an
“attentional” feedback signal to the association cortex (orange feedback
connections in Figure 4.1A).
4.3 Learning
Learning in the network is controlled by two factors that gate plasticity: a
global neuromodulatory signal and an attentional feedback signal. Once
an action is selected, the unit that codes the winning action a feeds back
to earlier processing levels to create synaptic tags (Frey and Morris, 1997;
Moncada et al., 2011), also known as eligibility traces (Houk, Adams, and
Barto, 1995; Sutton and Barto, 1998) on the responsible synapses (orange
pentagons in Figure 4.1). Tagging of connections from the association layer
to the motor layer follows a form of Hebbian plasticity: the tag strength
depends on presynaptic activity (yj ) and postsynaptic activity after action
selection (zk) and tags thus only form at synapses wja onto the winning (i.e.
selected) motor unit a,
∆T agjk = −αT agja + yjzk , which is equivalent to:
∆T agja = −αT agja + yj , for the winning action a, because za = 1 and
∆T agjk = −αT agjk , for k , a, because zk,a = 0 , (4.13)
where α controls the decay of tags. Here, ∆ denotes the change in one time-
step, i.e. T ag(t + 1) = T ag(t) +∆T ag(t), and T ag(t = 0) = 0. The formation
of tags on the feedback connections w′aj follows the same rule so that the
strength of feedforward and feedback connections becomes similar during
learning, in accordance with neurophysiological findings (Mao et al., 2011).
Thus, the association units that provided strong input to the winning action
a also receive strongest feedback (Figure 4.1, middle panel): they will be
held responsible for the outcome of a. Importantly, the attentional feedback
signal also guides the formation of tags on connections vij so that synapses
from the input layer onto responsible association units j (strong w′aj ) are
most strongly tagged (Figure 4.1B). For regular units we propose:
∆T agij = −αT agij + xiσ ′(inpj )w′aj , (4.14)
where σ ′ is the derivative of the association unit’s activation function σ
(equation (4.8)), which determines the influence that a change in the input
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inpj has on the activity of unit j. The idea has been illustrated in Figure 4.1B.
Feedback from the winning action (lower synapse in Figure 4.1B) enables
the formation of tags on the feedforward connections onto the regular
unit. These tags can interact with globally released neuromodulators that
inform all synapses about the RPE (green cloud ‘δ’ in Figure 4.1). Note that
feedback connections only influence the plasticity of representations in the
association layer but do not influence activity, in the present version of the
model. We will come back to this point in the discussion.
In addition to synaptic tags, AuGMEnT uses synaptic traces (sTrace, blue
circle in Figure 4.1A,C) for the learning of new working memories. These
traces are located on the synapses from the sensory units onto memory cells.
Any pre-synaptic activity in these synapses leaves a trace that persists for
the duration of a trial. If one of the selected actions provides a feedback
signal (panel iv in Figure 4.1C) to the post-synaptic memory unit, the trace
gives rise to a tag making the synapse plastic as it can now interact with
globally released neuromodulators:
dsT raceij = xi with (sT race(t = 0) = 0) , (4.15)
∆T agij = −αT agij + sT raceijσ ′(inpj )w′aj . (4.16)
The traces persist for the duration of the trial, but all tags decay
exponentially (0 < α < 1). We assume that the time scale of trace updates is
fast compared to the tag updates, indicated by d, so that tags are updated
with the latest traces. After executing an action, the network may receive a
reward r(t). Moreover, an action a at time step t − 1 may have caused a
change in the sensory stimulus. For example, in most studies of monkey
vision, a visual stimulus appears if the animal directs gaze to a fixation
point. In the model, the new stimulus causes feedforward processing on the
next time step t, which results in another set of Q-values. To evaluate
whether a was better or worse than expected, the model compares the
predicted outcome Qa(t − 1), which has to be temporarily stored in the
system, to the sum of the reward r(t) and the discounted action-value Qa′ (t)
of unit a′ that wins the subsequent stochastic WTA-competition. This
temporal difference learning rule is known as SARSA (Rummery and
Niranjan, 1994; Sutton and Barto, 1998):
δ(t) = r(t) +γq′a(t)− qa(t − 1) . (4.17)
The RPE δ(t) is positive if the outcome of a is better than expected and neg-
ative if it is worse. The representation of action values is biologically plausi-
ble because neurons coding action-value have been found in the frontal cor-
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tex, basal ganglia and midbrain (Hikosaka, 2005; Morris et al., 2006; Same-
jima et al., 2005) and some orbitofrontal neurons specifically code the cho-
sen value, qa (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006). Moreover, dopamine neu-
rons in the ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra represent δ (Mon-
tague, Hyman, and Cohen, 2004; Schultz, 2002, 2007). In the model, the
release of neuromodulators makes δ available throughout the brain (green
cloud in Figure 4.1). Plasticity of all synapses depends on the product of δ
and tag strength:
∆vij = βδ(t)T agij ,
∆wjk = βδ(t)T agjk , (4.18)
where β is the learning rate, and where the latter equation also holds
for the feedback weights w′kj . These equations capture the key idea of
AuGMEnT: tagged synapses are held accountable for the RPE and change
their strength accordingly. Note that AuGMEnT uses a four-factor learning
rule for synapses vij . The first two factors are the pre- and postsynaptic
activity that determine the formation of tags (equations (4.13), (4.14),
(4.16)). The third factor is the “attentional” feedback from the motor
selection stage, which ensures that tags are only formed in the circuit that
is responsible for the selected action. The fourth factor is the RPE δ, which
reflects whether the outcome of an action was better or worse than
expected and determines if the tagged synapses increase or decrease in
strength. Note that the computation of the RPE demands the comparison of
Q-values in different time-steps. The RPE at time t depends on the action
that the network selected at t − 1 (see equation (4.17) and the next section),
but the activity of the units that gave rise to this selection have typically
changed at time t. The synaptic tags solve this problem because they
labeled those synapses that were responsible for the selection of the
previous action.
AuGMEnT is biologically plausible because the equations that
govern the formation of synaptic tags (equations (4.13),(4.14),(4.16))
and traces (equation (4.15)) and the equations that govern plasticity
(equation (4.18)) rely only on information that is available locally, at the
synapse. Furthermore, the hypothesis that a neuromodulatory signal, like
dopamine, broadcasts the RPE to all synapses in the network is supported
by neurobiological findings (Montague, Hyman, and Cohen, 2004; Schultz,
2002, 2007).
In the next section we present the main theoretical result, which is
that the AuGMEnT learning rules minimize the temporal difference errors
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(equation (4.17)) of the transitions that are experienced by the network by
stochastic gradient descent. Although AuGMEnT is not guaranteed to find
optimal solutions (we cannot provide a proof of convergence), we found
that it reliably learns difficult non-linear working memory problems, as
will be illustrated below.
AuGMEnT minimizes the reward-prediction error (RPE)
The aim of AuGMEnT is to reduce the RPE δ(t) because low RPEs for all
network states imply reliable Q-values so that the network can choose the
action that maximizes reward at every time-step. The RPE δ(t) implies
a comparison between two quantities: the predicted Q-value before the
transition, qa(t − 1), and a target Q-value r(t) + γqa′ (t), which consists of
the actually observed reward and the next predicted Q-value (Sutton and
Barto, 1998). If the two terms cancel, the prediction was correct. SARSA
aims to minimize the prediction error by adjusting the networks weights w
to improve the prediction qa(t − 1) to bring it closer to the observed value
r(t) + γqa′ (t). It is convenient to do this through on-line gradient descent
on the squared prediction error E(qa(t − 1)) = 12 ([r(t) +γqa′ (t)]− qa(t − 1))2
with respect to parameters w (Rummery and Niranjan, 1994; Sutton and
Barto, 1998):
∆w ∝ −∂E(qa(t − 1))
∂w
= −∂E(qa(t − 1))
∂qa(t − 1)
∂qa(t − 1)
∂w
= δ(t)
∂qa(t − 1)
∂w
, (4.19)
where ∂qa(t−1)∂w is the gradient of the predicted Q-value qa(t − 1) with respect
to parameters w. We have also used δ(t) = −∂E(qa(t−1))∂qa(t−1) , which follows from
the definition of E(qa(t − 1)). Note that E is defined with regard to the sam-
pled transition only so that the definition typically differs between succes-
sive transitions experienced by the network. For notational convenience we
will abbreviate E(qa(t − 1)) to Eqa in the remainder of this chapter. We will
refer to the negative of equation (4.19) as “error gradient”.
The RPE is high if the sum of the reward r(t) and discounted qa′ (t)
deviates strongly from the prediction qa(t − 1) on the previous time step.
As in other SARSA methods, the updating of synaptic weights is only
performed for the transitions that the network actually experiences. In
other words, AuGMEnT is a so-called “on policy” learning method (Sutton
and Barto, 1998).
We will first establish the equivalence of stochastic gradient descent
defined in equation (4.19) and the AuGMEnT learning rule for the synaptic
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weights wRjk(t) from the regular units onto the Q-value units (Figure 4.1).
According to equation (4.19), weights wRja for the chosen action k = a on
time step t − 1 should change as:
∆wRja ∝ δ(t)
∂qa(t − 1)
∂wRja(t − 1)
, (4.20)
leaving the other weights k , a unchanged.
We will now show that AuGMEnT causes equivalent changes in synaptic
strength. It follows from equation (4.11) that the influence of wRja on qa(t−1)
(i.e. ∂qa(t−1)
∂wjaR(t−1) in equation (4.20)) equals y
R
j (t − 1), the activity of association
unit j on the previous time step. This result allows us to rewrite (4.20) as:
∆wRja ∝ −
∂Eqa
∂wRja(t − 1)
= δ(t)
∂qa(t − 1)
∂wRja(t − 1)
= δ(t)yRj (t − 1) . (4.21)
Recall from equation (4.13) that the tags on synapses onto the winning
output unit a are updated according to ∆T agja = −αT agja + yj (orange
pentagons in Figure 4.1). In the special case α = 1, it follows that on time
step t, T agja(t) = y
R
j (t − 1) and that tags on synapses onto output units k , a
are 0. As a result,
∆wRja ∝ δ(t)yRj (t − 1) = δ(t)T agja(t); (4.22)
= δ(t)T agjk(t) , (4.23)
for the synapses onto the selected action a, and the second, generalized,
equation follows from the fact that ∂qa(t−1)
∂wRjk(t−1)
= 0 for output units k , a that
were not selected and therefore do not contribute to the RPE. Inspection of
equations (4.18) and (4.23) reveals that AuGMEnT indeed takes a step of
size β in the direction opposite to the error gradient of equation (4.19)
(provided α = 1; we discuss the case α , 1 below). The updates for synapses
between memory units m and Q-value units k are equivalent to those
between regular units and the Q-value units. Thus,
∆wMmk ∝ −
∂Eqa
∂wMmk(t − 1)
= δ(t)
∂qk(t − 1)
∂wMmk(t − 1)
= δ(t)T agmk(t) . (4.24)
The plasticity of the feedback connections w
′R
kj and w
′M
km from the Q-value
layer to the association layer follows the same rule as the updates of con-
nections wRjk and w
M
mk and the feedforward and feedback connections be-
tween two units therefore become proportional during learning (Roelfsema
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and van Ooyen, 2005). We will now show that synapses vRij between the in-
put layer and the regular memory units (Figure 4.1) also change according
to the negative gradient of the error function defined above. Applying the
chain rule to compute the influence of vRij on the error E(t) results in the
following equation:
∆vRij ∝ −
∂Eqa
∂vRij (t − 1)
= δ(t)
∂qa(t − 1)
∂yRj (t − 1)
∂yRj (t − 1)
∂inpRj (t − 1)
∂inpRj (t − 1)
∂vRij (t − 1)
,
= δ(t)wRjaσ
′(inpRj (t − 1))xi(t − 1) . (4.25)
The amount of attentional feedback that was received by unit j from the
selected Q-value unit a at time t − 1 is equal to wRaj because the activity
of unit a equals 1 once it has been selected. As indicated above, learning
makes the strength of feedforward and feedback connections similar so
that wRja can be estimated as the amount of feedback w
′R
aj that unit j receives
from the selected action a,
− ∂Eqa
∂vRij (t − 1)
= δ(t)w′Raj σ
′(inpRj (t − 1))xi(t − 1) , (4.26)
Recall from equation (4.14) that the tags on synapses vRij are updated
according to ∆T agij = −αT agij + xiσ ′(inpj )w′Raj . Figure 4.1B illustrates how
feedback from action a controls the tag formation process. If α = 1, then on
time step t, T agij (t) = xi(t − 1)σ ′(inpRj (t − 1))w′Raj so that equation (4.26) can
be written as:
− ∂Eqa
∂vRij (t − 1)
= δ(t)T agij (t) . (4.27)
A comparison to equation (4.18) demonstrates that AuGMEnT also takes
a step of size β in the direction opposite to the error gradient for these
synapses.
The final set of synapses that needs to be considered are between the
transient sensory units and the memory units. We approximate the total
input inpMm (t) of memory unit m as (see equation (4.7)):
inpMm (t) =
∑
l
vMlm(t)x
′
l(t) +
t−1∑
l,t′=0
vMlm(t
′)x′l(t
′) ,
≈
∑
l
vMlm(t)
t∑
t′=0
x′l(t
′) , (4.28)
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The approximation is good if synapses vMlm change slowly during a trial.
According to equation (4.19), the update for these synapses is:
∆vMlm ∝ −
∂Eqa
∂vMlm
= δ(t)
∂qa(t − 1)
∂yMm (t − 1)
∂yMm (t − 1)
∂inpMm (t − 1)
∂inpMm (t − 1)
∂vMlm(t − 1)
,
= δ(t)w′Mamσ ′(inpMm (t − 1))[
t−1∑
t′=0
x′l(t
′)] . (4.29)
Equation (4.15) specifies that dsT racelm = xl so that sT racelm =
∑t−1
t′=0 x
′
l(t
′),
the total presynaptic activity of the input unit up to time t − 1 (blue circle
in Figure 4.1C). Thus, equation (4.29) can also be written as:
∆vMlm = δ(t)w
′M
amσ
′(yMm (t − 1))sT racelm . (4.30)
Equation (4.16) states that ∆T aglm = −αT aglm + sT racelmσ ′(inpMm )w′Mam ,
because the feedback from the winning action a converts the trace
into a tag (panel iv in Figure 4.1C). Thus, if α = 1 then T agMlm(t) =
w′Mamσ ′(inpMm (t − 1))sT racelm so that:
∆vMlm = δ(t)T ag
M
lm(t) . (4.31)
Again, a comparison of equations (4.31) and (4.18) shows that AuGMEnT
takes a step of size β in the direction opposite to the error gradient, just as
is the case for all other categories of synapses. We conclude that AuGMEnT
causes a stochastic gradient descent of all synaptic weights to minimize
the temporal difference error if α = 1. As an aside, it is straightforward to
generalize the learning rules for memory units to a case with imperfect,
leaky, memory (with decay rate possibly varying as a function of inputs),
see the appendix.
AuGMEnT and SARSA(λ)
AuGMEnT provides a biological implementation of the well known RL
method called SARSA, although it also goes beyond traditional SARSA
(Rummery and Niranjan, 1994; Sutton and Barto, 1998) by (i) including
memory units (ii) representing the current state of the external world as a
vector of activity at the input layer (iii) providing an association layer that
aids in computing Q-values that depend non-linearly on the input, thus
providing a biologically plausible equivalent of the error-backpropagation
learning rule (Rumelhart, Hinton, and Williams, 1986), and (iv) using
synaptic tags and traces (Figure 4.1B,C) so that all the information necessary
for plasticity is available locally at every synapse.
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The tags and traces determine the plasticity of memory units and aid in
decreasing the RPE by improving the Q-value estimates. If a memory unit j
receives input from input unit i then a trace of this input is maintained at
synapse vij for the remainder of the trial (blue circle in Figure 4.1C). Sup-
pose that j, in turn, is connected to action a which is selected at a later time
point. Now unit j receives feedback from a so that the trace on synapse vij
becomes a tag making it sensitive to the globally released neuromodulator
that codes the RPE δ (panel iv in Figure 4.1C). If the outcome of a was bet-
ter than expected (δ > 0) (green cloud in panel v), vij strengthens (thicker
synapse in panel vi). When the stimulus that activated unit i reappears on a
later trial, the larger vij increases unit j’s persistent activity which, in turn,
enhances the activity of the Q-value unit representing a, thereby decreas-
ing the RPE.
The synaptic tags of AuGMEnT correspond to the eligibility traces used
in RL schemes such as SARSA(λ) (Rummery and Niranjan, 1994). In SARSA
learning speeds up if the eligibility traces do not fully decay on every
time step, but exponentially with parameter λ ∈ [0,1] (Sutton and Barto,
1998); the resulting rule is called SARSA(λ). In AuGMEnT, the parameter α
plays an equivalent role and precise equivalence can be obtained by setting
α = 1−λγ as can be verified by making this substitution in equations (4.13),
(4.14) and (4.16) (noting that T ag(t + 1) = T ag(t) + ∆T ag(t)). It follows
that tags decay exponentially as T ag(t + 1) = λγT ag(t), equivalent to the
decay of eligibility traces in SARSA(λ). These results thereby establish
the correspondence between the biologically inspired AuGMEnT learning
scheme and the RL method SARSA(λ). A special condition occurs at the
end of a trial. The activity of memory units, traces, tags, and Q-values are
set to zero (see Sutton and Barto, 1998), after updating of the weights with
a δ that reflects the transition to the terminal state.
In the next section we will illustrate how AuGMEnT can train multi-
layered networks with the form shown in Figure 4.1 to perform a large
variety of tasks that have been used to study neuronal representations in
the association cortex of monkeys.
4.4 Simulation of animal learning experiments
We tested AuGMEnT on four different tasks that have been used to investi-
gate the learning of working memory representations in monkeys. The first
three tasks have been used to study the influence of learning on neuronal
activity in area LIP and the fourth task to study vibrotactile working mem-
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ory in multiple cortical regions. All tasks have a similar overall structure:
the monkey starts a trial by directing gaze to a fixation point or by touch-
ing a response key. Then stimuli are presented to the monkey and it has to
respond with the correct action after a memory delay. At the end of a trial,
the model could choose between two possible actions. The full task reward
(rf , 1.5 units) was given if this choice was correct, while we aborted trials
and gave no reward if the model made the wrong choice or broke fixation
(released the key) before a go signal.
Researchers usually train monkeys on these tasks with a shaping
strategy. The monkey starts with simple tasks and then the complexity is
gradually increased. It is also common to give small rewards for reaching
intermediate goals in the task, such as attaining fixation. We encouraged
fixation (or touching the key in the vibrotactile task below) by giving a
small shaping reward (ri , 0.2 units) if the model directed gaze to the
fixation point (touched the key). In the next sections we will demonstrate
that the training of networks with AuGMEnT is facilitated by shaping.
Shaping was not necessary for learning in any of the tasks, however, but it
enhanced learning speed and increased the proportion of networks that
learned the task within the allotted number of training trials.
Across all the simulations, we used a single, fixed configuration of the
association layer (three regular units, four memory units) andQ-layer (three
units) and a single set of learning parameters (Tables 4.1,4.2). The number
of input units varied across tasks as the complexity of the sensory stimuli
differed. We note, however, that the results described below would have
been identical had we simulated a fixed, large input layer with silent input
units in some of the tasks, because silent input units have no influence on
activity in the rest of the network.
Saccade/Antisaccade Task
The first task (Figure 4.2A) is a memory saccade/anti-saccade task modeled
after Gottlieb and Goldberg (1999). Every trial started with an empty screen,
shown for one time step. Then a fixation mark was shown that was either
black or white, indicating that a pro- or anti-saccade would be required. The
model had to fixate within 10 time-steps, otherwise the trial was terminated
without reward. If the model fixated for two time-steps, we presented a
cue on the left or the right side of the screen for one time-step and gave
the fixation reward ri . This was followed by a memory delay of two time
steps during which only the fixation point was visible. At the end of the
memory delay the fixation mark turned off. To collect the final reward rf in
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the pro-saccade condition, the model had to make an eye-movement to the
remembered location of the cue and to the opposite location on anti-saccade
trials. The trial was aborted if the model failed to respond within eight time
steps.
The input units of the model (Figure 4.2B) represented the color of the
fixation point and the presence of the peripheral cues. The three Q-value
units had to represent the value of directing gaze to the center, left and
right side of the screen. This task can only be solved by storing cue location
in working memory and, in addition, requires a non-linear transformation
and can therefore not be solved by a linear mapping from the sensory units
to the Q-value units. We trained the models for maximally 25,000 trials,
or until they learned the task. We kept track of accuracy for all four trial
types as the proportion correct responses in the last 50 trials. When all
accuracies reached 0.9 or higher, learning and exploration were disabled
(i.e. β and  were set to zero) and we considered learning successful if the
model performed all trial-types accurately.
We found that learning of this task with AuGMEnT was efficient. We
distinguished three points along the task learning trajectory: learning to
obtain the fixation reward (‘Fix’), learning to fixate until fixation-mark
offset (‘Go’) and finally to correctly solve the task (‘Task’). To determine
the ‘Fix’-learn trial, we determined the time point when the model attained
fixation in 90 out of 100 consecutive trials. The model learned to fixate after
224 trials (median) (Figure 4.2C). The model learned to maintain gaze until
the go signal after ∼ 1,300 trials and it successfully learned the complete
task after ∼ 4,100 trials. Thus, the learning process was at least an order
of magnitude faster than in monkeys that typically learn such a task after
months of training with more than 1,000 trials per day. To investigate the
effect of the shaping strategy, we also trained 10,000 networks without the
extra fixation reward (ri was zero). Networks that received fixation rewards
were more likely to learn than networks that did not (99.5% versus 76.4%;
χ2 = 2,498, p < 10−6). Thus, shaping strategies facilitate training with
AuGMEnT, similar to their beneficial effect in animal learning (Krueger
and Dayan, 2009).
55
PL,PR
AL,AR
PR
PL
AR
AL
PL
PR
AL
AR
Target
Action
A
0 1
Pr
op
. N
ea
re
st 
Ac
tiv
at
ion
-V
ec
to
r P
air
s
Start Fix Cue GoDelay
RL RL R
RL F
B
Fi
x
Go
Ta
sk
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
Co
nv
er
ge
d
0
0.5
0
0.2
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
0
0.1 >10000 
C
0
0.5
As
so
c.
0
0.5
As
so
c.
0
0.5
As
so
c.
F C G0
1Q
F C G F C G F C G
RR RRL L L L
F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F F
D D D D
Left Cue Right CueLeft Cue Right Cue
Pro-Saccade Anti-Saccade
* * * *
D
E F
(Proportion)
G
H
Sustained
On
Off
Figure 4.2
56
Figure 4.2 (continued from previous page): Saccade/antisaccade task. A, Structure
of the task, all possible trials have been illustrated. Fixation mark color indicates whether
a saccade (P) or anti-saccade (A) is required after a memory delay. Colored arrows show
the required action for the indicated trial types. L: cue left; R: cue right. B, The sensory
layer represents the visual information (fixation point, cue left/right) with sustained
and transient (on/off) units. Units in the Q-value layer code three possible eye positions:
left (green), center (blue) and right (red). C, Time course of learning: 10,000 networks
were trained, of which 9,945 learned the task within 25,000 trials. Histograms show the
distribution of trials when the model learned to fixate (‘fix’), maintain fixation until the
‘go’-signal (‘go’) and learned the complete task (‘task’). D, Activity of example units in the
association andQ-layer. The grey trace illustrates a regular unit and the green and orange
traces memory units. The bottom graphs show activity of the Q-value layer cells. Colored
letters denote the action with highest Q-value. Like the memory cells, Q-value units
also have delay activity that is sensitive to cue location (∗ in the lower panel) and their
activity increases after the go-signal. E, 2D-PCA projection of sequence of association
layer activations for the four different trial types for an example network. S marks the start
of the trials (empty screen). Pro saccade trials are shown with solid lines and anti-saccade
trials with dashed lines. Color indicates cue location (green - left; red - right) and labels
indicate trial type (P/A = type pro/anti; L/R = cue left/right). Percentages on the axes
show variance explained by the PCs. F, Mean variance explained as a function of the
number of PCs over all 100 trained networks, error bars s.d. G, Pairwise analysis of
activation vectors of different unit types in the network (see main text for explanation).
MEM: memory; REG: regular. This panel is aligned with the events in panel (A). Each
square within a matrix indicates the proportion of networks where the activity vectors of
different trial types were most similar. Color scale is shown below. For example, the right
top square for the memory unit matrix in the ‘go’ phase of the task indicates that around
25% of the networks had memory activation vectors that were most similar for Pro-Left
and Anti-Right trials. H, Pairwise analysis of activation-vectors for networks trained on
a version of the task where only pro-saccades were required. Conventions as in (G).
The activity of a fully trained network is illustrated in Figure 2D. One
of the association units (grey in Figure 4.2D) and the Q-unit for fixating at
the center of the display (blue in Figure 4.2B,D) had strongest activity at
fixation onset and throughout the fixation and memory delays. If recorded
in a macaque monkey, these neurons would be classified as fixation cells.
After the go-signal the Q-unit for the appropriate eye movement became
more active. The activity of the Q-units also depended on cue-location
during the memory delay as is observed, for example, in the frontal eye
fields (∗ in Figure 4.2D) (Sommer and Wurtz, 2001). This activity is caused
by the input from memory units in the association layer that memorized
cue location as a persistent increase in their activity (green and orange in
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Figure 4.2D). Memory units were also tuned to the color of the fixation mark
which differentiated pro-saccade trials from anti-saccade trials, a conjoined
selectivity necessary to solve this non-linear task (Rigotti et al., 2013). There
was an interesting division of labor between regular and memory units in
the association layer. Memory units learned to remember the cue location.
In contrast, regular units learned to encode the presence of task-relevant
sensory information on the screen. Specifically, the fixation unit in Fig.
4.2D (upper row) was active as long as the fixation point was present and
switched off when it disappeared, thus cueing the model to make an eye
movement. Interestingly, these two classes of memory neurons and regular
("light sensitive") neurons are also found in areas of the parietal and frontal
cortex of monkeys (Gnadt and Andersen, 1988; Sommer and Wurtz, 2001)
where they appear to have equivalent roles.
Figure 4.2D provides a first, casual impression of the representations
that the network learns. To gain a deeper understanding of the representa-
tion in the association layer that supports the non-linear mapping from the
sensory units to the Q-value units, we performed a principal component
analysis (PCA) on the activations of the association units. We constructed a
single (32× 7) observation matrix from the association layer activations for
each time-step (there were seven association units and eight time-points in
each of the four trial-types), with the learning rate β and exploration rate
 of the network set to zero. Figure 4.2E shows the projection of the
activation vectors onto the first two principal components for an example
network. It can be seen activity in the association layer reflects the
important events in the task. The color of the fixation point and the cue
location provide information about the correct action and lead to a ‘split’ in
the 2D principal component (PC) space. In the ‘Go’ phase, there are only
two possible correct actions: ‘left’ for the Pro-Left and Anti-Right trials and
‘right’ otherwise. The 2D PC plot shows that the network splits the space
into three parts based on the optimal action: here the ‘left’ action is
clustered in the middle, and the two trial types with target action ‘right’
are adjacent to this cluster. This pattern (or its inversion with the ‘right’
action in the middle) was typical for the trained networks. Figure 2F shows
how the explained variance in the activity of association units increases
with the number of PCs, averaged over 100 simulated networks; most
variance was captured by the first two PCs.
To investigate the representation that formed during learning across all
simulated networks, we next evaluated the similarity of activation patterns
(Euclidean distance) across the four trial types for the regular and memory
association units and also for the units in the Q-value layer (Figure 4.2G).
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For every network we entered a ‘1’ in the matrix for trial types with the
smallest distance and a ‘0’ for all other pairs of trials and then aggregated
results over all networks by averaging the resulting matrices. Initially the
patterns of activity in the association layer are similar for all trial types,
but they diverge after the presentation of the fixation point and the cue.
The regular units convey a strong representation of the color of the fixation
point (e.g. activity in pro-saccade trials with a left cue is similar to activity
in pro-saccade trials with a right cue; PL and PR in Figure 2G), which is
visible at all times. Memory units have a clear representation of the previous
cue location during the delay (e.g. AL trials similar to PL trials and AR to
PR trials in Figure 4.2G). At the go-cue their activity became similar for
trials requiring the same action (e.g. AL trials became similar to PR trials),
and the same was true for the units in the Q-value layer.
In our final experiment with this task, we investigated if working
memories are formed specifically for task-relevant features. We used the
same stimuli, but we now only required pro-saccades so that the color
of the fixation point became irrelevant. We trained 100 networks, of
which 96 learned the task and we investigated the similarities of the
activation patterns. In these networks, the memory units became tuned to
cue-location but not to color of the fixation point (Figure 4.2H; note the
similar activity patterns for trials with a differently colored fixation point,
e.g. AL and PL trials). Thus, AuGMEnT specifically induces selectivity for
task-relevant features in the association layer.
Delayed Match-to-category Task
The selectivity of neurons in the association cortex of monkeys changes if
the animals are trained to distinguish between categories of stimuli. After
training, neurons in frontal (Freedman, Riesenhuber, et al., 2001) and
parietal cortex (Freedman and Assad, 2006) respond similarly to stimuli
from the same category and discriminate between stimuli from different
categories. In one study (Freedman and Assad, 2006), monkeys had to
group motion stimuli in two categories in a delayed-match-to-category task
(Figure 4.3A). They first had to look at a fixation point, then a motion
stimulus appeared and after a delay a second motion stimulus was
presented. The monkeys’ response depended on whether the two stimuli
came from the same category or from different categories.
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Figure 4.3 (continued from previous page): Match-to-category task. A, When the
network directed gaze to the fixation point, we presented a motion stimulus (cue-1), and
after a delay a second motion stimulus (cue-2). The network had to make a saccade to the
left when the two stimuli belonged to the same category (match) and to the right otherwise.
There were twelve motion directions, which were divided into two categories (right). B,
The sensory layer had a unit representing the fixation point and 20 units with circular
Gaussian tuning curves (s.d. 12 deg.) with preferred directions evenly distributed over
the unit circle. C, Activity of two example memory units in a trained network evoked
by the twelve cue-1 directions. Each line represents one trial, and color represents cue
category. Responses to cues closest to the categorization boundary are drawn with a
dashed line of lighter color. F, fixation mark onset; C, cue-1 presentation. D, delay; G,
cue-2 presentation (go signal); S, saccade. D, Activity of the same two example memory
units as in (C) in the ‘go’ phase of the task for all 12× 12 combinations of cues. Colors of
labels and axes indicate cue category. E, Left, Motion tuning of the memory units (in C) at
the end of the memory delay. Error bars show s.d. across trials and the dotted vertical line
indicates the category boundary. Right, Tuning of a typical LIP neuron (from Freedman
and Assad, 2006), error bars show s.e.m. F, Left, Distribution of the direction change
that evoked the largest difference in response across memory units from 100 networks.
Right, Distribution of direction changes that evoked largest response differences in LIP
neurons (from Freedman and Assad, 2006).
We investigated if AuGMEnT could train a network with an identical
architecture (with 3 regular and 4 memory units in the association layer)
as the network of the delayed saccade/antisaccade task to perform this
categorization task. We used an input layer with a unit for the fixation point
and 20 units with circular Gaussian tuning curves of the form:
r(x) = exp
(
− (x −θc)
2
2σ2
)
, (4.32)
with preferred directions θc evenly distributed over the unit circle and
a standard deviation σ of 12 deg. (Figure 4.3B). The two categories were
defined by a boundary that separated the twelve motion directions (adjacent
motion directions were separated by 30 deg.) into two sets of six directions
each.
We first waited until the model directed gaze to the fixation point. Two
time-steps after fixation we presented one of twelve motion-cues as cue-1
for one time step and gave the fixation reward ri (Figure 4.3A). We added
Gaussian noise to the motion direction (s.d. 5 deg.) to simulate noise in the
sensory system. The model had to maintain fixation during the ensuing
memory delay that lasted two time steps. We then presented a second
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motion stimulus as cue-2 and the model had to make an eye-movement
(either left or right; the fixation mark did not turn off in this task) that
depended on the match between the categories of the cues. We required an
eye movement to the left if both stimuli belonged to the same category and
to the right otherwise, within eight time-steps after cue-2. We trained 100
models and measured accuracy for the preceding 50 trials with the same
cue-1. We determined the duration of the learning phase as the trial where
accuracy had reached 80% for all cue-1 types.
In spite of their simple feedforward structure with only seven units in
the association layer, AuGMEnT trained the networks to criterion in all
simulations within a median of 11,550 trials. Figure 4.3C illustrates motion
tuning of two example memory neurons in a trained network. Both units
had become category selective, from cue onset onwards and throughout
the delay period. Figure 4.3D shows the activity of these units at ‘Go’ time
(i.e. after presentation of cue-2) for all 144 combinations of the two cues.
Figure 4.3E shows the tuning of the memory units during the delay period.
For every memory unit of the simulations (N = 400), we determined the
direction change eliciting the largest difference in activity (Figure 4.3F) and
found that the units exhibited the largest changes in activity for differences
in the motion direction that crossed a category boundary, as do neurons in
LIP (Freedman and Assad, 2006) (Figure 4.3E,F, right). Thus, AuGMEnT can
train networks to perform a delayed match-to-category task and it induces
memory tuning for those feature variations that matter.
Probabilistic Decision Making Task
We have shown that AuGMEnT can train a single network to perform
a delayed saccade/anti-saccade task or a match-to-category task and to
maintain task-relevant information as persistent activity. Persistent activity
in area LIP has also been related to perceptual decision making, because LIP
neurons integrate sensory information over time in decision making tasks
(Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Can AuGMEnT train the very same network
to integrate evidence for a perceptual decision? We focused on a recent
study (Yang and Shadlen, 2007) in which monkeys saw a red and a green
saccade target and then four symbols that were presented successively.
The four symbols provided probabilistic evidence about whether a red or
green eye-movement target was baited with reward (Figure 4.4A). Some
of the symbols provided strong evidence in favor of the red target (e.g. the
triangle in the inset of Figure 4.4A), others strong evidence for the green
target (heptagon) and other symbols provided weaker evidence. The pattern
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Figure 4.4: Probabilistic classification task. A, After the network attained fixation,
we presented four shapes in a random order at four locations. The shapes s1, . . . , s4 cued a
saccade to the red or green target: their location varied randomly across trials. Reward
was assigned to the red target with probability P (R | s1, s2, s3, s4) = 10W /(1 + 10W ), with
W =
∑4
i=1wi , and to the green target otherwise. Inset shows weights wi associated with
cues si .B, The sensory layer had units for the fixation point, for the colors of the targets
on each side of the screen and there was a set of units for the symbols at each of the four
retinotopic locations. C, Activity of two context sensitive memory units andQ-value units
(bottom) in a trial where four triangle symbols were presented to a trained network. The
green target is the optimal choice. F: fixation mark onset; D: memory delay; G: fixation
mark offset (‘Go’-signal).
of choices revealed that the monkeys assigned high weights to symbols
carrying strong evidence and lower weights to less informative ones. A
previous model with only one layer of modifiable synapses could learn a
simplified, linear version of this task where the symbols provided direct
evidence for one of two actions (Soltani and Wang, 2009). This model used a
pre-wired memory and it did not simulate the full task where symbols only
carry evidence about red and green choices while the position of the red
and green targets varied across trials. Here we tested if AuGMEnT could
train our network with three regular and four memory units to perform the
full non-linear task.
We trained the model with a shaping strategy using sequence of tasks of
increasing complexity, just as in the monkey experiment (Yang and Shadlen,
2007). We will first describe the most complex version of the task. In this
version, the model (Figure 4.4B) had to first direct gaze to the fixation
point. After fixating for two time-steps, we gave the fixation reward ri and
presented the colored targets and also one of the 10 symbols at one of
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four locations around the fixation mark, In the subsequent three time-steps
we presented the additional symbols. We randomized location of the red
and green targets, the position of the successively presented symbols as
well as the symbol sequence over trials. There was a memory delay of two
time steps after all symbols had been presented and we then removed
the fixation point, as a cue to make a saccade to one of the colored targets.
Reward rf was assigned to the red target with probability P (R | s1, s2, s3, s4) =
10W /(1 + 10W ), with W =
∑4
i=1wi (wi is specified in Figure 4.4A, inset) and
to the green target otherwise. The model’s choice was considered correct
if it selected the target with highest reward probability, or either target if
reward probabilities were equal. However, rf was only given if the model
selected the baited target, irrespective of whether it had the highest reward
probability.
The shaping strategy used for training gradually increased the set of
input symbols (2,4, . . . ,10) and sequence length (1 . . .4) in eight steps (Table
4.3). Training started with the two ‘trump’ shapes which guarantee reward
for the correct decision (triangle and heptagon, see Figure 4.4A, inset).
We judged that the task had been learned when the success rate in the
last n trials was 85%. As the number of possible input patterns grew we
increased n to ensure that a significant fraction of possible input-patterns
had been presented before we determined convergence (see Table 4.3).
Difficulty was first increased by adding the pair of symbols with the next
smaller absolute weight, until all shapes had been introduced (level 1-5) and
then by increasing sequence length (level 6-8). With this shaping strategy
AuGMEnT successfully trained 99 of 100 networks within a total of 500,000
trials. Training of the model to criterion (85% correct in the final task) took
a median total of 55,234 trials across the eight difficulty levels, which is
faster than the monkeys learned. After the training procedure, the memory
units had learned to integrate information for either the red or green choice
over the symbol sequence and maintained information about the value
of this choice as persistent activity during the memory delay. Figure 4.4C
shows the activity of two memory units and theQ-value units of an example
network during a trial where the shield symbol was presented four times,
providing strong evidence that the green target was baited with reward. The
memory units became sensitive to the context determined by the position
of the red and green saccade targets. The unit in the first row of Figure
4.4C integrated evidence for the green target if it appeared on the right
side and the unit in the second row if the green target appeared on the left.
Furthermore, the activity of these memory units ramped up gradually as
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more evidence accumulated.
The activity of neurons in LIP was correlated to the log likelihood that
the targets are baited (Yang and Shadlen, 2007). To investigate the influence
of log likelihood on the activity of the memory units, we computed log
likelihood ratio (logLR) quintiles as follows. We enumerated all 10,000
length 4 symbol combinations s ∈ S and computed the probability of reward
for a saccade to the red target, P (R|S) for every combination. We next
computed the conditional probabilities of reward P (R|sl) and P (G|sl) =
1 − P (R|sl) for sequences sl of length l ∈ {1 . . .4} (marginalizing over the
unobserved symbols). We then computed LogLR(sl) as log10(P (R|sl)/P (G|sl))
for each specific sequence of length l and divided those into quintiles.
To determine how the activity of memory units depended on the log
likelihood that the targets were baited we first compared their average
activity after observing a complete sequence of the lower and upper
quintile, and reordered the quintiles so they were increasing for each unit.
We then computed the average within-quintile activities over the aligned
population. The upper panel of Figure 4.5A shows how the average activity
of the four memory units of an example network depended on the log
likelihood that the targets were baited and the lower panel shows LIP data
(Yang and Shadlen, 2007) for comparison. It can be seen that the memory
units’ activity became correlated to the log likelihood, just like LIP neurons.
Importantly, the synaptic weights from input neurons to memory cells
depended on the true weights of the symbols after learning (Figure 4.5B).
This correlation was also strong at the population level as can be seen in
Figure 4.5C which shows the distribution of all the correlation coefficients
(N = 396). Thus, plasticity of synapses onto the memory neurons can
explain how the monkeys valuate the symbols and AuGMEnT explains
how these neurons learn to integrate the most relevant information.
Furthermore, our results illustrate that AuGMEnT not only trains the
association units to integrate stochastic sensory evidence but also endows
them with the required mixed selectivity for target color and symbol
sequence that is required to solve this non-linear task (Rigotti et al., 2013).
Vibrotactile Discrimination Task
The previous simulations addressed tasks that have been employed for the
study of neurons in area LIP of monkeys. Our last simulation investigated a
task that has been used to study vibrotactile working memory (Hernández
et al., 1997; Romo, Brody, et al., 1999). In this task, the monkey touches a
key with one hand and then two vibration stimuli are applied sequentially
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Figure 4.5: Tuning in the association layer in the probabilistic classification task.
A, Trials were subdivided in quintiles based on the log-likelihood ratio of the evidence
favoring one target. Average activations of the four memory units of a trained model
network (top; 100,000 trials) and LIP neurons (bottom, from Yang and Shadlen, 2007)
depend on the log-likelihood ratio. B, Left, Average synaptic weights between input
units representing symbols and an example memory unit are strongly correlated (ρ ≈ 1,
p < 10−6) with true symbol weights. Right, Subjective weights assigned by a monkey as
estimated from the performance data (from Yang and Shadlen, 2007). C, Histogram of
Spearman correlations between average synaptic weights for symbols and true symbol
weights for 396 memory units (AuGMEnT trained 99 of 100 simulated networks to
criterion). Note that there are also units with zero correlation that do not contribute
to the mapping of the symbols onto Q-values. These units were accompanied by other
association units with stronger correlations.
to a fingertip of the other hand (Figure 4.6A). The monkey has to indicate
whether the frequency of the first vibration stimulus (F1) is higher or
lower than the frequency of the second one (F2). At the end of the trial the
animal indicates its choice by releasing the key and pressing one of two
buttons. The overall structure of the task is similar to that of the visual
tasks described above, but the feature of interest here is that it requires a
comparison between two scalar values; F2 that is sensed on the finger and
F1 that has to be maintained in working memory.
Recent computational work has addressed various aspects of the
vibrotactile discrimination task. Several models addressed how neural
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network models can store F1 and compare it to F2 (Deco, Rolls, and Romo,
2010; Machens, 2005; Miller and Wang, 2006). More recently, Barak et al.
(2013) investigated the dynamics of the memory states in networks trained
with three different supervised learning methods and compared them to
the neuronal data. However, these previous studies did not yet address
trial-and-error learning of the vibrotactile discrimination task with a
biologically plausible learning rule. We therefore investigated if AuGMEnT
could train the same network that had been used for LIP, with three regular
units and four memory units, to solve this task. The input layer was
modeled after sensory area S2 of the monkey. Neurons in this cortical area
have broad tuning curves and either monotonically increase or decrease
their firing rate as function of the frequency of the vibrotactile stimulus
(Romo, Hernández, Zainos, and Salinas, 2003). The input units of the
model had sigmoidal tuning curves:
r(x) =
1
1 + exp(w(θc − x)) , (4.33)
with 10 center points θc evenly distributed over the interval between 5.5Hz
and 49.5Hz. We used a pair of units at every θc with one unit increasing
its activity with stimulus frequency and the other one decreasing, so that
there were a total of 20 input units. Parameter w determines the steepness
of the tuning curve and was +/- 5. We modeled sensory noise by adding
independent zero mean Gaussian noise (s.d. 7.5%) to the firing rates of
the input units. We also included a binary input unit that signaled skin
contact with the stimulation device (unit S in Figure 4.6B). The association
and Q-value layers were identical to those of the other simulations (Figure
4.6B).
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Figure 4.6 (continued from previous page): Vibrotactile discrimination task. A,
Top line shows vibrotactile stimuli, bottom colored lines show target actions for the
example trial (F1 < F2). H, hold key; L, press left button to indicate F2 < F1; R, press
right button to indicate F2 > F1. B, Network model. The units in the sensory layer are
tuned for the tactile frequency with monotonically increasing or decreasing sigmoidal
tuning curves. The binary ‘S’ neuron codes for skin contact of the vibrotactile probe
and becomes active at ‘Contact’ in A. C, Average psychometric curves for 100 networks
trained on the variable F1 task. Each set of data points (grouped by color) shows responses
for the F1 stimulus that is indicated with a vertical line for flanking F2 stimuli; blue:
F1=20Hz, yellow: F1=30Hz and pink: F1=40Hz. Y-axis shows the mean proportion
of trials where networks indicated that F2 > F1 (each comparison was evaluated 100
times for every network). Error bars show s.d. over networks. Curves are logistic fits to
the model responses. D, Tuning of two example memory units to F1 frequency during
the delay phase. E, Histogram of linear correlations between F1 frequency and memory
unit activations during the delay phase for 100 networks (N = 400). F, Example activity
traces for two memory units and the three Q-value units. Left panel shows the response
for F1=20Hz and F2=F1 ±5Hz (solid +5Hz, dashed −5Hz). The response of the Q-value
units is coded following the color scheme in panels A and B. Right panel shows the activity
of these units when F1 was 30Hz. F2 indicates onset of second vibration stimulus. D:
Memory delay phase. Note that F2 is 25Hz for the continuous lines in the left panel and
also for the dashed lines in the right panel, but that these trials require different responses
(right button if F1=20Hz and left button if F1=30Hz). G, Scatter plot of linear regression
parameters of various unit types when F2 was presented (as explained in the main text).
A positive A1 (A2) parameter indicates that a unit becomes more active for higher F1
(F2). Green line shows y = x and the activity of units on this line is related to the sum of
F1 and F2. The red line represents y = −x, and the activity of units on this line represents
the difference between F1 and F2. The color scheme for the Q-value units is the same as in
(A) and (B). H, Scatter plot of linear regression parameters at the time of F2 presentation
for networks trained on the version of the task with fixed F1. I, Psychometric curves for
block-trained fixed F1 networks (see vibrotactile discrimination text). Same conventions
as for (C). Only the logistic fit (black line) for F1=30Hz is drawn.
Our first simulation addressed a version of the task where F1 varied
from trial to trial (Hernández et al., 1997). A trial started when the input
unit indicating skin contact with the vibrating probe became active and the
model had to select the hold-key within ten time-steps, or else the trial was
terminated. When the model had held the key for two time-steps, a vibration
stimulus (F1, uniformly random between 5 and 50 Hz) was presented to
the network for one time-step and the small shaping reward (ri) was given.
This was followed by a memory delay after which we presented the second
vibration stimulus (F2), drawn from a uniform distribution between 5 and
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50 Hz, but with a minimal separation of 2 Hz from F1. If F2 was lower
than F1 the model had to select the left button (green Q-value unit in
Figure 4.6B) - and the right button (red) otherwise - within eight time steps
after the presentation of F2 to obtain the reward rf . To determine model
performance, we divided the range of F1 stimuli into 9 bins of 5 Hz and
kept track of the running average of performance in 50 trials for each bin.
When the model reached a performance of 80% for every F1 we disabled
learning and exploration (setting learning parameters β and  to zero) and
checked the performance of the model for F1 stimuli of 20, 30 and 40 Hz
and F2 stimuli with offsets of [−10,−8, . . . ,−2,2, . . . ,8,10] Hz, repeating each
test 20 times. We considered learning to be successful if the model classified
the nearest F2 frequencies (2 Hz distance) with a minimal accuracy of 50%
and all other F2 frequencies with an accuracy better than 75%, for every
F1 bin. AuGMEnT trained all 100 simulated networks to criterion within a
median of 3,036 trials. Figure 4.6C illustrates the average (±s.d.) choices of
these 100 trained models as a function of F2, for three values of F1 as well as
a logistic function fitted to the data (as in Hernández et al., 1997). It can be
seen that the model correctly indicates whether F1 is higher or lower than
F2 and that the criterion depends on the value F1, implying that the model
has learned to store this analog scalar value in its working memory. What
are the memory representations that emerged during learning? Figure 4.6D
shows the F1 tuning of two memory units in an example network; typically
the tunings are broad and can be increasing or decreasing as a function
of F1, similar to what was found in experiments in the frontal cortex of
monkeys (Romo and Salinas, 2003). Figure 4.6E shows the distribution of
linear correlations between 400 memory units in 100 trained networks and
F1 frequency; most units exhibit a strong positive or negative correlation,
indicating that the networks learned to code the memory of F1 as the level
of persistent firing of the memory units.
We next investigated how the model carried out the comparison process
that has to take place after the presentation of F2. This comparison process
depends critically on the order of presentation of the two stimuli, yet
it involves information that comes in via the same sensory inputs and
association units (Deco, Rolls, and Romo, 2010). We found that the memory
units were indeed sensitive to both F1 and F2 in the comparison period.
Figure 4.6F shows the response of two example memory units and the three
Q-value units for trials with an F1 of 20 or 30 Hz, followed by an F2 with a
frequency that was either 5Hz higher (solid line) or lower than F1 (dashed
line). The activity of the memory units encodes F1 during the memory delay,
but these units also respond to F2 so that the activity after the presentation
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of F2 depends on both frequencies. The lower panel illustrates the activity of
the Q-value units. The activity of the Hold Q-value unit (H, blue) is highest
until the presentation of F2, causing the model to hold the key until the
go-signal. This unit did not distinguish between trials that required a right
or left button press. The activities of Q-value units for the left and right
button press (red and green traces) explain how the network made correct
decisions at the go-signal because the Q-value of the appropriate action
became highest (the solid lines in Figure 4.6F show activity if F2>F1 and
dashed lines F2<F1). It can be seen, for example, how the response elicited
in the Q-value layer by an F2 of 25Hz depended on whether the preceding
F1 was 20Hz (continuous curves in the left panel of Figure 4.6F) or 30Hz
(dashed curves in the right panel). We next quantified how the activity of
the memory, regular and Q-units from 100 networks (N = 400, 300 and 300
units, respectively) depended on F1 and F2 during the comparison phase
with a regression (see Romo, Hernández, and Zainos, 2004) using all trials
where the F2 stimulus was presented and for all combinations of the two
frequencies between 5 and 50 Hz (step size 1Hz),
r(F1,F2) = F1a1 +F2a2 + b (4.34)
Here a1 and a2 estimate the dependence of the unit’s activity on F1 and F2,
respectively. The activity of many memory units depended on F1 and also
on F2 (Figure 4.6G, left) and the overall negative correlation between the
coefficients (r = −0.81, p < 10−6) indicates that units that tended to respond
more strongly for increasing F1 tended to decrease their response for
increasing F2 and vice versa, just as is observed in area S2, the prefrontal
cortex and the medial premotor cortex of monkeys (Romo, Brody, et al.,
1999; Romo, Hernández, and Zainos, 2004; Romo and Salinas, 2003). In
other words, many memory units became tuned to the difference between
F1 and F2 in the comparison phase, as is required by this task. In spite of
the fact that F1 and F2 activate memory units with the same synapses, the
inverse tuning is possible because the F1 stimulus has turned off and
activated the off-cells in the sensory layer in the comparison phase. In
contrast, the F2 stimulus is still ‘on’ in this phase of the task so that the
off-units coding F2 did not yet provide their input to the memory cells. As
a result, the memory units’ final activity can reflect the difference between
F1 and F2, as is required by the task. Regular units only have access to the
current stimulus, and were therefore they are only tuned to F2 in the
comparison phase (Figure 4.6G, middle). Q-value units reflect the outcome
of the comparison process (Figure 4.6G, right): their correlation coefficients
with F1 and F2 fall into three clusters as predicted by the required action.
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The version of the task described above demanded the comparison between
two flutter frequencies because F1 varied from trial to trial. Hernández
et al. (1997) also studied a version of the task where F1 was fixed for a
block of trials. In this version, the monkeys based their response on F2 only
and did not memorize F1. As a result their performance deteriorated at the
start of a new block of trials with a different F1. Networks trained with
AuGMEnT also only memorize task-relevant information. Do networks
trained with AuGMEnT also fail to memorize F1 if it is fixed during
training? To investigate this question, we trained models with a fixed F1 of
30 Hz (Hernández et al., 1997) and presented F2 stimuli in the range
between 5-50 Hz (2.5 Hz spacing) with a minimal distance from F1 of 10
Hz. We estimated convergence as the trial when accuracy reached 90%
(running average of 50 trials). AuGMEnT trained all 100 networks to
criterion in this simpler task within a median of 1,390 trials. After learning
the fixed F1 task, we subjected the networks to block training with F1
stimuli of 20, 30 and 40 Hz (as in Hernández et al., 1997) while we
presented F2 stimuli with frequencies of [−10,−8, . . . ,−2,2, . . . ,8,10] Hz
relative to F1 (10 total, each shown 150 times). These blocks of trials had a
pseudorandom ordering but we always presented a 30Hz F1 in the last
block. When we tested immediately after every block, we found that the
models were well able to adapt to a specific F1. However, the models were
not able to solve the variable F1 task after this extensive block training,
even though they had significant exposure to different F1 stimuli. Figure
4.6I shows the average psychometric curves for 100 networks after the last
block with F1=30Hz. Colors represent trials with different F1 stimuli (as in
Figure 4.6C). It can be seen that the models disregarded F1 and only
determined whether F2 was higher or lower than 30 Hz, just as monkeys
that are trained with a blocked procedure (Hernández et al., 1997). Thus,
the model can explain why the monkeys do not learn to compare the two
stimuli if the F1 is fixed for longer blocks of trials. The memory units and
the Q-value units now had similar rather than opposite tuning for F1 and
F2 (positive correlations in the left and right panel of Figure 4.6H; compare
to Figure 4.6G), which indicates that blocked training causes a failure to
learn to subtract the memory trace of F1 from the representation of F2.
We conclude that AuGMEnT is able to train networks on a task that
requires a comparison between two analog stimuli and where the correct
decision depends on stimulus order. Memory units learn to represent the
analog value that needs to be memorized as a graded level of persistent
activity. However, if F1 is fixed for blocks of trials, the network does not
memorize F1 but learns to base its decision on F2 only, in accordance with
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experimental findings.
4.5 Varying parameters of the network
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Figure 4.7: Robustness to variations in the parameters that control learning rate.
The upper row shows how the proportion of networks that converged varies as function of
β (learning rate) and λ (decay of tags); white regions had a proportion of convergence
lower than 0.8. The lower row shows the effect of β and λ on the median trial when the
learning criterion was reached; white regions reached convergence lated than the yellow
regions (see insets).
It is remarkable that AuGMEnT can train the same simple network to
perform a wide range of tasks, simply by delivering rewards at the
appropriate times. In the simulations described above we fixed the
number of units in the association layer and Q-value layer and used
a single set of learning parameters. To examine the stability of the
learning scheme, we also evaluated learning speed and convergence
rate for various values of the learning rate β and the SARSA learning
parameter λ (which determines the tag-decay parameter α because
α = (1−λγ) as was explained above, γ was kept at the default value). For
the saccade/antisaccade, match-to-category and vibrotactile discrimination
tasks we tested β ∈ 0.05,0.10, . . . ,1.0 and λ ∈ 0.0,0.10, . . . ,0.9 while the
other parameters remained the same (Tables 4.1,4.2) and ran 100
simulations for every combination. Figure 4.7 shows the proportion of
networks that converged and the median convergence trial. Training in the
probabilistic classification task required a number of different training
stages and a longer overall training time and we evaluated this task with a
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Figure 4.8: Varying the size of the association layer. A, Scaling with unchanged
learning parameters β and λ. Left, convergence rate (proportion of 100 networks that
learned the saccade/antisaccade task). Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Right,
median convergence speed (number of trials to criterion). B, Left, convergence rates with
adjusted learning parameters. Bar shading indicates parameter setting (see legend in
right panel). Right, median convergence speed with optimized parameters.
smaller set of parameters (Figure 4.7, right). There was a wide range for the
learning parameters where most of the networks converged and these
ranges overlapped for the four tasks, implying that the AuGMEnT learning
scheme is relatively robust and stable. So far our simulations used a fixed
network with only seven units in the association layers. Can AuGMEnT
also train networks with a larger association layer? To further investigate
the generality of the learning scheme, we ran a series of simulations with
increasing numbers of association units, multiplying the number of
association units in the network described above by 2,4, . . . ,128 and
training 100 networks of each size in the saccade/antisaccade task. We first
evaluated these larger networks without changing the learning parameters
and found that the learning was largely unaffected within a limited range
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of network sizes, whereas performance deteriorated for networks that were
32-128 fold larger (Figure 4.8A). The decrease in performance is likely
caused by the larger number of synapses, causing larger adjustments of the
Q-values after each time step than in the smaller networks. It is possible to
compensate for this effect by choosing a smaller β (learning rate) and λ. We
jointly scaled these parameters by 1/2,1/4 and 1/8 and selected the
parameter combination which resulted in the highest convergence rate and
the fastest median convergence speed for every network size (Figure 4.8B).
The performance of the larger networks was at least as good as that of the
network with seven units if learning parameters were scaled. Thus,
AuGMEnT can also successfully train networks with a much larger
association layer.
4.6 Discussion
AuGMEnT provides a new theoretical framework that can explain how
neurons become tuned to relevant sensory stimuli in sequential decision
tasks during trial-and- error learning. The scheme uses units inspired by
transient and sustained neurons in sensory cortices (Nassi and Callaway,
2009), action-value coding neurons in frontal cortex, basal ganglia and
midbrain (Hikosaka, 2005; Morris et al., 2006; Samejima et al., 2005) and
neurons with mnemonic activity that integrate input in association cortex.
To the best of our knowledge, AuGMEnT is the first biologically plausible
learning scheme that implements SARSA in a multi-layer neural network
equipped with working memory. The model is simple, yet is able to
learn a wide range of difficult tasks requiring non-linear sensory-motor
transformations, decision making, categorization, and working memory.
AuGMEnT can train the very same network to perform either of these tasks
by presenting the appropriate sensory inputs and reward contingency, and
the representations it learns are similar to those found in animals trained
on similar tasks. AuGMEnT is a so-called on-policy method because it only
relies on the Q-values that the network experiences during learning. These
on-policy methods appear to be more stable than off-policy algorithms
(such as Q-learning which considers transitions not experienced by the
network), if combined with neural networks (see e.g. Baird, 1995; Boyan
and Moore, 1995).
AuGMEnT forms memory representations for features that need to be
remembered. In the delayed saccade/anti-saccade task, training induced
persistent neuronal activity tuned to the cue location and to the color of the
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fixation point, but only if it was relevant. In the categorization task, units
became sensitive to category boundaries and in the decision making
task, units integrated sensory evidence with stronger weights for the
more reliable inputs. These properties resemble those of neurons in
LIP (Freedman and Assad, 2006; Gnadt and Andersen, 1988; Gottlieb
and Goldberg, 1999; Yang and Shadlen, 2007) and the frontal cortex
(Funahashi, Bruce, and Goldman-Rakic, 1989) of monkeys. Finally, the
memory units learned to memorize and compare analog values in the
vibrotactile task, just as has been observed in the frontal cortex of monkeys
(Hernández et al., 1997; Romo, Brody, et al., 1999).
AuGMEnT makes a number of predictions that could be tested in
future neuroscientific experiments. The first and foremost prediction is
that feedback connections gate plasticity of the connections by inducing
synaptic tags. Specifically, the learning scheme predicts that feedback
connections are important for the induction of tags on feedforward
connections from sensory cortices to the association cortex (Fig. 4.1B). A
second prediction is the existence of traces in synapses onto neurons with
persistent activity (i.e. memory units) that are transformed into tags upon
the arrival of feedback from the response selection stage, which may occur
at a later point in time. The third prediction is that these tags interact with
globally released neuromodulators (e.g. dopamine or acetylcholine), which
determine the strength and sign of the synaptic changes (potentiation or
depression). Neurobiological evidence for the existence of these tags and
their interaction with neuromodulatory substances will be discussed below.
A final prediction is that stationary stimuli provide transient input to
neurons with persistent activity. As a result, stimuli that are visible for a
longer time do not necessarily cause a ramping of activity. In our network
ramping was prevented because memory units received input from "on"
and "off" input units only. We note, however, that other mechanisms such
as, for example, rapidly adapting synapses onto memory cells, could
achieve the same effect. In contrast, neurons in association cortex without
persistent activity are predicted to receive continuous input, for as long as
a stimulus is present. These specific predictions could all be tested in
future neuroscientific work.
Role of attentional feedback and neuromodulators in learning
AuGMEnT implements a four-factor learning rule. The first two factors are
pre- and post-synaptic activity of the units and there are two additional
‘gating factors’ that enable synaptic plasticity. The first gating factor is the
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feedback from units in the motor layer that code the selected action. These
units send an attentional signal back to earlier processing levels to tag
synapses responsible for selecting this action. The importance of selective
attention for learning is supported by experiments in cognitive psychology.
If observers select a stimulus for an action, attention invariably shifts to
this stimulus (Deubel and Schneider, 1996) and this selective attention
signal gates perceptual learning so that attended objects have larger impact
on future behavior (Ahissar and Hochstein, 1993; Jiang and Chun, 2001;
Schoups et al., 2001). Moreover, neurophysiological studies demonstrated
that such a feedback signal exists, because neurons in the motor cortex that
code an action enhance the activity of upstream neurons providing input
for this action (Moore and Armstrong, 2003; Roelfsema, van Ooyen, and
Watanabe, 2010).
The second gating-factor that enables plasticity is a global neuro-
modulatory signal that broadcasts the RPE to many brain regions and
determines the sign and strength of the changes in synapses that have been
tagged. Dopamine is often implicated because it is released if reward
expectancy increases and it influences synaptic plasticity (Montague,
Hyman, and Cohen, 2004; Schultz, 2002). There is also a potential role for
acetylcholine because cholinergic cells project diffusely to cortex, respond
to rewards (Kilgard and Merzenich, 1998; Richardson and DeLong,
1986) and influence synaptic plasticity (Kilgard and Merzenich, 1998).
Furthermore, a recent study demonstrated that serotonergic neurons also
carry a reward-predicting signal and that the optogenetic activation of
serotonergic neurons acts as a positive reinforcer (Liu et al., 2014).
Guidance of synaptic plasticity by the combination of neuromodulatory
signals and cortico-cortical feedback connections is biologically plausible
because all information for the synaptic update is available at the synapse.
Synaptic tags and synaptic traces
Learning in AuGMEnT depends on synaptic tags and traces. The first step in
the plasticity of a synapse onto a memory cell is the formation of a synaptic
trace that persists until the end of the trial (Figure 4.1C). The second step
is the conversion of the trace into a tag, when a selected motor unit feeds
back to the memory cell. The final step is the release of the neuromodulator
that modifies tagged synapses. The learning rule for the synapses onto the
regular (i.e. non-memory) association units is similar (Figure 4.1B), but tags
form directly onto active synapses, skipping the first step. We note, however,
that the same learning rule is obtained if these synapses also have traces that
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decay within one time-step. The hypothesis that synaptic plasticity requires
a sequence of events (Friedrich, Urbanczik, and Senn, 2011; Fusi, Drew, and
Abbott, 2005) is supported by the synapses’ complex biochemical machinery.
There is evidence for synaptic tags (Cassenaer and Laurent, 2012; Frey and
Morris, 1997; Moncada et al., 2011) and recent studies have started to
elucidate their identity (Moncada et al., 2011). Neuromodulatory signals
influence synaptic plasticity even if released seconds or minutes later than
the plasticity-inducing event (Cassenaer and Laurent, 2012; Moncada et al.,
2011), which supports that they interact with some form of tag.
Comparison to previous modeling approaches
There has been substantial progress in biologically inspired reinforcement
learning models with spiking neurons (Izhikevich, 2006; Potjans, Diesmann,
and Morrison, 2011; Seung, 2003; Urbanczik and Senn, 2009) and with
models that approximate population activity with continuous variables
(Engel and Wang, 2011; Friedrich, Urbanczik, and Senn, 2011; Hoerzer,
Legenstein, and Maass, 2014; Houk, Adams, and Barto, 1995; O’Reilly and
Frank, 2006; Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005; Soltani and Wang, 2009;
Suri and Schultz, 1998). Many of the models rely either on Actor-Critic
learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) or on policy gradient learning (Williams,
1992). An advantage of Actor-Critic models is that model components
relate to brain regions (Houk, Adams, and Barto, 1995; Potjans, Diesmann,
and Morrison, 2011; Suri and Schultz, 1998), e.g. the activity of dopamine
neurons resembles the RPE. AuGMEnT has features in common with these
models. For example, it uses the change in Q-value to compute the RPE
(equation (4.17)). Another widely used class of models is formed by policy
gradient learning methods (Seung, 2003; Williams, 1992) where units (or
synapses (Seung, 2003)) act as local agents that try to increase the global
reward. An advantage is that learning does not require knowledge about
the influence of units on other units in the network, but a disadvantage is
that the learning process does not scale well to larger networks where the
correlation between local activity and the global reward is weak (Urbanczik
and Senn, 2009). AuGMEnT uses ‘attentional’ feedback from the selected
action to improve leaning (Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005) and it also
generalizes to multi-layer networks. It thereby alleviates a limitation of
many previous biologically plausible RL models, which can only train a
single layer of modifiable synaptic weights and solve linear tasks (Engel and
Wang, 2011; Friedrich, Urbanczik, and Senn, 2011; Houk, Adams, and Barto,
1995; Potjans, Diesmann, and Morrison, 2011; Soltani and Wang, 2009; Suri
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and Schultz, 1998; Urbanczik and Senn, 2009) and binary decisions (Engel
and Wang, 2011; Friedrich, Urbanczik, and Senn, 2011; Soltani and Wang,
2009; Urbanczik and Senn, 2009).
Unlike these previous models, AuGMEnT is a model of action-value
learning (SARSA(λ), Sutton and Barto, 1998). It differs from many
previous models in its ability to train task-relevant working memory
representations, without pre-wiring. We modeled memory units as
integrators, because neurons that act as integrators and maintain their
activity during memory delays have been found in many cortical regions
(Egorov et al., 2002; Freedman and Assad, 2006; Funahashi, Bruce, and
Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Gnadt and Andersen, 1988; Gottlieb and Goldberg,
1999; Yang and Shadlen, 2007). To keep the model simple, we did not
specify the mechanisms causing persistent activity, which could derive
from intracellular processes, local circuit reverberations or recurrent
activity in larger networks spanning cortex, thalamus and basal ganglia
(Engel and Wang, 2011; Fransén et al., 2006; Koulakov et al., 2002).
A few studies included a pre-wired working memory in RL (Engel and
Wang, 2011; Soltani and Wang, 2009) but there has been comparatively
little work on biologically plausible learning of new memories. Earlier
neural networks models used “backpropagation-through-time”, but
its mechanisms are biologically implausible (Zipser, 1991). The long
short-term memory model (LSTM, Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997) is a
recent and popular approach. Working memories in LSTM rely on the
persistent activity of memory units, which resemble the ones used
by AuGMEnT. However, LSTM relies on the biologically implausible
error-backpropagation rule. To our knowledge, only one previous model
addressed the creation of working memories with a neurobiologically
inspired learning scheme, the prefrontal basal-ganglia working memory
model (PBWM, O’Reilly and Frank, 2006), which is part of the Leabra
cognitive architecture (O’Reilly, Hazy, and Herd, 2012; O’Reilly and
Munakata, 2000). Although a detailed comparison of AuGMEnT and
Leabra is beyond the scope of this work, it is useful to mention a few key
differences. First, the complexity and level of detail of the Leabra/PBWM
framework is greater than that of AuGMEnT. The PBWM framework uses
more than ten modules, each with its own dynamics and learning rules,
making formal analysis difficult. We chose to keep the models trained with
AuGMEnT as simple as possible, so that learning is easier to understand.
AuGMEnT ’s simplicity comes at a cost because many functions remained
abstract (see next section). Second, the PBWM model uses a teacher that
informs the model about the correct decision, i.e. it uses more information
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than just reward feedback. Third, PBWM is an actor-critic architecture that
learns the value of states, whereas AuGMEnT learns the value of actions.
Fourth and finally, there are important differences in the mechanisms for
working memory. In PBMW, memory units are bi-stable and the model is
equipped with a system to gate information in prefrontal cortex via the
basal ganglia. In AuGMEnT, memory units are directly activated by on-
and off-units in the input layer and they have continuous activity levels.
The activity profile of memory units is task-dependent in AuGMEnT. It can
train memory units to integrate evidence for probabilistic decision
making, to memorize analog values as graded levels of persistent activity
but also to store categories with almost binary responses in a delayed
match-to-category task.
Biological plausibility, biological detail and future work
We suggested that AuGMEnT is biologically plausible, but what do we
mean with this statement? Our aim was to propose a learning rule based
on Hebbian plasticity that is gated by two factors known to gate plasticity:
a neuromodulatory signal that is released globally and codes the reward-
prediction error and an attentional feedback signal that highlights the part
of the network that is accountable for the outcome of an action. We showed
that the combination of these two factors, which are indeed available at the
level of the individual synapses, can cause changes in synaptic strength that
follow gradient descent on the reward-prediction error for the transitions
that the network experiences. At the same time, the present model provides
only a limited degree of detail. The advantage of such a more abstract
model is that it remains mathematically tractable. The downside is that
more work will be needed to map the proposed mechanisms onto specific
brain structures. We pointed out the correspondence between the tuning
that developed in the association layer and tuning in the association cortex
of monkeys. We now list a number of simplifying assumptions that we
made and that will need to be alleviated by future models that incorporate
more biological detail.
First, we assumed that the brain can compute the SARSA temporal
difference error, which implies a comparison between the Q-value of one
state-action combination to the Q-value of the next combination. Future
modeling studies could include brain structures for storing the Q-value
of the previously selected action while new action-values are computed.
Although we do not know the set of brain structures that store action values,
previous studies implicated the medial and lateral prefrontal cortex in
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storing the outcome that is associated with an action (Matsumoto, 2003;
Wallis, 2007). Prefrontal neurons even update the predicted outcome as new
information comes in during the trial (Luk and Wallis, 2009). An alternative
to storing Q-values is provided by Actor-Critic architectures that assign
values to the various states instead of state-action combinations. They use
one network to estimate state-values and another network to select actions
(Houk, Adams, and Barto, 1995). Interestingly, (Houk, Adams, and Barto,
1995) proposed that the basal ganglia could compute temporal difference
errors by comparing activity in the indirect pathway, which might store the
predicted value of the previous time-step, and the direct pathway, which
could code the predicted value of the next state. We hypothesize that a
similar circuit could be used to compute SARSA temporal difference errors.
In addition, we also did not model the action-selection process itself, which
has been suggested to take place in the basal ganglia (see Lo and Wang,
2006).
A second simplification is that we did not constrain model units to be
either inhibitory or excitatory—outgoing weights could have either sign and
they could even change sign during learning. Future studies could specify
more detailed network architectures with constrained weights (e.g. as in
O’Reilly and Frank, 2006). Indeed, it is possible to change networks into
functionally equivalent ones with excitatory and inhibitory units that have
only positive weights (Parisien, Anderson, and Eliasmith, 2008), but the
necessary generalization of AuGMEnT-like learning rules would require
additional work.
The third major simplification is that feedback connections in
AuGMEnT influence the formation of synaptic tags, but do not influence
the activity of units at earlier processing levels. Future studies could
include feedback connections that also influence activity of units in the
lower layers and develop learning rules for the plasticity of activity
propagating feedback connections. These connections might further
expand the set of tasks that neural networks can master if trained by
trial-and-error. In this context it is of interest that previous studies
demonstrated that feedforward propagation of activity to higher cortical
areas mainly utilizes the AMPA receptor, whereas feedback effects
rely more on the NMDA receptor (Self et al., 2012), which plays an
important role in synaptic plasticity. NMDA receptors also modify
neuronal activity in lower areas, and another candidate receptor that could
have a specific role in the influence of feedback connections on plasticity
are metabotropic glutamate receptors, which are prominent in feedback
pathways (De Pasquale and Sherman, 2011; Sherman and Guillery, 1998)
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Parameter Description Value
β Learning Rate 0.15
λ Trace/Tag decay rate 0.20
γ Discount factor 0.9
α Tag persistence 1−λγ
 Exploration rate 0.025
Table 4.1: Default parameters for AuGMEnT
Architecture Value
Input units Task dependent
Memory units N = 4
Regular units N = 3
Q-value units N = 3
Initial weights Uniform ∼ [−.25,0.25]
Table 4.2: Default architecture parameters for AuGMEnT
and known to influence synaptic plasticity (Sajikumar and Korte, 2011).
A fourth simplification is that we modeled time in discrete steps and
used units with scalar activity levels and differentiable activation functions.
Therefore, implementations of AuGMEnT using populations of spiking
neurons in continuous time deserve to be studied. We leave the integration
of the necessary biological detail in AuGMEnT-like networks that would
alleviate all these simplifications for future work.
Conclusions
Here we have shown that interactions between synaptic tags and
neuromodulatory signals can explain how neurons in ‘multiple-demand’
association areas acquire mnemonic signals for apparently disparate tasks
that require working memory, categorization or decision making. The
finding that a single network can be trained by trial and error to perform
these diverse tasks implies that these learning problems now fit into a
unified reinforcement learning framework.
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Task difficulty # Input symbols Sequence length n trials to determine success
1 2 1 1,000
2 4 1 1,500
3 6 1 2,000
4 8 1 2,500
5 10 1 3,000
6 10 2 10,000
7 10 3 10,000
8 10 4 20,000
Table 4.3: Probabilistic Classification convergence windows
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5Learning attentional filtering inAuGMEnT
Abstract
Many theories propose that top-down attentional signals control
activity in sensory cortices. But who controls the controller? We here
investigate how AuGMEnT (Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2012,
2015, and chapter 4), a biologically plausible neural reinforcement
learning scheme, can create higher order representations and top-down
attentional signals. The learning scheme trains neural networks using
two factors that gate Hebbian plasticity: (1) an attentional feedback
signal from the response-selection stage to earlier processing levels;
and (2) a globally available neuromodulator that encodes the reward
prediction error. We demonstrate how the neural network learns to
direct attention to one of two colored stimuli that are arranged in a rank-
order (Lennert and Martinez-Trujillo, 2011). Like monkeys trained on
this task, the network develops units that are tuned to the rank-order
of the colors and it generalizes this newly learned rule to previously
unseen color combinations. These results thereby provide new insights
in how individuals can learn to control attention as demanded by
the reward contingency. This chapter is based on Rombouts, Bohte,
Martinez-Trujillo, et al. (2015).
5.1 Introduction
Our perception is highly selective. We mainly register the information that
pertains to our goals and ignore the rest. Consider, for example, a tennis
player waiting for the return of the ball. He focuses on the posture and
motion of the opponent and on the way he holds the racquet, but he neither
perceives other people on the court nor the surrounding advertisements.
Through training he has learned to focus attention on the visual information
that matters for the next hit. But, how did he learn to specifically attend to
the visual features that matter?
In many circumstances learning depends on rewards or punishments.
Winning and losing points during practice games is an incentive for
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learning how to play tennis. Reinforcement learning (RL) theories provide
a useful framework for understanding how feedback from the environment
in the form of rewards and punishments shapes behavioral performance
(Sutton and Barto, 1998). Researchers have made substantial progress in
RL theories and there are influential theories about the implementation of
RL in the brain (Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, and Hikosaka, 2010b;
Dayan and Balleine, 2002). Furthermore, other influential theories have
addressed how attention influences neuronal activity in visual cortical
areas (Bundesen, Habekost, and Kyllingsbæk, 2005; Desimone and Duncan,
1995; Roelfsema, 2006). However, with a few exceptions (e.g. Whitehead
and Ballard, 1991), these theories did yet not address the question of how
the brain can learn to direct attention to those features that matter. In the
present study we will investigate a new, biologically plausible RL-scheme
with the aim to train a neural network to control attention. Our approach is
inspired by recent findings about the influence of rewards on attention in
experimental psychology and also by neurophysiological findings on how
attention influences the representation of visual information in the brain.
In recent years, researchers in experimental psychology obtained many
new insights in how rewards influence the deployment of attention, as
documented in a recent special issue of Visual Cognition (Anderson,
Theeuwes, and Chelazzi, 2015). Visual stimuli that are associated to high
reward are likely to attract more attention at a later point in time than
stimuli associated with lower reward (Anderson, Laurent, and Yantis, 2011;
Chelazzi et al., 2013; Della Libera and Chelazzi, 2009; Hickey, Chelazzi,
and Theeuwes, 2010; Raymond and O’Brien, 2009). In many tasks the
reward-contingencies determine what information is relevant and what
information is not, which makes it evident that reinforcers should
influence attention. Neurophysiological studies have demonstrated that
areas of the parietal and frontal cortex selectively represent task-relevant
information, and the pairing of stimuli with rewards and punishments
should therefore favor the representation of these stimuli (Duncan, 2010;
Gottlieb and Balan, 2010). Most theories of attention state that these
neurons in frontal and parietal cortex provide a top-down signal that
influences the representation of stimuli in the visual cortex (Corbetta and
Shulman, 2002; Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Miller and Cohen, 2001).
Indeed, the neuronal responses elicited by attended objects are enhanced
in many, if not all, areas of visual cortex (Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004;
Treue and Maunsell, 1996), and attentional selection processes can
be monitored even at the level of the primary visual cortex (area V1)
(Roelfsema, 2006). Because the required top-down attentional control
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signals depend on the precise task demands, they should be strongly
influenced by RL. However, the mechanisms that allow reward signals to
shape these attentional top-down control signals are not well understood.
Interestingly, neuronal activity evoked by stimuli associated with high
rewards is also stronger in visual and association cortex than activity
evoked by stimuli associated with less reward (Louie, Grattan, and
Glimcher, 2011; Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011; Serences, 2008; Stănişor
et al., 2013). Although some have proposed that the effects of attentional
selection and reward expectancy differ at the neuronal level (Louie,
Grattan, and Glimcher, 2011; Platt and Glimcher, 1999), a recent study
demonstrated that V1 neurons modulated by reward expectancy are also
modulated by attention and with a similar timing (Stănişor et al., 2013).
The latter suggests both modulations are caused by a common top-down
signal reaching the visual cortex driven by both reward expectation and
selective attention (Maunsell, 2004).
To gain more insight in how reinforcers can influence the deployment
of attention, we will here train a neural network model to carry out a
non-linear attentional control task that has been studied in monkeys by
Lennert and Martinez-Trujillo (2011). We will train the network with
AuGMEnT (Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2012, 2015, and chapter 4),
which incorporates two factors that are known to modulate synaptic
plasticity (Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005; Roelfsema, van Ooyen, and
Watanabe, 2010). The first factor is a reward-prediction error that codes
whether the outcome of an action is better or worse than expected. It is
thought that such a reward prediction error is broadcast throughout the
brain by the release of neuromodulators, such as dopamine or serotonin, so
that it is available at many synapses and can influence their plasticity (Liu
et al., 2014; Schultz, 2002). The second factor is an attentional top-down
signal from the response selection stage to earlier processing levels. The
learning rule enforces that this top-down signal highlights the subset of
synapses that are responsible for the action that was chosen by the network
and this signal thus determines which synapses are sensitive to the
neuromodulators that determine the changes in synaptic strength. Overall,
the learning rule incorporates four signals that are all available locally, at
the synapse: (i) presynaptic activity; (ii) postsynaptic activity; (iii) the
globally released neuromodulatory signal and (iv) activity of feedback
connections from the response selection stage.
In the task of Lennert and Martinez-Trujillo (2011) the monkeys first
had to direct their gaze to a fixation mark in the center of a display
flanked by two moving random dot patterns (RDPs) made up of grey dots
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(Figure 5.1A). After a delay, both RDPs changed color. These color changes
were an attentional cue for the monkeys, because they indicated which of
the patterns was the target and which one the distracter (e.g., green was the
target and red the distracter). The monkeys’ task was to respond to a brief
change in the motion direction of the target pattern by releasing a button
while ignoring a similar change in the distracter’s direction. The crucial
design feature of the task is that that were six possible colors, which were
organized in a rank order following an ordinal scale (red < orange < yellow
< green < blue < purple; the original study used different colors which did
not map onto the spectrum in this orderly manner). The monkeys had to
attend to the pattern with the highest color rank (the target) and ignore the
pattern with the lowest rank (the distracter). They only received a juice
reward for responses to a change in the target direction, whereas trials
were aborted without reward if they responded to the distracter change.
Note that this task is non-linear, because the color cues determine whether
a response is required to the left motion cue so that the right motion cue
should be ignored, or whether the contingency is reversed. The monkeys
were found to learn the order relationships by trial and error, which is
remarkable because they saw only two colored patterns at the same time.
They generalized the rule to infer the relative rank of new color pairs that
they had not seen during training (i.e., transitive knowledge).
Once the monkeys had learned this task Lennert and Martinez-Trujillo
(2011) recorded the activity of neurons in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
They observed that the firing rate of a substantial fraction of the cells
coded the location of the target pattern. Some of these neurons increased
their firing rate if the target pattern was on the left side of the display,
whereas others increased their response if the target pattern was on the
right. Moreover, the strength of the attentional control signal depended
on the distance between the ranks of the target and distracter colors. The
signal was strongest if the distance between the ranks was high and weaker
for colors with adjacent ranks (distance effect).
Although the study of RL was not the aim of Lennert and Martinez-
Trujillo (2011), as rewards were only used as incentive for the monkeys to
do the task, this study does allow us to address the central theoretical issues
that we wish to investigate: how do brain structures control attention and
how do they optimize this control while animals learn a task by RL? More
specifically: (1) which mechanism can cause neurons in prefrontal cortex to
encode the rank order of the colors? (2) how do these control signals ensure
that the monkey only responds to changes in the direction of the target?
and (3) how do the monkeys generalize the rule to new colors that they
88
have not seen during training?
To address these questions, we used the AuGMEnT learning scheme that
can train neural networks to perform many of the tasks that have been used
in monkey studies, including tasks that require decision-making, non-linear
sensory-motor mappings, working memory and categorization (Rombouts,
Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2012, 2015). The network aims to learn the value of
the successive actions that need to be taken during a trial, such as holding
or releasing a button. These action values correspond to the expectancy of
obtaining a reward at the end of the trial, and the representation of these
action values allows the model to make the optimal choice at every time
step during a trial.
A unique feature of the learning rule is that neuronal plasticity makes
feedforward and feedback connections reciprocal, in accordance with
anatomical and neurophysiological findings (Felleman and Van Essen,
1991; Mao et al., 2011). When the model learns to select actions based on
the relevant features, the units coding these features start to receive
attentional feedback from the response selection stage. We show that a
model trained with AuGMEnT can indeed learn the attentional control
task, and that the behavior of the model is similar to that of monkeys. We
further show that the model explains the formation of rank-difference
tuning and how trial-and-error learning can shape attentional top-down
signals.
5.2 Methods
Model
We have described the AuGMEnT learning rule in previous work
(Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2012, 2015, and chapter 4), but we have
not used it so far to study how trial-and-error learning shapes top-down
attentional selection signals. In these previous studies we outlined the
theory behind the model and how it optimizes network performance. We
also demonstrated how AuGMEnT allows networks to learn non-linear
sensory-motor transformations and decision-making tasks. We will
here summarize the key features of the model, which are necessary to
understand learning of the attentional control task. If you are already
familiar with AuGMEnT, you can safely skip to the next paragraph.
An important property of AuGMEnT is that it can train a two-layer
neural network to perform many tasks, by simply varying the input stimuli
and the reward contingency. In the present study, we used the same network
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Figure 5.1: Task and Model. A, When the monkeys attained fixation, two grey moving
stimuli appeared. After a delay the stimuli were colored and these colors determined
which of the two stimuli had to be monitored for a motion change. After a motion change
in the relevant stimulus, the monkey had to release a button whereas motion changes at
the irrelevant side had to be ignored. B, The neural network was composed of an input
layer with sustained, on and off units, an association layer with regular and memory
units and a motor layer with units coding for action values (Q-values). Motor units have
feedback connections (dashed) to the association layer. C, Sensory stimuli give rise to
activations in the top layer of the network. Synaptic traces (blue lines) are formed on
synapses that have feedforward activations (left). Then a stochastic WTA process in the
motor layer selects one of the actions for execution (middle). The selected action unit
informs the rest of the network that is was selected via feedback connections (dashed lines
in the middle panel). The interaction of feedback signals from the selected action and
feedforward signals arising from the sensory stimuli give rise to the formation of synaptic
tags (orange hexagons). These tags label the synapses in the network that were responsible
for the selected action (middle). Finally, after the actually executing the action selected
at time t, observing a reward and selecting a new action for execution, the difference
between the predicted value at time t and the value of the actually observed transition
gives rise to a prediction error δ, which is encoded by a globally released neuromodulator
(green cloud). Synaptic weights in the network are updated by a simple multiplicative
interaction of the tag strength and the prediction error signal (right).
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topology as in our previous work (Figure 5.1B) to understand how rewards
influence attentional control. The model is a two layer neural network that
learns to predict action values (also known as Q-values, Sutton and Barto,
1998) for the different actions that it can take (Figure 5.1B). Thus, when a
stimulus is presented to the input layer, the model’s task is to propagate
activity from the input layer to the association layer and then to theQ-value
layer to compute the value of the different actions that the model can take.
Phrased more formally, there is a Q-value unit for every possible action a
and this unit aims to represent the (discounted) expected reward for the
remainder of a trial if the network selects an action a in the current state s:
Qpi(s,a) = Epi[Rt |st = s,at = a] , with Rt =
∞∑
p=0
γpr(t+p+1) , (5.1)
where Epi[·] is the expected value of the sum of discounted future rewards
Rt , given current action-selection policy pi, and where γ ∈ [0,1] determines
the discounting of future rewards r. Discounting means that rewards in the
distant future are considered less valuable than rewards that can be earned
at earlier time points.
Learning is guided by a neuromodulatory signal that represents the
SARSA temporal difference error δ:
δ(t) = r(t) +γQ′(t)−Q(t − 1) , (5.2)
where r(t) is the scalar reward observed on time step t. SARSA is a method
from the RL literature (Rummery and Niranjan, 1994; Sutton and Barto,
1998) that considers transitions from one state-action combination to the
next while evaluating the reward (hence SARSA; State-Action Reward State-
Action). This δ is positive if the outcome of an action was better than
expected and negative if it was worse. For example, if the Q-value of an
action taken on time-step t equals 0.8, the network expects 0.8 units reward
for the remainder of the trial. If the network at time t + 1 selects the next
action with a value of 0.9, the action at time t turned out to be better than
expected (δ = 0.1) and the network updates the synapses to increase the
value of the action that was taken at time t1.
The sensory layer (’stimuli’ in Figure 5.1B) of the network represents
the current stimulus with three different unit types: Instantaneous (xi(t))
units, and On (+,x+i (t)) and Off (−,x−i (t)) units, so that each sensory input
1Note that this holds for the case where γ = 1.
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si(t) is encoded by three different types of input units:
xi(t) = si(t) , (5.3)
x+i (t) = [si(t)− si(t − 1)]+ , (5.4)
x−i (t) = [si(t − 1)− si(t)]+ , (5.5)
where [·]+ is a threshold operator that leaves positive inputs unchanged
but returns 0 for negative inputs. Thus, instantaneous units code for the
current sensory input, whereas On-units are active for only one time-step if
a feature has just appeared and Off-units when it disappeared.
The association (middle) layer of the network (middle in Figure 5.1B) is
equipped with two different types of units: regular units and memory units.
The activity of regular units depends on the current activity of units in the
input layer, whereas memory units exhibit persistent activity so that they
can represent working memories of stimuli presented earlier, as are found
in for instance in prefrontal and parietal cortex (Funahashi, Bruce, and
Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Gnadt and Andersen, 1988). We will first describe
the activity of regular units before we describe the activity of the memory
units.
Instantaneous units xi in the input layer project to the regular associa-
tion units via synaptic weights vRij (with v
R
0j is a bias weight) (Figure 5.1B).
Their activity yRj is determined by:
inpRj (t) =
∑
i
vRijxi(t) , (5.6)
yRj (t) = σ (inp
R
j (t)) ≡ 1/(1 + exp(θ − inpRj (t)) , (5.7)
where σ (·) is a non-linear activation function (squashing function) and
we note that our results generalize to other forms of this activation function.
The activation function of the memory units is similar. The on (+) and off (−)
units in the sensory layer project to the memory units via synaptic weights
v+im and v
−
im and their activation is determined as:
inpMm (t) = inp
M
m (t − 1) +
∑
i
(v+imx
+
i (t) + v
−
imx
−
i (t)) , (5.8)
yMm (t) = σ (inp
M
m (t)) , (5.9)
so that their activity also depends on features that have appeared or disap-
peared during earlier time steps in the trial. The instantaneous units in the
input layer do not project to the memory units to prevent the integration of
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a constant input, which would give rise to ramping activity of the memory
units.
Finally, the regular and memory association units project to the
output/motor layer via synaptic weights wRjk (with w
R
0k as a bias weight)
and wMmk , respectively, to give rise to a set of Q-values qk for the different
actions k that the model can take so that:
qk(t) =
∑
m
wMmky
M
m (t) +
∑
j
wRjky
R
j (t) . (5.10)
Thus, when activity has been propagated to the output layer, this layer
encodes a set of Q-values, one for every action. Then a stochastic winner
take all (WTA) competition determines the action that the network will
perform. With high probability (1− ) the greedy action (with highest Q) is
selected (ties broken randomly), but with a small probability  the winning
action is determined by sampling from the Boltzmann distribution to allow
the exploration of other actions:
PB(k) =
exp(qk)∑
k′ exp(qk′ )
, (5.11)
where PB(k) is the probability that action k is selected. After selecting an
action a, the activation in the Q-value layer becomes zk = Ika, where Ika is
an identity function returning 1 if k = a and 0 otherwise. In other words,
only the winning output unit a has activity 1 and the activity of the other
units in the output layer becomes zero. The output layer then informs the
rest of the network about the selected action via feedback weights w
′M
km to
memory units and w
′R
kj to regular association units (dashed lines in Fig. 1B),
and the interaction of the feedback and feedforward activations is used to
constrain synaptic plasticity to those synapses that were actually involved
in selecting the action. The network creates synaptic traces and synaptic
tags that determine synaptic plasticity. The traces signal that a synapse
has been active, whereas tags signal that the synapse was involved in the
selection of an action, so that the synapse is going to be held responsible for
the outcome of this action. Synaptic traces on synapses from regular and
memory units to the output layer are proportional to the strength of the
afferent signal through these synapses:
sT raceRjk(t) = yj (t) , (5.12)
sT raceMmk(t) = ym(t) . (5.13)
These traces are a prerequisite for plasticity because tags can only form on
those synapses that contain a trace. Tags in the output layer form only on
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synapses onto the winning output unit that was selected for an action, and
they then decay exponentially:
T agRjk(t + 1) = λγT ag
R
jk(t) + sT race
R
jk(t)zk(t) , (5.14)
T agMmk(t + 1) = λγT ag
M
mk(t) + sT race
M
mk(t)zk(t) , (5.15)
The parameter λ ∈ [0,1] determines the rate of decay of tags (in RL these
tags are called eligibility traces; Sutton and Barto, 1998). The strength of
the tag determines the degree of plasticity of the synapse.
The updates for the synapses vRij between the input and association layer
have a similar form:
sT raceRij (t) = xi(t) , (5.16)
T agRij (t + 1) = λγT ag
R
ij (t) + sT race
R
ij (t)f b
R
j (t) , (5.17)
= λγT agRij (t) + sT race
R
ij (t)σ
′(inpRj (t))w
′R
aj , (5.18)
Note that the formation of tags here depends on f bRj (t), which is a shorthand
for the attentional feedback signal that originates from the winning output
unit a and arrives at unit j through the feedback connections w
′R
aj , and σ
′ is
the derivative of the activation function with respect to its input, which has
the convenient form σ ′(inpRj ) = σ (inp
R
j )(1−σ (inpRj )). Thus, only synapses vRij
that receive feedback from the response selection stage are rendered plastic
because they form tags. The updates for the synapses v+/−im onto memory
units are similar:
sT race+/−im (t) = sT race
+/−
im (t − 1) + x+/−i (t) , (5.19)
T ag+/−im (t + 1) = λγT ag
+/−
im (t) + sT race
+/−
im (t)f b
M
m (t) , (5.20)
= λγT ag+/−im (t) + sT race
+/−
im (t)σ
′(inpMm (t))w
′M
am , (5.21)
where the critical difference is that synaptic traces to memory units accu-
mulate, i.e. they reflect the total input provided by a synapse during the
trial, whereas all other traces disappear after a single time step. After ex-
ecuting action a with expected value qa and updating the traces and tags
as specified above, the network makes a transition to a new state in the en-
vironment and it selects a new action a′ with associated Q-value q′a on the
next time step. The network may also receive a reward r during this tran-
sition. After the transition, a neuromodulatory substance (e.g. dopamine)
is globally released in the network, which encodes the SARSA prediction
error δ(t). The concentration of the neuromodulator depends on the differ-
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ence between successive Q-values, taking the discounting as well as the re-
ward r into account:
δ(t) = r(t) +γqa′ (t)− qa(t − 1) . (5.22)
This prediction error is positive if the outcome of the previous action is
better than expected and negative if it is worse, and it is also positive if the
network experiences a transition to a higher Q-value but does not receive
an immediate reward. Synaptic plasticity in the network is then simply
determined by the interaction of this neuromodulatory substance with the
tagged synapses as:
∆wRjk = βδ(t)T ag
R
jk(t) ; ∆w
M
lk = βδ(t)T ag
M
lk (t) , (5.23)
∆vRij = βδ(t)T ag
R
ij (t) ; ∆v
+/−
im = βδ(t)T ag
+/−
im (t) , (5.24)
where β determines the learning rate. Feedback weights are updated in the
same manner. As was mentioned in the introduction, the learning rule is
neurobiologically plausible because the factors that determine plasticity are
the pre- and postsynaptic activity, the “attentional” feedback signal from
the response selection stage and the neuromodulator coding for δ(t), signals
that are all available locally, at the synapse.
When the network reaches the end of a trial the γ parameter used
in the computation of the reward prediction error is set to zero for the
corresponding time-step and the dynamic parameters (i.e. tags, synaptic
traces, unit activations) in the network are cleared. It can be shown that the
above learning rules change the synapses in the network as to minimize the
SARSA temporal difference prediction errors by stochastic gradient descent,
and that AuGMEnT can be seen as a biologically plausible implementation
of the SARSA(λ) learning algorithm, extended with a working memory
(chapter 4 and Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2012, 2015). The non-
linear units of the association layer allow the network to learn non-linear
mappings from sensory stimuli onto Q-values, as is essential in the present
attentional control task. Figure 5.1C provides a graphical summary of the
learning mechanism described above.
Color task network architecture In order to investigate how AuGMEnT
can train a network to control attention, we constructed the simplest
possible network that captures the essentials of the attentional control task
based on color ranking. We equipped the network with a retinotopically
organized sensory layer (Figure 5.1B, top) with binary neurons, i.e. neurons
that were either active or silent, representing the seven possible colors on
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the left side and on the right side. We additionally included a binary
neuron that represented the change in motion direction on each side,
which the model had to report (for targets) or to ignore (for distracters) and
a binary unit for the fixation mark in the middle. As in our previous work
(Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2012, 2015, and chapter 4), the
association layer was equipped with three regular units and four memory
units. We previously demonstrated that AuGMEnT can also be used to
train networks with many more units in the association layer. The action
layer of the network had neurons that coded for two different actions: one
to hold a response button and the other to release the button. For all results
reported here we used the following parameters: β = 0.35,λ = 0.40,γ = 0.9
and  = 0.025 and θ = 2.5. We note that the results below do not critically
depend on the precise value of these parameters—we found AuGMEnT to
be robust across a wide range of parameters and in a large variety of tasks
(Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2015, and chapter 4).
Model of the attentional control task
The task (Figure 5.1A) was modeled as a sequence of discrete time steps.
Every trial started with an empty screen, shown for one time step. Then we
presented the fixation mark flanked by the grey patterns. The model had
to “press” the response button within ten time steps, otherwise the trial
was terminated without reward. If the model “held” the button for two
time-steps, the colors of the stimuli changed, with the target changing to a
color with a higher rank than the distracter. If the target stimulus changed
direction (i.e. when the binary ‘change’ neuron on the corresponding side
became active) the model had to “choose” the release action within eight
time steps to receive a “reward” of 1.5 units. However, if the distracter
stimulus changed direction, the model had to hold the button for two
additional time steps, after which the target stimulus would briefly change,
indicating that the model could release the button to obtain the reward. As
in our earlier work (Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2015, and chapter 4),
we used a shaping strategy to encourage the model to learn to hold the
button by giving a small reward (hold-reward) of 0.2 units when the model
held the button for two time-steps after the fixation mark turned on. We
note that this shaping strategy is not essential for the learning of the task,
but that it speeds up the learning process, as in animal learning (Krueger
and Dayan, 2009).
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Model training
We carried out two separate sets of simulations. In the first set of simulations
we investigated the generalization performance of the network by training it
on a subset of all color combinations and then testing performance for color
combinations that had not been presented during training. This allowed us
to investigate whether AuGMEnT can generalize to unseen combinations of
colors, as monkeys did. In the second set of simulations we presented all
color combinations from the start of training. The monkeys in Lennert and
Martinez-Trujillo (2011) were trained for 3-5 months on this full version
of the task, and these simulations allowed us to investigate the neuronal
tuning that develops after significant experience in the color task.
Test of generalization
The first training scheme was developed to study if the model could gener-
alize the color-ranking scheme to unseen combinations of colors. We used
the same shaping scheme as used to test the generalization performance of
the monkeys in the Lennert and Martinez-Trujillo (2011) study. The models
were first trained on the color-pairs ‘green-blue’, ‘yellow-green’ and ‘yellow-
blue’ (rule: yellow < green < blue). The ordering of the colors and the stim-
ulus (target or distracter) where the first direction change occurred were
randomized. We will use the term ‘respond trial’ for a trial where the tar-
get stimulus changed first, and ‘ignore trial’ for a trial where the distracter
stimulus was the first to change. After the model learned the task (see be-
low) we sequentially trained the model on unseen colors, first training on
the combination ‘red-yellow’. In combination with the initial set, the rela-
tive ranking of the red color could be inferred from the ‘red-yellow’ pair,
because red < yellow, and yellow < green < blue. If the model inferred this
ordering, it should learn the other combinations with the red color (‘red-
green’ and ‘red-blue’) more easily. We repeated this training scheme for the
‘orange’ color, first training on ‘orange-yellow’, and then testing learning
speed for ‘orange-green’, ‘orange-blue’ and ‘red-orange’ simultaneously. We
considered that learning was complete when the model made 85% correct
choices in the last 100 trials of each color pair. All networks learned the
task within a median of 1,800 trials.
Training on all color pairs
We also evaluated the model’s performance when it was immediately ex-
posed to all color pairs, without shaping except for the small hold-reward.
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The locations of colors and the distracter/target trials were generated uni-
formly at random. We considered learning successful if the models made
more than 85% correct choices in the last 100 presentations of all possible
color pairs, collapsing over the two possible locations of the two colors and
across respond and ignore trials. All models learned this task in less than
5,200 trials.
5.3 Results
We investigated the learning behavior of AuGMEnT using two different
training schemes as explained in the methods section above. In the original
study, the monkeys were either trained on a version of the task that tested
their generalization to new color combinations or in the full task with all
color combinations. In accordance with these two training schemes, we used
a first scheme to test if a neural network trained with AuGMEnT would
generalize the rule to new color-pairs, and a second scheme to study the
behavior of networks that have been trained with all color combinations.
Generalization to new color combinations
In the first version of the task we trained 100 networks (i.e. repetitions with
different initializations of the network weights) to test generalization (see
Methods), aiming to record the decisions that the models made during each
stage of the training procedure. In the first phase, we trained the networks to
discover the general rule with three basic color pairs, ‘green-blue’, ‘yellow-
green’ and ‘yellow-blue’. The only feedback that the network received about
its performance was the small hold-reward if it held the response button for
two time-steps and the large reward if it responded to the motion change on
the relevant side. In spite of this limited feedback about their performance,
all networks learned these patterns within a median of 1,800 trials, which
is fast when compared with learning by the monkeys.
Figure 5.2 shows the distributions of the number of mistakes that the
models made in each learning stage for the different color pairs, including
trials where the model released the button prematurely, before the first
change in the direction of the moving patterns. After the models had learned
the ranking of green, blue and yellow they rapidly generalized to previously
unseen color pairs. Specifically, ‘red-yellow’ was clearly the most difficult
to learn, because the color red was introduced for the first time and its rank
relative to yellow was unknown. Once the models had learned that red
had a lower rank than yellow, the subsequent transfer to ‘red-green’ and
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Figure 5.2: Generalization of the model to new color combinations. The box plots
illustrate the number of errors made, on average, by 100 networks trained on the
generalization version of the color task. First, the models were trained on three color
pairs; green-blue, yellow-green and yellow-blue. Then, models were exposed to red as a
novel color, which initially only occurred in combination with the known color yellow.
After reaching criterion performance (methods), transfer learning was tested by training
the model on the remaining color pairs, red-green and red-blue. It can be seen that few
additional errors were made for these new color pairs. This scheme was repeated for the
orange color. The error pattern for a monkey trained using the same scheme is overlaid
(white circles). The boxes illustrate the lower quartile, median (thick) and upper quartile,
whereas the whiskers extend to most extreme data point within 1.5 multiples of the inner
quartile range). Note the discontinuity of the y-axis.
‘red-blue’ was easy, consistent with the hypothesis that the model could
exploit the order relationship, as yellow was lower in rank than green and
blue, so that red<yellow implies red<green and red<blue. We subsequently
introduced the orange color, pairing it with yellow. The model quickly
learned that orange had a lower rank than yellow and it subsequently
made only few errors with ‘orange-green’ and ‘orange-blue’. The error
rate increased slightly for the last color pair (’orange-red’), but this also
occurred when a monkey was trained on this task. This phenomenon can be
explained because the relative rank of orange and red is undetermined when
the model has learned that orange<yellow and red<yellow. The general
learning pattern of the networks follows the monkeys’ behavior (white
circles in Figure 5.2). Indeed, the Spearman rank correlation between the
median network performance and the monkey’s performance was 0.86
(p < 0.012). Thus, these simulations indicate that neural networks trained
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with AuGMEnT generalize a color ranking scheme to unseen combinations
of colors, and that the pattern of errors is similar to that shown by a monkey
when trained on the same task.
Full task
We next investigated the behavior of AuGMEnT on the full task with all
possible combinations of color stimuli, which was also used to train the
monkeys. For these simulations we trained an additional 100 networks.
They all managed to learn the task to criterion within a median of 2,800
trials, which is fast compared to the monkeys who took about 3-5 months
of training. Note that the learning of the full task was slower than in the
generalization task (1,800 trials). This slightly slower learning process
can be explained by the fact that the purple (highest rank) color was not
included in the generalization task. Furthermore, the generalization task
included many examples with adjacent ranks, which is helpful if the task is
to infer a rank order (Krueger and Dayan, 2009).
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Figure 5.3: Effect of difference in color rank on the error rate. A, Hit rate of monkeys
Ra and Se after 3-5 months of training as a function of distance between color ranks.
Error bars denote s.e.m. B, Average hit rates of models (N = 100) throughout learning
the full color rank task as a function of distance between color ranks. Error bars show
s.e.m. The networks were trained until they reached an accuracy of 85% (see methods),
which explains why the total performance is around 80% when averaged over the whole
training period. Note that the scale of panels A and B differs.
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When a task requires the comparison of stimuli that are “close” in rank,
humans and animals tend to require a longer time to reach a decision and
make more errors (Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, and Cohen, 1998). Also
the monkeys that were trained on the color-rank task exhibited a clear
effect of the difference in rank between the color stimuli on the error rate
(Figure 5.3A, Lennert and Martinez-Trujillo, 2011).
To investigate whether the networks trained with AuGMEnT exhibit
a similar sensitivity, we recorded all errors made by the networks during
training, for colors separated by distance of 1,2, or 3 on the color scale.
Figure 5.3B shows that networks trained with AuGMEnT exhibited a similar
distance effect (one-way analysis of variance-ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis post-
hoc test, H = 45.76,p < 0.001). Thus, the neural networks captured many
aspects of the behavioral performance of the monkeys. To examine how
the networks learned to focus their attention on the side of the color with
highest rank, we next examined the activity of the units in networks trained
to perform the full task.
Activity of the units in a trained network
To obtain a first intuition of how the trained networks solve this task,
Figure 5.4 shows the activity of two memory units in the association layer
and also the activity of the Q-value units in the output layer of an example
network, for all trial types with a green and orange stimulus. The unit on
the top (light blue trace) had a stronger response when the target color
was on the left (compare the first and third column) whereas the unit
in the middle row (grey trace) had a stronger response when the target
color was on the right. It can be seen that motion stimuli also had strong
effects on the units’ activity level; for instance the blue “left” unit received
excitatory input from a motion change on the left (M1 in the first column
of Figure 5.4 and M2 in the second column). Similarly, the grey “right” unit
was excited by the right motion stimulus. Examination of the activity of
Q-value units (lower row in Figure 5.4) revealed that the Q-value of the
“Hold” action is higher than the activity of the “Release” action, until the
moment where the motion stimulus is presented on the side that needs to be
monitored by the model. This activity pattern of the Q-value units follows
from the fact that this example network had learned to hold the lever until
the motion change occurred on the relevant side. When we examined the
activity of many networks, we found that memory units had a very strong
tuning to the difference in rank between the two colors. Specifically, their
activity increased or decreased monotonically with the difference in rank
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Figure 5.4: Example activity traces of a network trained on the full color-ranking
task. Top panels show the behavior of two memory units with task-relevant tuning. The
top unit (light blue circle) responded most strongly to if the highest-ranking color was on
the left (green had a higher rank than orange), and the middle unit (grey cross) prefers
the highest rank on the right. The insets at the top show the time point when the fixation
marker (F, black line) and the grey stimuli appeared on the screen, and when the colors
turned on (C, bottom: left stimulus color, middle: right stimulus color). The black vertical
line indicates the onset of a motion stimulus (M). In “respond” trials the first motion
change occurred on the target side, and on “ignore” trials the first change occurred on the
distracter side (M1) and then on the target side (M2). The bottom panels show action
values that the model predicted for the “Hold” (blue) and “Release” (red) actions.
between the two colors. In the next section, we provide a detailed analysis
of rank-difference tuning in the trained networks.
Tuning to the difference in rank between colors
We found that the sensitivity of the model to the difference in the rank of
the colors was mainly expressed in the synaptic weights from the On- and
Off-cells in the input layer onto the memory units in the association layer.
To assess the rank-difference tuning of these memory units in more detail
we analyzed the synaptic weights from the input layer units that coded
the colors on the left and right. Figure 5.5A shows the input connections
of the two memory units of the network of Figure 5.4. There was a clear
relation between synaptic weights and the rank and location of the two
colored stimuli. The unit on the left of Figure 5.5A (light blue traces in
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Figure 5.5: Tuning of memory units to the difference in rank between the two
colors. A, Visualization of weights from “on” sensory units to example memory units
(same as those shown in Figure 5.5), ordered by rank. The solid line marks the synaptic
weights from input units coding colors of different ranks in the left visual field, and the
dashed line marks the weights coming from the right visual field. B, Sum of activations
due to the presence of all possible combinations of color stimuli. C, Scatter-plot of linear-
regression parameters (see main text). These results are based on synapses between the
On-cells in the input layer and the memory units in the association layer. Off-cells and
regular units usually did not have strong weights. The two example neurons from panel
A (and Figure 5.4) have been marked with a light blue circle and a grey cross. Neurons
that prefer stimuli on the right have been colored red, and neurons that prefer stimuli on
the left are shown in green. Neurons that do not have strong opposite tuning for colors on
the left and right are marked in black. Color labels were obtained by k-Means clustering
(see Results).
Figure 5.4) had positive weights to colors of increasing rank on the left
and negative weights for colors of increasing rank on the right. The unit
on the right (grey traces in Figure 5.4) had the opposite tuning and prefers
stimuli with a higher rank on the right. The panels in Figure 5.5B show the
amount of input to these two memory units for all color combinations, as
determined by the weights in Figure 5.5A. The unit on the left of the figure
received strong input if the higher ranked stimulus was on the left, and its
activity depended on the distance in rank between the two stimuli as soon
as the color cues were presented. The unit on the right of the figure had the
opposite tuning to color combinations.
In order to quantify the prevalence of this gradual opposite left-right
tuning to the color rank across units in the association layer of all trained
networks, we computed linear regression coefficients (al/r ) between color
ranks (Rl/r ) and synaptic weights w from the left and right (l/r) retinotopic
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location:
w(Rl) = alRl + bl , (5.25)
w(Rr ) = arRr + br , (5.26)
Figure 5.5C shows the regression coefficients for left and right stimuli (al/r ).
It can be seen that many memory units exhibited a tuning similar to that of
the two units illustrated in Figure 5.5A. Units with positive weights from
stimuli with a high rank on one side almost invariably also had positive
weights from stimuli with a low rank on the other side.
The memory units of the association layer fell into three groups: “left”
(green in Figure 5.5C), “right” (red), and “non-tuned” (black) units. We
labelled the units by performing k-Means clustering (assuming three
clusters), and used this labeling to investigate how the networks solved the
task. This analysis revealed that most networks had one unit preferring
“left” stimuli (1.12± 0.35; mean ± s.e.m) and another one preferring “right”
stimuli (1.10± 0.33), while the remaining units fell into the grey category
of Figure 5.5C without clear tuning (1.78± 0.48).
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Figure 5.6: Rank difference coding. A, Rank difference coding of a single cell in the
prefrontal cortex of a monkey (top) and a population of prefrontal neurons (bottom, both
adapted from Lennert and Martinez-Trujillo (2011)). Solid lines: target pattern on the
preferred side, dashed lines: target on non-preferred side. B, Rank difference coding in a
single model unit (top) and over the whole population of trained model units. Solid lines:
target at preferred location, dashed lines: distracter at preferred location. Shadings show
s.e.m.
In monkeys, task-relevant neurons encode information about the
rank-difference of stimuli and thereby which of the two stimuli should
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be monitored for a motion change. One example neuron is shown in
Figure 5.6A. This neuron increased its response if the target stimulus
appeared on the preferred side of the neuron and in particular if the
difference in color rank between the preferred and non-preferred was
large. A similar effect was observed at the population level when cells
were aligned according to their preferred side, which differed across
neurons (Figure 5.6B, bottom). When we examined the activity of the top
(light blue) “left” coding unit in response to color pairs with different
rank-distances we found that the unit’s activation after the onset of the
color stimuli also varied monotonically with the difference in rank. Its
activity was enhanced when the to-be-attended stimulus was on the left
and suppressed when it was on the right, and this differential response
increased with the difference in rank (Figure 5.6B, top). A similar pattern
also held at the population level (Figure 5.6B, bottom), where we used the
labels obtained by k-Means clustering (Figure 5.5C) to assign units to the
left and right-coding groups. Thus, units in the networks that are trained
with the AuGMEnT learning rule acquire a selectivity that resembles the
tuning of neurons in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of monkeys.
In the next section we will investigate one important remaining question
about the solution that was learned by these neural networks. How do
networks deal with the motion stimuli, and in particular, how do they filter
out stimuli on the distracter side, while monitoring stimuli on the target
side as they instruct the model to release the button?
Response to the motion stimulus on the relevant and irrelevant side
To illustrate the attentional filtering mechanism, we will first focus our
analysis on the example “left” coding unit that has been illustrated in
Figures 5.4, 5.5A and 5.6B (indexed by a light blue circle). We recorded
the unit’s activation in response to the first motion stimulus for three color
pairs of increasing distance. We compared two types of trials; “respond”
trials where the target stimulus was on the left side and the motion changed
occurred on the same side, and “ignore” trials where the target stimulus
was on the right but the first motion change occurred on the left. These two
trials types are of interest, because the motion stimulus occurs on the left,
but in one case it is a target and in the other case it is a distracter, so we
can specifically study the effect of attentional filtering. Figure 5.7 shows the
influence of the left motion stimulus on the activity of the association unit
when attended (left panel) versus when it needs to be ignored (right panel).
When the left stimulus needs to be attended, the inputs from the color input
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Figure 5.7: Attentional filtering by an example “left” unit. Left, Color combination
with the highest rank on the left brings the unit close to the steep part of the non-linear
activation function (black sigmoidal curve). The appearance of the motion stimulus can
therefore cause a large increase in the unit’s activity. The three arrows show the increase
in activity for color combinations with a distance in rank of 1,2 and 3. This increase
in activity is propagated to the output layer to cause an increase of the Q-value of the
button release action. Right, Color combinations cueing that the right motion stimulus is
relevant cause suppression so that the unit is relatively insensitive to a change in motion
direction on the left side. Thus, a motion change on the irrelevant side cannot cause a
strong increase in the Q-value of the release action and will be ignored by the model.
units brought the activity close to the steep part of the unit’s non-linear
activation function so that the additional motion input causes a substantial
increase in activity. This increased activity enhanced the Q-value of the
release action because there was an excitatory connection from this memory
unit onto the Q-value unit coding the release-action.
In contrast, when the left stimulus had to be ignored, the unit received
less input from the color input units so that its activity was farther from
the steep part of the activation function. Now the motion input caused
a smaller increase in activity so that it is effectively ignored because it
did not lead to a large increase of the Q-value of the release action. Most
networks that we investigated employed this mechanism but we also found
the inverse solution, where the activity of the memory unit was high and
the motion stimulus on the relevant side inhibited the memory unit, which
in turn disinhibited the ‘release’ action through an inhibitory connection.
It is intriguing that this attentional filtering problem can be solved by
an appropriate weighting of color inputs to memory units, without an
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influence of feedback connections on the firing rate in sensory modules
(which was absent in our model; see the next section). In our model, the
feedback connections are only necessary for guiding plasticity. Our results
obviously do not exclude that top-down effects on firing rates in sensory
cortices are essential in other tasks (such as visual search). Our analysis
thereby provides insight in how attentional filtering can be implemented
by a simple feedforward neuronal network, and how it can be learned with
a biologically plausible reinforcement learning scheme.
Learning of feedback connections
Target 
Distracter
Figure 5.8: Learning shapes attentional feedback from the response selection
stage. Mean summed attentional feedback arriving at memory units encoding information
about the target side (green) versus the distracter side (red) throughout learning. Shading
shows s.e.m. We averaged feedback across all trial types. Because they did not occur
equally often (due to the random generation of trial types), we estimated the relative
position of trials of every type in the learning sequence with linear interpolation before
averaging them.
Finally, we investigated how the amount of top-down attention for the
pattern on the left and right side evolve during learning. Although in the
current model the feedback connections from the response selection stage to
the association units are only used to gate plasticity and do not influence the
activity of units at earlier processing levels, our main aim was to investigate
how these feedback connections can be learned. In order to assess how
feedback connections change during the course of learning, we measured
the summed feedbacks arriving at memory units for the different trial types
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throughout learning for the 100 trained networks. We compared the amount
of feedback from the response selection stage (i.e. through the connections
marked by dashed lines in Figure 5.1B) to “left” and “right” memory units
(Figure 5.5C) in trials where attention had to be directed to the left and to
the right and integrated the total amount of feedback that arrived during
the trials (Figure 5.8). Specifically, for each trial of duration T that networks
experienced, we computed the quantity
∑
0<t≤T f bMm (t) (methods) for each
memory unit.
The effect of learning is clear—during initial learning, when weights
are random, units tend to receive an equal and increasing amount of
feedback regardless of the trial type. After about 10% of the training time,
the strength of the feedback to the units coding for the distracter side
started to decrease, whereas the amount of feedback to the target side
increased slightly until the end of training. Thus, during the learning
process, units that code information about the target receive more feedback
from the response selection stage than units that code information about
the distracter.
5.4 Discussion
In recent years important studies have started to document how rewards
teach attention in human and non-human primate observers. When
subjects receive a high reward for a particular stimulus, then this stimulus
is likely to attract more attention at a later point in time (Anderson,
Laurent, and Yantis, 2011; Chelazzi et al., 2013; Della Libera and Chelazzi,
2009; Hickey, Chelazzi, and Theeuwes, 2010; Raymond and O’Brien, 2009).
As a general finding, stimuli that have been associated with a high reward
evoke stronger neuronal responses than stimuli that have been associated
with lower rewards in many brain structures including the motor cortex
(Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011), the parietal cortex (Peck et al., 2009; Platt
and Glimcher, 1999), and visual cortex (Serences, 2008; Stănişor et al.,
2013). In primary visual cortex, the neurons that are influenced by visual
attention are also the ones that are influenced by reward expectancy
(Stănişor et al., 2013), which suggests that there is a unified selection
mechanism that is driven by reward expectancy as well as by shifts of
attention (Maunsell, 2004). Such an effect of the reward contingency on the
distribution of attention is expected because the contingency determines
which information is task-relevant and which information can be ignored.
In other words, there are strong theoretical grounds to believe that rewards
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should indeed control attention. However, the precise mechanisms that
explain how a reward in one trial can influence the deployment of
attention in a later trial have not been well understood.
Here we have shown how a neural network trained with a biologically
plausible reinforcement learning rule can learn an attentional control task
when the only feedback from the environment is the occasional reward
for correct performance. The performance of the networks trained with
AuGMEnT exhibited a number of similarities with the performance of
monkeys, and the activities of network units provide new insights into the
changes in neuronal tuning that emerge during learning. First, the models
exhibited a pattern of generalization to unseen color combinations that
was remarkably similar to the generalization performance of the monkeys.
Second, model units acquired a strong tuning to the difference in rank-
order between the two color stimuli, just as was found in the prefrontal
cortex of monkeys that had been trained on the task. Third, these newly
formed representations explain why pairs of stimuli nearby in rank are
associated with more errors than pairs of stimuli with larger differences in
rank, because the activity of units in the association layer is more similar for
stimuli with nearby ranks. Fourth, the simulation provided insight in how a
neural network can decrease its sensitivity to stimuli that are task-irrelevant
thereby filtering out distracting information. Finally, the present results
illustrate how reward ‘teaches’ attention. The modified representations
increased the amount of attentional feedback that was sent to units coding
for the relevant motion stimulus, as instructed by the color cues.
The AuGMEnT learning rule uses two factors to gate neuronal plasticity,
and their joint action at the synapse can provide a learning rule that is as
powerful as the biologically implausible error-backpropagation rule
(Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005). The first factor is a reward prediction
error, which can be computed based on the difference in activity of the
Q-value units that are selected in consecutive time-steps and has been
included in many previous models on RL (e.g. Ashby, Ennis, and Spiering,
2007; Dayan and Yu, 2002; Sutton and Barto, 1998). This globally released
signal informs all the synapses of the network whether the outcome
of the previous action was better or worse than expected. Previous
neurophysiological studies have demonstrated that many dopamine
neurons in the substantial nigra and ventral tegmental area carry such
reward-prediction errors (Schultz, 2002). These dopamine neurons have
relatively widespread connections so that many synapses in the brain could
pick up this reward prediction signal, although other neuromodulatory
systems such as acetylcholine (Kilgard and Merzenich, 1998) or serotonin
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(Liu et al., 2014) could play equivalent roles.
The second factor that gates learning is the attentional feedback from
the response selection stage (Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005; Rombouts,
Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2012, 2015). This feedback signal originates from
the units that code for the action that was selected and it assigns credit
to units at earlier processing levels that were responsible for this choice.
The reciprocity of feedforward and feedback connections ensures that the
units at the lower levels that provide the strongest input to the selected
action are also the ones to receive a strong feedback signal. They are the
ones to change their synaptic strengths (they will have the tag) as instructed
by the reward prediction error (the globally released neuromodulator).
A role of attentional feedback in the gating of learning is supported by
studies demonstrating that subjects learn more readily about attended than
non-attended features and objects (Ahissar and Hochstein, 1993; Jiang
and Chun, 2001; Trabasso and Bower, 1968). Furthermore, studies in eye
movement research have firmly established that attention is invariably
directed to those items that are selected for a motor response (Deubel and
Schneider, 1996; Kowler et al., 1995), in accordance with the proposed
feedback scheme.
At first sight, our reasoning that the feedback connections gate learning
and that they themselves are learned at the same time may seem circular.
How can connections gate their own plasticity? The key observation is that
the feedback pathways tag those synapses of the feedforward pathways
that were responsible for the selected action. These tags are a prerequisite
for synaptic change based on the globally released neuromodulator. If the
action resulted in an outcome that was better than expected, the tagged
synapses increase in strength to promote the future selection of the same
action. If the outcome of the action was disappointing, then these synapses
decrease in strength.
The resulting improvements in the feedforward pathways need to be
accompanied by equivalent changes in the feedback pathways, as the reci-
procity ensures that the credit in later trials will also assigned accurately,
in spite of the modified feedforward connections. In the present work, the
only influence of the attentional feedback signal is the deposit of synaptic
tags for credit assignment and we did not model the well-established in-
fluence of feedback connections on the firing rates in lower level brain re-
gions (Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004; Roelfsema, 2006). Future models that
include top-down effects on firing rates may further expand the capabilities
of neural networks that are trained with AuGMEnT-like learning rules.
The present study provides new insights in how rewards can teach
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attention. It is remarkable that a simple network that starts with a random
connectivity can learn a relatively complex task where the rank of two
color cues determines which of two stimuli needs to be monitored for a
change in motion direction, by trial and error. Trial and error learning
with the AuGMEnT learning rule is versatile, because the same network
and learning rule can teach networks to perform different tasks, including
ones that require storage of information in working memory, non-linear
mappings of sensory stimuli onto motor responses and tasks that require
the integration of stochastic sensory evidence for a decision (Rombouts,
Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2012, 2015).
We illustrated how the reward-prediction errors of RL theory can also
provide powerful learning rules for the shaping of attentional feedback
connections. These new results thereby provide insight in how a perceptual
system may learn to focus attention on those features that are important to
solve a cognitive task. We hypothesize that similar mechanisms are at work
when we learn in less constrained environments as is the case, for example,
when learning to play tennis. We anticipate that future work will address
the possible generalizations of AuGMEnT-like learning rules to situations
that are even more challenging or that they will point out their limitations.
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6Learning neural resets
Abstract
Working memory is a key component of intelligence that the brain
implements as persistent neural activations. How do persistent neurons
learn to store information, and how can they be made to forget this
information once it is no longer relevant? When animals learn episodic
tasks, neurons in prefrontal cortex learn to represent task ends. We
show that a biologically plausible neural network model equipped with
persistent memory and a ‘reset’ action can learn to store and forget
information at task ends by reinforcement learning. The new model
has competitive performance compared to a variety of (biologically
implausible) models. This chapter is based on Rombouts, Roelfsema,
and Bohte (2014).
6.1 Introduction
Animals can learn very complex tasks based on simple reward and
punishment schemes. Such tasks may require working memory (e.g.
Gottlieb and Goldberg, 1999; Yang and Shadlen, 2007) where the correct
sequence of actions depends on past information. It could be argued that
most, if not all, tasks require some form of working memory, making the
study of these types of tasks particularly relevant.
Successful models for learning working memory tasks employ a form
of persistent memory, (e.g. Bakker, 2002; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006;
Peshkin, Meuleau, and Kaelbling, 1999; Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema,
2012; Todd, Niv, and Cohen, 2009). From neuroscience, there is ample
experimental evidence that brains contain neurons that have persistent
activations in working memory tasks (e.g. Gottlieb and Goldberg, 1999;
Yang and Shadlen, 2007). Persistent memory was also found to be powerful
for supervised training of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) (Gers,
Schmidhuber, and Cummins, 2000). However, models that employ
persistent memory also need some mechanism for forgetting (Gers,
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Schmidhuber, and Cummins, 2000). The reason for this is intuitive:
Imagine performing a sequence of tasks where the information from a
previous task may interfere with the execution of the current task (known
as proactive interference). Clearing memory representations at task
boundaries eliminates this problem.
The mathematical framework for modeling the learning of optimal
sequences of actions from rewards and punishments is Reinforcement
Learning (RL, Sutton and Barto (1998)). A large body of work has modeled
(animal) learning in the RL framework. Most work has focussed on tasks
that can be modeled as Markov Decision Problems, or MDPs. Working
memory tasks fall in the class of Partially Observable MDPs, or POMDP
tasks (Todd, Niv, and Cohen, 2009) as they require information presented
at some previous time to make an optimal decision at a later point in time.
In the RL literature, learning episodic tasks involves a transition to a
special terminal state and a subsequent reset of all dynamic parameters
such as eligibility traces before starting a new trial (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
However, autonomously learning agents do not have access to such ‘trial-
end’ information. Learning task-ends should therefore be part of learning
the task, and this may in fact not be trivial. When interacting with a new
task, the animal has to learn that actions performed in the current task do
not influence rewards in the next task, i.e. that they are independent. If
tasks are independent, then it is beneficial to also clear working memory.
Experimental neuroscience shows that animals indeed learn to recog-
nize the endings of tasks. For instance, in Fujii and Graybiel (2003), mon-
keys need to make a sequence of eye movements to visual targets. Neurons
recorded in Prefrontal Cortex (PFC) show a burst of activation at the end of
trials–a ‘trial-end’ signal. This behavior is very robust: the burst remains
time-locked to the stimulus predicting trial-end under a wide range of ma-
nipulations. When the burst is fired, monkeys do indeed stop task execu-
tion. The authors suggest that the ‘stop’ signal could be used to reset PFC
representations of the task held in working memory.
Here, we introduce re-AuGMEnT, a biologically plausible neural
network model that can learn whole tasks, including trial ends, by
reinforcement learning. The model is based on AuGMEnT (Rombouts,
Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2012), which can learn challenging working
memory tasks but requires supervised ‘reset’-signals to reset working
memory representations. We propose to include an ‘internal’ action that
implements the ‘reset’. This action can be included naturally in the
AuGMEnT framework, and appropriately timed reset signals can then
indeed be learned. As far as we are aware, this is the first work that
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suggests a possible role for ‘end’ signals found in the brain (Fujii and
Graybiel, 2003) within the RL framework. We show that the model can
learn the tasks in Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema (2012), and we show
that AuGMEnT and re-AuGMEnT outperform a range of other RL working
memory models on a T-Maze task.
This chapter is organized as follows. We first briefly introduce the
original AuGMEnT framework of Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema (2012),
and detail how we include learnable resets. We then show how the model
compares on a set of working memory tasks that are used in neuroscience.
We further show how both models perform on a T-Maze task, and compare
to a range of other RL working memory models (RL-LSTM, Memory Bits
and Elman networks (Bakker, 2002; Peshkin, Meuleau, and Kaelbling,
1999)). We show that AuGMEnT significantly outperforms state-of-the art
(RL-LSTM), and that re-AuGMEnT, without being given resets, is at least on
par with Memory Bits and Elman networks which do have access to
trial-end signals. Finally, we show how re-AuGMEnT relates to important
earlier ideas and models cited above.
6.2 Model
We describe re-AuGMEnT adopting the same notation as Rombouts, Bohte,
and Roelfsema (2012). The reader already familiar with AuGMEnT can
skip ahead to the next paragraph which describes the reset mechanism.
We suppress time indices t when expressions do not include information
from previous time-steps. re-AuGMEnT is a three layer neural network that
computes Q-values for alternative actions (Sutton and Barto, 1998), and
where the hidden layer includes integrating units that learn to store task
relevant information. (Fig 6.1a). The top layer contains two types of units:
instantaneous and transient on(+)/off(-) units. Instantaneous units xi(t)
encode sensory variables si(t) at time step t, and on/off units code truncated
temporal derivatives of these same sensory variables as:
x+i (t) = [si(t)− si(t − 1)]+ ; x−i (t) = [si(t − 1)− si(t)]+ ,
where [x]+ = x for x > 0 and 0 otherwise. The hidden layer also contains
two kinds of units; regular units (superscripted with R) and memory
units (superscripted with M). Regular units j receive inputs from all
instantaneous units in the input layer via weights vRij (with v
R
0j a bias
weight). Their activation yRj is determined by a standard sigmoidal
transformation of their inputs aRj :
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yRj = σ (a
R
j ,θ) = 1/
(
1 + exp(θ − aRj )
)
with aRj =
∑
i
vRijxi .
where θ shifts the squashing function. Memory units integrate input
from the on/off units x′l = {x+l ,x−l } through connections vMlm:
aMm (t) = a
M
m (t − 1) +
∑
l
vMlmx
′
l(t),
where activations yMm are computed as y
M
m = σ (a
M
m ,θ). Memory units and
regular hidden units project to output layer units k through, respectively,
connections wMmk and w
R
jk (with w
R
0k a bias weight). The Q-value for action k
in state s, qs,k (where s is implicitly defined by the hidden layer activations)
is:
qs,k = qk =
∑
j
yRj w
R
jk +
∑
m
yMm w
M
mk .
Given the Q-values computed by the network, actions are selected
using a max-Boltzmann Winner-Takes-All (WTA) mechanism (Wiering and
Schmidhuber, 1997) with exploration rate , situated in an external
controller. The network learns by minimizing SARSA Temporal Difference
errors δ(t) by stochastic gradient descent (Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema,
2012):
E(t) =
1
2
δ(t)2 =
1
2
(
r(t) +γqs′ ,K ′ (t)− qs,K (t − 1))2 ,
where r is the reward received after executing the action K in state s at
time (t − 1), qs′ ,K ′ is the predicted value of the winning action K ′ for
the next state s′, and γ is the discount rate. Learning is implemented
by an interaction of feedforward and feedback signals and a globally
available neuromodulator like dopamine which represents δ(t). The
activation of the winning output unit is set to 1, and the activations of the
other output units are set to 0: zk = δkK , where δkK is the Kronecker
delta function. The winning unit sends feedback through feedback
connections w′ (Fig 6.1a, dashed connections). The feedback interacts with
the feedforward activations to form synaptic tags T agxy on each connection
commensurate to the degree that this connection influenced the action
selection. Connection strengths wxy are modified as ∆wxy = βδT agxy , with
β the learning rate. Synaptic tags are then updated as:
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∆T agRjk = (λγ − 1)T agRjk + yRj zk ,
∆T agMjk = (λγ − 1)T agMmk + yMm zk ,
∆T agRij = (λγ − 1)T agRij +w′RKjyRj (1− yRj )sT raceRij ,
∆T agMlm = (λγ − 1)T agMlm +w′MKmyMm (1− yMm )sT raceMlm ,
with λ a decay parameter (Sutton and Barto, 1998) and w′RKj and w′
M
Kj
feedback weights from the output layer to the hidden layer. sTraces are
intermediate variables:
sT raceRij = xi(t) ; sT race
M
lm =
∑t
t′=0
x′l(t
′) .
A Tag effectively encodes an eligibility trace (Sutton and Barto, 1998),
and an sTrace encodes the history of activations that were transmitted
through the associated synapse.
Resets When the ‘reset’ action is selected, parameters are updated as
normal. Then, the values of memory sTraces and the activations of memory
units are set to zero. After this reset, new feedforward activations are
computed given the current observation, and an action is selected, with the
restriction that the reset action cannot be selected twice in a row. Weights,
sTraces and Tags are then again updated as defined above. In addition to
these modifications to AuGMEnT (Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2012),
we extended the observation layer with information about the reward and
with the previous action of the network (including the new reset action).
This is helpful as these signals can contain information about trial-ends.
6.3 Experiments
We tested our model on the same set of (non-linear) tasks as were used for
testing AuGMEnT (Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2012) (Fig. 6.2b,c) and
also to the T-Maze task from Bakker (2002) (Fig. 6.1d). For AuGMEnT we
used networks with three regular units and four memory units in the hidden
layer, as in Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema (2012). As the re-AuGMEnT
model expands the input layer, we used ten regular and ten memory units
in the hidden layer. The number of output units (possible actions) depended
on the task. For AuGMEnT we used the same parameters for the network
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Figure 6.1: a, AuGMEnT (black lines) and extended re-AuGMEnT (grey lines). Dashed
lines: feedback connections, Diamonds: memory units b, Saccade/Antisaccade (SA) task
after (Gottlieb and Goldberg, 1999). c, Probabilistic Classification (YS) task after (Yang
and Shadlen, 2007). d, T-Maze task after (Bakker, 2002). Corridor length N = 3. Dashed
lines show agent’s observation space (coded as in grey numbers). Circle indicates location
of reward at end of maze (G - invisible)
and tasks as Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema (2012). For re-AuGMEnT
networks, we set β = 0.05 and λ = 0.10. Unless otherwise noted, results are
based on runs with 100 randomly initialized networks.
Saccade/Antisaccade. The Saccade/Antisaccade (SA) task is based on
(Gottlieb and Goldberg, 1999) (Fig. 6.1b). We implemented the task as in
(Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema, 2012). Briefly, the model is presented
with a fixation mark (filled or empty square), then a cue (circle) appears on
the left or right. After a delay the fixation mark turns off and the model has
to select ‘left’ or ‘right’. For the filled square the model has to select the cue
direction and the opposite direction for the empty square. The trial ends
without reward if the model breaks fixation before the fixation mark turns
off. A correct trial yielded a reward of 1.5. We gave both models at most
1×105 trials to learn the task. After networks made 90% optimal choices
for each of the four possible subtasks over the last 50 examples of each, we
checked for correct performance by running 100 validation trials with β
and  set to 0.
Probabilistic Classification. The probabilistic classification task is based
on (Yang and Shadlen, 2007) (Fig. 6.1c). Trial structure is similar to that of
the SA task discussed above, but now four shapes are presented to the model.
After a delay period with only the fixation mark visible, the model has to
select ‘left’ or ‘right’. The optimal choice depends on the four shapes s1–s4
that were shown; each shape has an associated weight (inset Fig. 6.1c) that
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Figure 6.2: Success rates for a, AuGMEnT (?) and re-AuGMEnT () learning SA and YS
task. b, T-Maze task (N = 100 for our models; N = 10 for results from (Bakker, 2002)).
See labels inset in d. Bars: 95% confidence intervals (by R method prop.test). c, Median
number of trials for learning the SA and YS tasks. Bars show 1st and 3rd quartile of
distribution. d, Mean number of time-steps (not trials) for learning the T-Maze.
determines the conditional reward distribution P (Red|W ) = 1/(1 + 10−W ),
with W =
∑4
i=1w(si); P (Green|W ) = 1 − P (R|W ). The colored targets are
randomly assigned to the left or right on each trial. The model received
a reward of 1.5 for its choice for the Red or Green target according to the
conditional distributions. We gave both models at most 5 × 105 trials to
learn the task. Learning was complete when the model made 85% optimal
choices over the last 2× 104 trials.
T-Maze. The T-Maze task is based on Bakker (2002) (Fig. 6.1d).
Information presented at the beginning of the maze is required to make
optimal decisions at the end. The agent has actions N,E,S,W to move in all
compass directions; task difficulty is scaled by increasing the corridor
length N . When the agent remains in the same place (e.g. by moving into a
wall), it receives a negative reward (−.1). The correct decision at the end of
the maze is worth 4, and the wrong decision −.1. We added a time-out
condition to the task: after 1.2N + 2 time-steps we automatically stopped
the trial, and started a new one. For the simulations we gave each network
at most 5× 105 trials to learn the task. Convergence was determined as for
the SA task, but checked at 80% optimal choices as in Bakker (2002).
The results in Fig. 6.2a show that re-AuGMEnT is able to learn the same
tasks as AuGMEnT with similar success rates. The learning process does
take significantly longer, and the within-model variance of learning speed
is also larger (Figure 6.2c). Given the increased complexity of the task,
such increased learning time is to be expected. Figures 6.2b,d compare the
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performance of AuGMEnT, re-AuGMEnT, and the methods tested in Bakker
(2002): RL-LSTM, Memory Bits (Peshkin, Meuleau, and Kaelbling, 1999)
and Elman Simple Recurrent Networks; note that none of these methods
are biologically plausible. It is clear that AuGMEnT outperforms all other
algorithms. At N = 70, this method still learns the task perfectly while
convergence for RL-LSTM, the second best algorithm, drops to 30%. re-
AuGMEnT does fairly well: it outperforms all models except RL-LSTM
and AuGMEnT. Learning in re-AuGMEnT is significantly slower than the
learning in AuGMEnT. This demonstrates that supervised reset signals
contain a significant amount of information about the task. Importantly,
both models automatically generalize over different delays (SA and YS tasks)
and corridor lengths due to the on/off units; e.g. a re-AuGMEnT network
that learned theN = 5 maze also solves theN = 70 maze (results not shown).
This is not guaranteed for the other models.
6.4 Discussion
We demonstrated that it is possible to learn to recognize when working
memory should be emptied in a biologically plausible neural network
trained by a SARSA(λ) Temporal Difference learning rule. This is needed
as, as soon as one requires persistent memory to solve problems, a form of
“forgetting” is required to flush this working memory once it is no longer
relevant (Gers, Schmidhuber, and Cummins, 2000). To achieve this, we
started from a model that can learn working memory tasks when resets
were provided in a supervised fashion (Rombouts, Bohte, and Roelfsema,
2012), and adapted this model so that it could learn when to reset its
memory by trial and error. We first confirmed that the model could learn
the tasks that can be learned by AuGMEnT using supervised resets; learning
in re-AuGMEnT takes longer, which indicates that supervised resets provide
significant information to an RL agent. We further compared AuGMEnT
and re-AuGMEnT to the results for an RL version of the LSTM algorithm
(RL-LSTM, Bakker (2002)), Memory Bits (Peshkin, Meuleau, and Kaelbling,
1999) and Elman networks on a T-Maze task. We found that AuGMEnT
significantly outperforms all other algorithms on this task. The presented
re-AuGMEnT model, which additionally has to learn to reset its memory,
outperforms all algorithms except AuGMEnT and RL-LSTM.
The connection between memory and forgetting has been noted earlier:
neural algorithms that include persistent memory are known to fail when
this memory is not reset at appropriate times (Gers, Schmidhuber, and
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Cummins, 2000). This was resolved for LSTM by coupling memory
elements to special forget-gates that can reset the memory and the
associated gradients in Gers, Schmidhuber, and Cummins (2000). These
gates are sigmoidal units which set the ‘leak’ of an associated memory cell
in a multiplicative fashion. The LSTM algorithm with forget gates is one of
the most powerful supervised learning algorithms for training RNNs.
While AuGMEnT shares a key idea of LSTM, we implemented resets by an
internal reset action rather than forget-gates. A reset provides a binary
on/off signal that is hard to achieve with sigmoidal gates, since gradients
vanish at the extremes–solutions thus tend to be fit to typical timescales of
the task, and do not automatically generalize to changes in delay length,
unlike re-AuGMEnT. Some ideas in the RL literature are related to the
current work. One notion is that of a memory cell that can be reset or
overwritten by ‘internal’ actions as in Peshkin, Meuleau, and Kaelbling
(1999) or Todd, Niv, and Cohen (2009), but neither of these models is
biologically plausible. The PBWM model (O’Reilly and Frank, 2006), a
biologically based learning scheme for learning working memory tasks is
also closely related. Although the model is based in RL, it requires a
teaching signal that provides the correct actions on each time-step and the
architecture and learning rules are elaborate. In summary, we have shown
that ‘reset’ actions allow a neural network to learn sequences of difficult
working memory tasks, including when to forget, purely by trial-and-error
learning. We hypothesize that such reset actions might explain the
presence of task-end signals found in the brain (Fujii and Graybiel, 2003).
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7Summary
In this thesis we developed three models of reinforcement learning based on
the framework of attention gated learning (Roelfsema and van Ooyen, 2005).
In chapter 3, we reinterpreted the AGREL framework in terms of learning
action-values. With this we showed how the framework can be applied to
learning in settings with general rewards (compared to the 0− 1 rewards
required in AGREL) and to settings where multiple simultaneous actions
need to be selected (compared to the 1-of-c classification in AGREL) under
the assumption of a scalar global prediction error signal. Preliminary work
shows that the ideas in chapter 3 can be extended as to learn continuous
actions with population coding output layers (Rombouts, Roelfsema, and
Bohte, 2013). In chapter 4 we introduced AuGMEnT, which leaves the
direct-reward setting of AGREL and MQ-AGREL for the delayed reward
setting, thus showing how attention-gated learning can be used for learning
action sequences, instead of single actions. The model is equipped with a
working memory that can be used to learn difficult working memory tasks.
The basic model can be seen as a biologically plausible implementation of
the SARSA(λ) algorithm (Rummery and Niranjan, 1994), and the model
with working memory extends this to learning problems in the class of
partially observable MDPs (see chapter 2). The representations that the
model learns are comparable to those that can be found in the brains of
monkeys when they are trained on the same tasks. In chapter 5 we used
AuGMEnT to model an attentional filtering task, investigating how such
filtering can be learned by simple trial-and-error learning. One assumption
we made for AuGMEnT is that a ‘reset’ signal is broadcast through the
network after a trial ends, which can be seen as a supervised learning signal.
In chapter 6 we extended AuGMEnT with an internal ‘reset’ action, and
demonstrated that this extended model can learn trial boundaries, purely
by reinforcement learning.
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8Samenvatting
Als je ooit een hond gehad hebt weet je dat je hem kan trainen door mid-
del van beloning en straf. Hoe dit leren precies in zijn werk gaat wordt al
sinds het begin van de twintigste eeuw bestudeerd. Een naam die wellicht
bekend voorkomt is Ivan Pavlov, beroemd geworden met zijn conditione-
ringsexperiment. Als honden in hun natuurlijke omgeving gaan eten ma-
ken ze speeksel aan om met de vertering te helpen. In zijn beroemdste ex-
periment liet Pavlov honden steeds een belletje horen, vlak voordat hij ze
een stuk vlees gaf. Aan het begin van de training ging de hond pas kwijlen
bij het verschijnen van het vlees, maar gestaag sloeg dit gedrag over naar
het klinken van de bel. Dit liet zien dat de hond geleerd had om het ver-
schijnen van vlees te voorspellen aan de hand van het geluid van de bel.
Een andere, minder bekende, wetenschapper is de Amerikaanse
Edward Thorndike. Hij sloot katten op in ‘puzzeldozen’ waar ze uit
moesten leren te ontsnappen voordat ze een beloning kregen. De kat moest
bijvoorbeeld op een knop drukken om een ontsnappingsdeur te openen.
Hij stelde vast dat het leren een regelmatig ‘S’ patroon volgde; eerst
vertoonden de dieren willekeurige gedragingen totdat ze per ongeluk een
keer op de knop drukten. Vervolgens leerden de dieren steeds sneller om
op de knop te drukken, totdat ze een maximale snelheid behaalden. Aan de
hand van zijn experimenten stelde Thorndike een aantal ‘wetten’ op,
waaronder de ‘wet van effect’: iedere keer als een actie gevolgd wordt door
een positieve uitkomst is het waarschijnlijker dat het dier dit gedrag zal
vertonen, en iedere keer dat een actie gevolgd wordt door een negatieve
uitkomst wordt het minder waarschijnlijk dat het dier dit gedrag zal
vertonen. Het belangrijkste verschil met het werk van Pavlov is dat
Thorndike’s werk liet zien dat dieren in staat zijn om sequenties van acties
te leren om beloning te krijgen, hetgeen meer op een natuurlijke situatie
lijkt.
Dit proefschrift bestudeert het leren van beloning en straf, in het bijzon-
der hoe dit zou kunnen werken in de hersenen. Ik heb ideeën uit verschil-
lende vakgebieden gebruikt om computermodellen te bouwen die, net als
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dieren, kunnen leren van beloning en straf.
Allereerst heb ik gebruik gemaakt van ideeën uit het onderzoeksveld
van ‘Reinforcement Learning’, ruw vertaald ‘leren met bekrachtigingen’.
Dit is een wiskundig raamwerk wat beschrijft dat agenten (met
andere woorden, mensen en dieren, maar ook computerprogramma’s)
hun beloning willen maximaliseren in interactie met een complexe,
onvoorspelbare wereld. Reinforcement Learning is gebaseerd op de
observaties van onder andere Thorndike en Pavlov, maar ook door het
wiskundige raamwerk van ‘Dynamic Programming’ uit de regeltechniek.
Reinforcement Learning beschrijft niet alleen wat het doel van het leren is,
maar ook hoe agenten dit doel kunnen bereiken. Het belangrijkste idee dat
ik gebruikt heb is het idee van ‘Temporal Difference Learning’, ofwel
TD-learning. Dit is een krachtig idee dat laat zien hoe een agent optimaal
gedrag kan leren in een onbekende en onvoorspelbare wereld.
Het bijzondere is dat deze vorm van leren zeer direct gekoppeld blijkt
aan wat bepaalde hersencellen (neuronen) doen terwijl dieren leren van be-
loning en straf. Deze cellen vormen dus een directe brug tussen theoreti-
sche modellen van optimaal leren en de biologie. Ze vormen ook een brug
tussen gedrag dat we kunnen observeren aan de buitenkant (bijvoorbeeld
kwijlen als de bel gaat) en wat er gebeurd in het complexe netwerk van neu-
ronen wat we de hersenen noemen.
Dit brengt mij bij het laatste belangrijke ingrediënt; neurale netwerken.
Neurale netwerken zijn abstracte, wiskundige beschrijvingen van de herse-
nen, en worden al sinds het midden van de 20ste eeuw bestudeerd. Interes-
sant genoeg zijn deze neurale netwerken momenteel onze beste methode
om computers taken te laten doen waar mensen goed in zijn maar compu-
ters niet, zoals bijvoorbeeld het herkennen van objecten in ingewikkelde
omgevingen, of het begrijpen van spraak. De kern van neurale netwerken
is het ontwikkelen van regels die beschrijven hoe koppelingen tussen neu-
ronen moeten veranderen om bepaalde gedragingen te optimaliseren—dit
worden leerregels genoemd.
In dit proefschrift heb ik leerregels ontwikkeld voor neurale netwerken
die leren door beloning en straf. Deze leerregels zijn biologisch plausibel,
omdat ze potentieel geïmplementeerd kunnen worden in hersenen, in te-
genstelling tot andere leerregels die biologisch implausibel zijn, omdat ze
bijvoorbeeld vereisen dat cellen toegang hebben tot niet locale informatie.
De leerregels zijn gebaseerd op het AGREL ‘Attention Gated Reinforcement
Learning’ model, ofwel aandachts-gestuurd leren. De voornaamste bijdrage
van dit proefschrift is een generalisatie van AGREL naar het tijdsdomein,
zodat het netwerk in staat is om sequenties van acties te leren om een belo-
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ning te verkrijgen. Een ander belangrijk onderdeel is het toevoegen van een
werkgeheugen wat het netwerk in staat stelt om taken te leren waar opti-
male acties niet direct gekoppeld zijn aan de huidige observatie, maar waar
ze ook kunnen afhangen van eerdere observaties. Ik laat zien dat het mo-
del in staat is om ingewikkelde taken te leren, en dat het qua gedrag, zowel
extern als intern lijkt op de gedragingen van echte dieren.
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Appendix
Here we show that the AuGMEnT learning rules can be easily generalized
to work for ‘leaky’ memory units, and that regular units and memory units
can be considered as two extrema, instant-decay or no-decay, respectively.
To show this, we start from the activation-equations for memory units
((4.7) and (4.8)) reproduced here for convenience:
inpMm (t) = inp
M
m (t − 1) +
∑
l
vMlmx
′
l(t) , (8.1)
yMm (t) = σ (y
M
m (t)) . (8.2)
We can introduce a leak factor ξ ∈ [0,1] that will introduce an exponential
decay in the linear activation of the unit as follows1:
inpMm (t) = inp
M
m (t − 1)ξ +
∑
l
vMlmx
′
l(t) . (8.3)
where we obtain a regular unit when we set ξ = 0 and a memory unit when
we set ξ = 1.
For arbitrary ξ, we need to make a small change in the derivation of the
update rule for weights into the unit. By assuming that weights vMlm change
only slowly, we can expand and rewrite inpMm (t) as follows:
inpMm (t) = inp
M
m (t − 1)ξ +
∑
l
vMlmx
′
l(t) , (8.4)
≈ [
∑
l
vMlmx
′
l(t − 1) + inpMm (t − 2)ξ]ξ +
∑
l
vMlmx
′
l(t) , (8.5)
≈
∑
l
vMlm[
t∑
t′=0
x′l(t
′)ξt−t′ ] , (8.6)
1It is also relatively straightforward to derive updates for time- and or input-dependent
ξ(t), following the same pattern.
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If we determine the gradient ∂inp
M
m (t)
∂vMlm
, we thus obtain simply:
∂inpMm (t)
∂vMlm
≈ [
t∑
t′=0
x′l(t
′)ξt−t′ ] , (8.7)
which looks similar to an sTrace, but with exponential discounting of previ-
ous inputs. It is easy to show that rewriting the sTrace update as:
dsT racelm = (ξ − 1)sT racelm(t) + x′l(t) , (8.8)
results in the term required in the above gradient. These two small changes
in the model suffice to generalize the AuGMEnT learning rules to a unified
form, where regular units are obtained for ξ = 0 and memory units for
ξ = 1.
It is interesting to consider the form of the synaptic trace update: its time-
scale of decay must be equivalent to the time-scale of the (leaky) memory
unit in order to estimate the correct gradient. By turning this reasoning
around, we can argue that this coupling makes it unlikely that the memory
as discussed in our model resides in the cell body, as it would be difficult
to find the correct update when inputs have different decays. A model that
has synaptic memory would be more plausible, with the added benefit that
the ‘activation’ of the synapse is directly equivalent to the synaptic trace
required for the update of the associated weight. This ‘synaptic’ memory
can be seen as a prediction of AuGMEnT, and it would be interesting to see
if this can be verified by experiment.
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